How Do Cyclists and Motor Vehicles Interact At Painted Cycling Lanes?
Minimal objective data is available about how cyclists and motor vehicles interact at painted cycling lanes. In the cycling community there is broad condemnation of painted cycling lanes due to the lack of protection if a motor vehicle should wander into the lane. Yet no one has provided any objective data about the frequency of such occurrences, the characteristics of the vehicles that encroach into a cycling lane and if there are specific locations where such occurrences are more common.
At Gorski Consulting methods have been developed to document the motion of vehicles within a lane. This generally involves placing a matrix of small markers in a lane and videotaping vehicles as they pass through the matrix. An example of this method is shown below where the path of a pick-up truck was monitored as it exited off the asphalt edge of a roadway in curve.
Comparing the paths of vehicles through this matrix allows for an understanding of how and why the paths occurred.
A similar procedure can be employed for documenting cyclist and motor vehicle motions where a painted cycling lane exists. It would be useful to conduct this testing before a cycling lane was painted to observe the paths of cyclists and vehicles. Following this, when the painting completed for a cycling lane, another round of testing should be completed. This should provide an indication of how the painting of the cycling lane has changed the paths of cyclists and motor vehicles.
It is anticipated that such testing will be explored sometime during this cycling season of 2023, possibly in the vicinity of London, Ontario. Anyone interested in participating in the study can contact Zygmunt Gorski at the following e-mail address: [email protected].
Red Hill Valley Parkway Judicial Inquiry – Correlation Between Friction Testing And Deceleration Achieved By Typical Motor Vehicles
The Red Hill Valley Parkway (RHVP) Judicial Inquiry heard considerable testimony of various witnesses about friction testing. Discussion was had with respect to the testing and results using a Brake Force Trailer, which was described as a standard device and methodology used for the purposes of Ontario’s Ministry of Transportation. Conversely discussion was had regarding testing with the Grip Tester and its results based on a British methodology. The Grip Tester is what was used in the Tradewind Report which became “lost” and therefore the reason for the Judicial Inquiry.
The Inquiry heard testimony from two opposing experts with respect to the appropriateness of using the Grip Tester and British methodology. In order to compare the results with the Brake Force Trailer Dr. Gerardo Flintsch performed some transformations and he testified that these provided a reasonably accurate depiction of the relationship. In contrast another expert, Mr. David Hein, testified that Dr. Flintsch’s transformations were unreliable. This demonstrates the difficulties existing when different instruments are used to document friction and experts claim that one is better than another. Since friction testing for the MOT and municipalities is performed by a very few persons it is difficult for anyone outside of their circle to come to an independent conclusion without having to believe one or the other based on blind faith. Such a predicament should not exist on such an important issue.
Comments were made in a summation report authored by the lawyers representing the City of Hamilton and the importance of two of those comments requires that they be repeated here, as follows:
In Canada, there are no published national or provincial standards or guidelines with
respect to friction measurement or management. There are also no policies or standards
that require or encourage the measurement or management of pavement skid resistance and
macrotexture on road networks or setting friction investigatory or intervention levels.
And secondly:
As discussed further below, FN(90)R=30 is the appropriate lens through which to view the
friction results on the Red Hill. FN(90)R=30 (which will be referred to as “FN30” for
simplicity hereinafter) is an unpublished investigatory level used by the MTO. On that
investigatory level, friction values of 30 or greater measured at 90 km/h with a ribbed tire
on a locked wheel tester are an acceptable friction value. Friction values below 30 may
merit further investigation.
One should ask, in an advanced country like Canada, why are there no standards for “friction measurement and management”? Who would be responsible for creating such a climate of unaccountability? It is not those whose lives are placed at risk who encourage such a development. But those whose responsibility it is to ensure road safety, such as the Ontario Ministry of Transportation (MOT), who would be happy to create an environment where they did not have to be accountable for road surface conditions that do not meet a minimum standard. It is defendants in civil litigation, such as the MOT and municipalities who could be held liable if it was determined that a certain minimum level of friction was not maintained on Ontario’s highways.
The above quote also confirms that there are “no policies or standards” for “measurement and management of pavement skid resistance”. It should not require much imagination that this is also because those whose responsibility it is to conduct measurements and manage roads are responsible for this environment, the defendants, MOT and municipalities in Ontario.
The second quote refers to an unpublished investigatory level. In other words, when measurements of friction are taken there is a level which should trigger further investigation. So why is this level not published? And who is responsible for this development? Once again it has to be the MOT and municipalities who have created this environment. Because if a threshold level was published, and well-known by the public, then the MOT and/or municipalities could be held accountable when a road surface fell below that threshold.
