Further Details of the Disintegrated Vehicle Collision That Did Not Officially Happen
View of the engine of the striking vehicle which had become separated after the vehicle disintegrated.
The disintegration of a vehicle that collided with an ET-PLUS guardrail terminal on the south side of Highway 401 just west of Highbury Avenue in London, Ontario, did not actually happen. Or so it would seem since there has been little information of its occurrence or consequences. Portions of the separated vehicle such as its front bumper, its engine, transmission and windshield were all found strewn throughout the roadside. The ET-PLUS terminal that it struck was also separated in an unusual manner such that the frontal plate became separated from its rear channel and that plate was never found.
Upon first viewing, the impacted ET-PLUS terminal seemed to be missing from the end of the guardrail – until one looked a little closer.
Further research indicates that the ET-PLUS located at this site had been impacted in a collision that was documented by Gorski Consulting on January 27, 2016. The three photos below show the general area and status of the impacted terminal at that time.
View, looking east, toward the impacted ET-PLUS terminal that was documented on January 27, 2016.
View of the struck ET-PLUS terminal that was documented on January 27, 2016.
View of the struck ET-PLUS terminal that was documented on January 27, 2016.
The problem with the performance of this installation is that, although substantial energy was dissipated through buckling of the guardrail in the background, very little of the energy was actually dissipated in passage of the rail through the throat of the terminal, as it is designed to do. It can be seen in the photo below that the guardrail came jammed at the back of the terminal’s channel when the terminal became deflected to a 90 degree angle. Buckling like this cannot result in any further movement of the terminal along the rail and the performance of the system becomes chaotic with unpredictable.
View of the ET-PLUS terminal showing how it was rotated 90 degrees at the rear of its channel thus preventing the rail from passing through its throat.
A top view of the terminal, shown below, demonstrates how a small length of guardrail managed to pass through the throat of the terminal before it became jammed.
A top view shows that a small length of guardrail managed to pass through the throat of the terminal before it became jammed.
Following this impact a new ET-PLUS terminal was installed, as shown in the two photos below taken on February 26, 2016.
View of the site on February 26, 2016 showing that a new ET-PLUS terminal had been installed after the impact in January of 2016.
View of the newly installed ET-PLUS terminal on February 26, 2016.
There were no subsequent impacts of the ET-PLUS terminal until the one that occurred on July 23, 2018. Questions remain about the lack of reporting of the collision and its consequences. Even if there was a lone driver who miraculously escaped any serious injury one would think that this would have been a news-worthy story.
Vehicle Disintegrates After Striking A Guardrail Terminal on Hwy 401 at Highbury Ave in London
A vehicle should not be torn apart like this after striking a roadside barrier that should be designed to reduce the severity of a collision.
On the morning of Monday, July 23, 2018, the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) reported on their Twitter account that a collision occurred on Highway 401 near the Highbury Ave exit at London, Ontario. No other information was made available nor did any official news organization report any further details of the crash. Gorski Consulting examined the site of the crash on July 27th, with some disturbing results.
A vehicle had been eastbound on Highway 401 and as it approached the exit ramp toward Highbury Ave. It veered off the pavement and headed toward the south guardrail. The end of the guardrail was equipped with an ET-PLUS terminal that was manufactured by Trinity Highway Products of Dallas, Texas. Anyone who has been following the status of roadside collisions in recent years would have heard about the controversy surrounding the ET-PLUS terminal as there was a well-publicized civil trial that took place claiming that the terminal was detective. While the U.S. Federal Highway Administration failed to confirm that the terminal was any worse that other systems the manner in which that conclusion was drawn was suspect. Regardless, the ET-PLUS terminal has received a record of questionable performance.
Gorski Consulting has been monitoring the performance of ET-PLUS terminals since becoming aware of the controversy in 2014. Since then an increasing number of installations have been examined and the results of impacts have been documented. Questionable results have been found yet there has been no official response from agencies such as the Ontario Ministry of Transportation which continues to allow the terminals to exist on Ontario’s highways. While the ET-PLUS used to be the primary and most popular terminal installed in Ontario, there has been a quiet replacement of those installations toward other manufacturers without further explanation.
The most recent impact of the ET-PLUS terminal on Highway 401 at Highbury Ave exemplifies the concerns about the performance of the terminal. The photo below shows the status of the impacted terminal when it was inspected on July 27, or about 4 days after the actual collision.