So the second quote refers to this test which is the “appropriate lens through which to view friction results”. Upon operating a Brake Force Trailer through a site at 90 km/h, the MOT states that a minimum friction number of 30 should be attained. What does this “30” mean? Well such terminology changes through the industry suggesting these changes are used to confuse readers. The “30” really refers to 30 per cent of the acceleration due to gravity. In the community of collision reconstructionists this is displayed as “f=.3”. In other words the resultant friction value is 30 per cent of the acceleration due to gravity. By using differing terminology and symbols confusion can be created when in fact there is only one way of referencing friction: only with respect to the earth’s gravitational pull or acceleration due to gravity.
The MOT claims that this “30” is the appropriate level that should commence an inquiry about a road surface. And the participants in the RHVP Judicial Inquiry never questioned whether this value was reasonable because an expert with many credentials testified that this was a reasonable level for investigation. But is it really a reasonable level?
Friction testing has been employed in the collision reconstruction community since the date that someone wanted to know who was responsible for the damages of a collision: essentially for numerous decades. In all these decades collision investigators, whether police, engineers or any collision experts, performed braking tests using their vehicles. The idea is that a set of skid marks are observed at a collision scene and the analyst wants to know how much speed was lost by the vehicle producing those skid marks. So a test is set up by travelling in a motor vehicle over the same surface at a known speed, say 90 km/h, and applying maximum braking while bringing the test vehicle to a complete stop. Thus locked wheel skid marks are produced and their length is measured. This length of skid marks identifies the total speed that was lost and therefore the average rate of deceleration over that time and distance is determined. So this is the friction value that has been discussed above. Over the decades the results of such testing has been presented in courts, throughout the world, and have been accepted. Discussions have been carried out in the collision reconstruction community about peak friction which occurs early in the deceleration as the wheels approach lock-up and the levelling off of that friction when the wheels reach lock-up. And in more current times when attempting to compare vehicles with different braking systems, such as passenger cars with anti-lock brakes versus commercial truck braking, it is important to disable the anti-lock system in the test vehicle so that fully-locked braking occurs. So these tests are purely and fully locked wheel tests which should be similar to locked wheel tests performed using a Brake Force Trailer.
A variety of equipment and testing procedures have been developed over the years by the collision reconstruction community for friction testing. For a number of years investigators developed their own “drag sleds” which they would pull over a road surface and a fish scale would tell them about the frictional force that was generated. This methodology created substantial controversy in the collision reconstruction community as it was argued that the results were unreliable. Others employed “shot markers” that were pointed down at a road surface and the shot would fire paint onto the pavement at the precise point when braking was commenced, thus there was some objective way of knowing the point at which the braking commenced. A variety of accelerometers such as a G-Analyst or VC-2000 began to be used. Now such accelerometers exist on smartphones and can be used to measure deceleration by attaching the phone solidly to a test vehicle. As a result of all this testing tables for friction levels were developed depending on factors such as test speed and characteristics of the test surface. Some of the earliest and best-known work was published by J. Stannard Baker in his classic Traffic Accident Investigation Manual from 1975. A copy of the Baker table of friction is shown below.
The data in the above table is taken from testing that occurred before 1975 and likely as old as the 1960s or older. Note that this table was seen in numerous court exhibits throughout North America for decades. The table contains two columns describing the friction levels obtained on dry and wet road surfaces. So we can see what many collision analysts deemed as reasonably accurate in that historical time. The section for a wet “ASPHALT or TAR” can be examined under four categories: 1. New, Sharp; 2. Travelled; 3. Traffic Polished, and 4. Excess Tar. Under wet conditions it can be seen that the expected co-efficient of friction for testing above 30 mph (50 km/h) was about .45 to .75 on new or sharp surfaces. And for “traveled” surfaces the coefficient of friction was expected to be .45 to .65. And “traffic polished” surfaces were expected to be .40 to .60. So this expectation was from very old testing with old technology cars, tires and asphalt road surfaces. Even the lowest deceleration for common asphalt shown in the above table is at .45. Why is it that, in this era of testing before 1975, it was expected that wet asphalt road surfaces should generate such “high” levels of deceleration? And surely, with over 50 years of scientific study and development we should expect the levels of deceleration afforded in current scenarios to be higher than what existed before 1975.