View, looking east, along the south roadside of Highway 401 at the aftermath of destruction visible after an eastbound vehicle struck the ET-Plus terminal in the background.
Upon first approach to the struck terminal it appeared to be missing from the end of the guardrail, as shown in the photo below.
Upon first viewing, the impacted ET-PLUS terminal seemed to be missing from the end of the guardrail – until one looked a little closer.
The photo below shows a view of the ET-PLUS in October, 2014 when it was first surveyed as part of a research study.
This is a view of the ET-PLUS terminal from October, 2014 when Gorski Consulting surveyed its condition as part of a research study.
Upon closer inspection it was revealed that the back portion of the ET-PLUS terminal, the channel, was still present and attached to the guardrail. However the frontal plate was missing, as shown in the photo below.
Closer inspection showed that the back “channel” of the terminal was still attached to the guardrail but the front plate appeared to have ben torn off and was missing.
A close-up view of the location where the channel was welded onto the plate showed that there had been a separation. This is a rare occurrence based on the select impacts that have been observed to date. The photo below shows a close-up view of the area of the separation in the weld of the terminal.
The peculiar circumstance is that the frontal plate of the terminal seemed to broken away at its weld with the channel.
Looking at the remainder of the guardrail there was evidence that it had buckled and therefore some energy was dissipated, as shown in the photo below.
The buckled remains of the guardrail indicated that some energy was dissipated from its deformation but this is not the way that the system should perform.
But that is not the way the system was designed to perform. As shown in a controlled test in the photo below, the head (plate) and channel of the terminal is supposed to be pushed along the guardrail like a locomotive riding a railway track. In doing so, the rail is supposed to pass through a narrowing in the terminal (“the throat”) which causes the guardrail to become deformed, like a ribbon. This process of squeezing through the throat and deforming the guardrail is the mechanism by which energy is dissipated in a controlled manner.
As shown in this frame from a high speed test conducted by the South-West Research Institute in Texas, the ET-PLUS terminal is designed so that the guardrail passes through the throat of the terminal causing the rail to become “ribboned” and this passage is what creates the required dissipation of energy.
Looking east along the side of the highway from where the impact occurred there were numerous parts of the vehicle which disintegrated, as shown in the photo below.
Looking east along the side of the highway there was evidence of many pieces of the striking vehicle which disintegrated after the barrier impact.
Some of the major components of the separated vehicle that were found strewn along the roadside was the front bumper reinforcement bar. This is the metal part of the bumper that is behind the plastic exterior. A cord was attached from one end of the bar to the other to demonstrate the extent of crush of the unit, which should normally be straight.
The reinforcement bar of the front bumper of the striking vehicle had an obvious crush in it which matched the width of the front plate of the ET-PLUS terminal.
Measuring the crush of the bar with a tape measure showed that the crush was about 46 centimeters, as shown in the photo below. Measurements like these can be used to estimate the extent of energy that was dissipated while also providing an estimate of the collision severity in terms of its change in velocity (Delta-V). Those calculations can be difficult when a vehicle disintegrates.
A measurement tape was used to measure the extent of crush of the front bumper reinforcement bar.
The width of the notch in the reinforcement bar was also revealing. As shown in the photo below, the maximum penetration was over a width of 40 centimeters.
The width of the maximum penetration of the bumper re-enforcement bar was 40 centimetres and this matches the width of a typical plate of the ET-PLUS terminal.
As confirmation, the photo below shows a measurement being taken of the plate of a typical ET-PLUS terminal. The width of 40 centimetres is the same as the width of the maximum crush in the re-enforcement bar.
Example of the measurement of the width of a typical plate of the ET-PLUS terminal or 40 centimetres.
So, even without having the opportunity to examine the vehicle, we can say that it was likely not sliding sideways, or not even in a substantial yaw, when it struck the terminal.
Another part of the vehicle that was found on the roadside was the vehicle’s engine, as shown below.
View of the engine of the striking vehicle which had become separated after the vehicle disintegrated.
Close to the location where the engine was resting the separated transmission was also nearby as shown in the photo below.
View of the vehicle’s transmission lying, separated, near the separated engine. Walking further eastward the vehicle’s windshield was found, as shown in the photo below.
Walking further eastward the vehicle’s separated windshield was found.
Walking further to the east an area of fractured red lens material was found. This is where the remaining portion of the vehicle tumbled and one of the rear corners of the vehicle made ground contact before coming to rest.
Walking further eastward an area of fractured red lens material identified the location where one of the rear corners of the vehicle made ground contact before coming to rest.
Walking still further eastward an area of trampled grass was located where the remaining portion of the disintegrated vehicle had come to rest, as shown in the photo below.
View, looking west, of the area of trampled grass which typically identifies the final rest position of a vehicle. The initial impact of the terminal can be seen in the distant background.
Some measurements were taken to establish where the various portions of the vehicle had come to rest. Using the original position of the ET-PLUS as a zero point, the front bumper came to rest 39.0 metres to the east, the engine came to rest 53 metres and the remaining portion of the vehicle came to rest at 69 metres east of the original location of the terminal. Assuming a rather moderate deceleration level of 0.5g, the vehicle’s rest position at 69 metres would indicate that the vehicle left the area of impact, at a speed of about 94 km/h. That speed is after the deceleration caused from damaging the barrier and causing the crush to its front end. Clearly this was a high speed impact yet it is an impact speed that is tested for safety compliance of the barrier system.
The curiosity of this incident is the lack of any official, public reporting of its consequences. It is possible that, through some miraculous circumstance, the driver, or perhaps additional occupants survived this massive collision without major injury. But that seems rather doubtful. So why was it not reported to the public?
Results From Testing on CN Rail Crossing of Hardy Road in Brantford Ontario
Results from travelling eastbound over the CN rail crossing of Hardy Road in Brantford Ontario.
The results are now in from the testing that was conducted on the CN rail crossing of Hardy Road in Brantford, Ontario.
The Brantford Expositor newspaper had run a story regarding complaints by local residents regarding the “deplorable” condition of the CN rail crossing at Hardy Road in Brantford. Gorski Consulting visited the site on July 23, 2018 and testing was done to determine the effect that the crossing had on the motion of a test vehicle.
As shown in the above chart there was considerable longitudinal and lateral motion caused to the test vehicle travelling eastbound at just 28 km/h. The standard deviation of the Longitudinal Rotation was 0.0979 radians per seconds, while the standard deviation of the Lateral Rotation was 0.1744 radians per second. These values can be compared to the data shown on the Road Data webpage of this Gorski Consulting website.
The motion caused when travelling westbound was not as dramatic, as demonstrated in the chart below.
Results from westbound travel over the CN rail crossing on Hardy Road in Brantford.
For the westbound test the standard deviation in the Longitudinal Rotation was 0.0642 radians per second whereas the standard deviation in the Lateral Rotation was 0.0985 radians per second.
Three tests were performed in each direction. The results of the other tests will not be shown here but will be posted shortly in the Road Data database on this website.
Testing at “Deplorable” CN Railway Crossing on Hardy Road in Brantford
Yesterday the Brantford Expositor newspaper ran an article about the “deplorable” condition of the CN railway crossing on Hardy Road in Brantford. In response Gorski Consulting attended the site and conducted objective testing to find out how “deplorable” the crossing actually was. As per standard procedures, video cameras were attached to the exterior and interior of a test vehicle and gyro sensors documented the extent of lateral and longitudinal motion of the test vehicle as it passed over the crossing. This procedure is identical to the methods that were used to develop the Road Data database on the Gorski Consulting website. We are now in the process of synchronizing the video and gyro data and should have some results in a day or two.
The numerical values of Lateral and Longitudinal Rotation will be reported in radians per second. One radian is equal to 57.3. High motions of a vehicle travelling at 80 km/h along a poor road surface over a time of 30 seconds might generate average values of motion of about 0.0500 radians per second. Translated, this would be equal to about ( 0.0500 X 57.3) 2.87 degrees per second.
The situation of a singular and short disturbance such as a railway crossing is different since the vehicle motion may be experienced only within a second or two. Thus we need to look at that very short time frame when the test vehicle is travelling over the rail crossing. Previous testing of speed bumps, bridge junctions and incomplete road repairs is published in the Road Data webpage of the Gorski Consulting website. As an extreme example, our test vehicle encountered a depression at an incomplete road repair in London, Ontario whereby the bottom of the test vehicle struck the pavement at low speed of just 32 km/h. The resultant motion documented by the gyro sensors indicated a peak, spike in motion of 0.7000 radians per second or 40 degrees per second !!. Luckily the impact did not deploy the test vehicle’s air bags.