The point is that the friction levels shown in the above table are not high, they are just substantially higher than the investigative level reportedly used by the MOT. The investigative level used by the MOT is low. And this should have been pointed out during the coarse of the Judicial Inquiry. It may be that the functioning of a Brake Force Trailer reports lower levels of friction than testing with motor vehicles. If so that has not been observed in the testimony of the Inquiry. In whatever manner the Brake Force Trailer functions it must, in some way, be related and representative to the friction achieved by the motor vehicles driven on the RHVP. And there should be an explanation of what that relationship is.
The Inquiry has heard how difficult it is to compare the results between the Brake Force Trailer and the Grip Tester. Does that mean too that there is difficulty in relating the Brake Force Trailer results to what is achieved by typical motor vehicles? The collision reconstruction community has failed to acknowledge that there has to be some variability it the testing of friction from one test vehicle to the next and that has to be accepted. But that variability does not necessarily make the test results invalid for the purposes for which the results are used. The level of variability caused by using slightly different test vehicles has been accepted as minimal consequence in court proceedings.
Those requesting friction testing for the MOT and municipalities must have understood that this variability existed when using common vehicles in any testing. And they likely understood that they did not what this variability to be a factor in obtaining a reliable measure of friction. This is likely why they chose to conduct testing with a specialized instrument such as the Brake Force Trailer. But this trailer must have some valid relationship to the friction demands experienced when driving real-life motor vehicles.
Whatever that relationship is, the reported investigatory level used by the MOT must be viewed as low. Results from testing just outside of the RHVP were higher suggesting that the Brake Force Trailer does not consistently report low friction readings wherever testing is done. The test results along the RHVP were consistently below f=.4 and that should have been a concern, not just because of the values themselves, but because those values occurred on the RHVP which has a high friction demand. The friction demand cannot be effectively reduced just by enforcing a lower speed limit as police cannot be everywhere, 24-7. But there is an inherent friction demand due to the geometry of the RHVP, the short distances between interchanges and the high traffic volumes. This should have been known to the City of Hamilton even before any friction testing results were received.
A final point that has not been addressed during the RHVP Judicial Inquiry is that longitudinal friction is not the only value of importance. The difference in the friction levels laterally across the lanes is also of importance. Vehicular loss-of-directional-control occurs primarily as a yawing action about a vehicle’s vertical centre-of-gravity. That yaw is developed when there are unequal forces operating at the wheels. In modern vehicles those forces are also adjusted by technology such as electronic stability control and traction control. But when friction is substantially different between different wheels because of differences in surface friction across a lane it complicates the issue, sometimes to the point that the surface may have no more friction to supply on one side of the vehicle for the demand that is needed. So knowing the variability of the frictional force across the lanes is an important matter. Measuring the difference in friction within the wheel tracks versus the area just outside of those tracks is important. There has been no discussion noted in the summaries of the testimony that such additional testing was performed.
Similarly the reporting of friction levels as an average over a distance of 500 metres does not always provide the necessary granular detail of importance within that distance. A reporting of the standard deviation of those individual numbers that make up the average can help to provide further information about the characteristics of the road surface. Details like these have not be discussed in the Inquiry’s testimony.
Basic Facts Needed to Understand Collision and Injury Severity
Internet comments over the years demonstrate that the very large number of persons communicating between each other do not understand the basics of how to interpret clues about motor vehicle collision severity and the likelihood that serious injuries will occur. For this reason this short article will provide a very basic commentary about two key factors, time and distance, that influence the severity of a collision and whether serious injuries could be expected. Some simplifications are necessary to reduce the length of this discussion.
Why humans get injured in motor vehicle collisions is because our bodies are in motion, at the same speed as the vehicle we occupy. Because of this motion we possess kinetic energy, just like the vehicle that we occupy. Collisions cause our motion to be reduced, often in a very short time and distance. Thus our kinetic energy also must be lost in a very short time and distance. But these short times and distances mean that the acceleration imposed on our body must be very high and our bodies cannot withstand these accelerations without causing injury.
Thus a primary observation in assessing the severity of a collision, and the potential for serious injury, is to examine the time and distance within which a collision has occurred. To shorten this discussion we assume that we are looking at a head-on collision such as the one pictured the photo above. The key observation to make is that increasing the time and distance in a collision reduces the collision severity and also reduces the potential for occupant injury.
We often look at a photo such as the one above and come to the conclusion that, if there appears to be a lot of damage then this must have been a severe collision and one which should cause serious injury. In many cases this is true. But the time and distance within which the collision took place must also be considered. The severity of the above collision can be different even though the damage is the same. Why? Because the time and distance within which the collision occurred could be different depending on the vehicle or object that the vehicle struck.