It will be interesting to see what the data shows for the Hardy Road crossing. Stay tuned.
Fatal Impact of Median Barrier Not Mentioned in Hwy 403 Crash in Mississauga Ontario
It was mis-leading of the OPP and news media not to mention that this vehicle struck a median barrier as part of the collision event that led to the driver’s death.
There has been an improvement in recent years in the reporting of collision events by police agencies such as the OPP. Twitter posts by the OPP include some basic photos of the site and vehicles involved. The viewing of these photos is not just a matter of morbid curiosity but it allows for independent agencies such as Gorski Consulting to provide further assessments and cautions about safety issues that may not be obvious to the general public.
Unfortunately, there continues to exist a strange pre-occupation in providing misleading information by police and news media that is not helpful to anyone. In the present case the OPP provided a photo (shown above) of the collision-involved vehicle that reportedly rolled over on Hwy 403 near Winston Churchill Boulevard in Mississauga, Ontario. That submission was helpful. However the circumstances by which this vehicle came into difficulty should have been explained. Whether it is the fault of the OPP or the news media is not clear. But the combination of the two has resulted in a failure to reveal certain aspects of the fatality that the public ought to know.
While the collision was reported as a rollover, it was likely more complicated than that. The environment of Hwy 403 presents a large area of level road surface which provides a safety benefit to road users, even if a vehicle rolls over. That level surface gives the opportunity for a rolling vehicle to continue its roll without any sudden impacts or snagging that might occur in an environment of an uneven surface. The bottom line is that in most simple rollovers the vehicle decelerates at a very moderate level in the range of 0.5 g. That deceleration is often lower that what one could expect from maximum braking. So the deceleration, in itself, is not dangerous as the vehicle may reduce its speed to final rest over many seconds, depending on its initial speed. So what we should expect in a simple rollover on a Highway such as the 403 is a situation that could be quite benign, provided that the occupants of a vehicle remain inside it and there is no structural intrusion into where the occupants are seated. It should be somewhat surprising therefore that the female driver of the vehicle was pronounced dead. While rollovers can be unpredictable, some explanation should have accompanied the reporting of this incident as to why a fatality occurred.
The benefit of social media such as Twitter is that we can actually hear alternative and independent explanations of what happened and such was the case here. An independent witness to the collision identified on Twitter as “ABerezuk” reported that:
“I saw it happen. The Jeep in the left lane heading on the 407 at the 407/403 split westbound. At the last second they leaned changed to the right lane. Then over onto the shoulder before the Barrels/Median. I believe they were focused on merging back into the 403 when they simply ran out of room. At the last second he tried to avoid the barrels. Hit them and started to roll. Came to a stop middle lane right in front of White hatchback. I think a VW.”
This is likely the barrier that was struck by the vehicle before it rolled over resulting in the death of the driver.
Never mind the specifics of what was mentioned above as some may be unclear or not completely accurate. What is valuable to know is that the vehicle struck “the barrels” and then rolled over. That is an important point. This indicates that this may not have been a simple rollover as described by police and official news media.
One only needs to examine the various accident photos at the site and the OPP photos to realize that there appears to have been some effort to prevent seeing the view of the struck barrier. In one of the news media photos a large fire truck was placed between the photographer and the struck barrier. In other instances the site photos were arranged in such a way to prevent showing the fact that the vehicle’s path passed through the location of the barrier. Such acts do not create a relationship of trust that the public should expect from official reporters of a death.
We provide “barrels” and other devices on roadsides and medians in order to the reduce the severity of collisions, not to increase their severity. While much research goes into placement of the proper types of systems that may be of greatest benefit, they do not work perfectly in every collision situation. Also not all systems are properly tested and the general public sometimes become the guinea pigs for those tested, or untested, systems that fail. That is unfortunate but it is a reality. What we can do to reduce such tragedies is to identify situations where such devices might not have worked as well as expected. That may not be the fault of the designers or the installers or the maintainers of the roadway. But we simply cannot know where the problem lies if we do not conduct a thorough investigation and if the public is not made aware that a problem may exist.
One does not have to venture far back in history to recall the unfortunate instances where society failed to act swiftly to prevent the death of a number of human guinea pigs. Lap belts, over-powered air bags, GM ignition switches, the list goes on. Similar problems exist on the roads and roadsides that need to be identified so that corrections can be made to reduce the number of those future human guinea pigs.
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