If the vehicle shown above had struck an immovable, concrete wall then the vehicle’s speed would be lost in a very short time and distance and the collision severity and injury severity would be high. Conversely if this vehicle had struck a very soft object such as a yielding roadside barrier or a line of small trees, the damage would occur over a longer time and distance and the severity of the collision would be less.
In many serious head-on collisions the elapsed time between initial contact and separation (i.e. the time of the collision) is just over 100 milli-seconds, or just over 1/10 of a second. That is a very short time. Conversely, some head-on collisions involving soft structures or incomplete overlap can increase that time of collision to as much as 300 milli-seconds. That difference between 100 and 300 milli-seconds appears to be small but in fact it is huge. Often a vehicle occupant begins to move forward within the vehicle interior at about 60 milli-seconds after initial contact. And air-bags deploy in about 50 milli-seconds. All these numbers sound small they are hugely influential in determining the level of occupant injury.
The severity of the collision experienced by the vehicle that we occupy is not the same as the severity of collision that our bodies experience. The damage we see on a vehicle only demonstrates the severity of the collision experienced by our vehicle. But the severity of the collision experienced by an occupant differs depending on factors such as how quickly we begin our deceleration with respect to the initial contact. If we use our seat-belts, and they are properly positioned tightly to our body, then we become a part of the structure of the vehicle in the sense that our bodies begin to decelerate after only a short delay after initial contact. If we do not wear our seat-belts we do not begin our deceleration until we begin our motion within the vehicle interior and then strike some portion of that interior. This longer delay is very important because, by the time our body reaches contact with the vehicle interior the vehicle has already lost a large portion of its speed. This means that the difference in speed between the vehicle interior and our body is much larger and we sustain greater injury.
So let us leave this brief discussion at these few concepts. There are many other matters that would need to be discussed before an reasonable understanding of collision severity and injury severity can be gained. But we can review these basic concepts. The severity of a motor vehicle collision experienced by a vehicle is not the same as the severity experienced by a vehicle occupant. But both are influenced by how much time elapses and how much distance is travelled during the time of contact.
Red Hill Valley Parkway Judicial Inquiry Concludes Testimony Phase
No, this is not a story about the latest pop music celebrity. It is also not a story about your greatest sports team or hero. In fact it is about the boring issue of how we govern ourselves. How politicians act. How public administrators act. And how the boring reams of red tape and legislation perform. This is why the official news media, in essence, have ignored the proceedings of the Red Hill Valley Parkway Judicial Inquiry. Yet, what appears to be very boring, is in fact an opportunity to see what is beneath the peeled back layers of secrecy that cover almost all interactions of municipally elected politicians and their publicly-paid staff.
The issue is that the existence of a scientific report (The Tradewind Report) became exposed when a reporter from the Hamilton Spectator newspaper engaged in some digging into the actions of the City of Hamilton’s involvement with its Red Hill Valley Parkway (RHVP). The Tradewind report contained data from testing on the surface of RHVP and its conclusions were that the surface was below an acceptable standard of friction level. This led to the possibility that the incidence of collisions on the RHVP was influenced by this deficiency. City politicians claimed that they did not know about the conclusions of the Tradewind report. This led some to focus on the actions of one administrator, Gary Moore, to whom the Tradewind report was delivered. Did Mr. Moore properly deal with the report’s findings and file it? Did he lose track of the report, or did he purposely hide it?
Meanwhile plaintiff lawyers were successful in obtaining permission to launch a class action lawsuit claiming in the neighbourhood of $250 million dollars against the City of Hamilton for the collisions that occurred on the RHVP. Presumably this would focus on the City of Hamilton’s inaction in improving the RHVP surface conditions. Knowing these huge implications the City opted to create a judicial inquiry that would demonstrate that the City was being proactive in finding out how the Tradewind report became “missing”. On April 24, 2019 the City passed a resolution requesting the formation of the Judicial Inquiry. And so the judicial inquiry was formed.
Almost three and a half years later the RHVP Inquiry has now completed its phase of obtaining testimony from a variety of witnesses and experts. In total over 16,000 pages of testimony has been uploaded to the RHVP website. While this can be viewed as a demonstration of transparency it can also be viewed as a method of drowning any interested persons in detail. It would be difficult for anyone who has another life to examine all this testimony and retrieve the few nuggets that can be used to determine what happened with the Tradewind report.
Another criticism of the Inquiry lies with the narrow list of its participants. The Province of Ontario, the City of Hamilton, Dufferin Construction and Golder Associates were the only entities who were allowed to review the various source materials available to the inquiry. These entities hired their lawyers and it was only these select few who determined what questions would be asked and in what direction the inquiries go. At no point was there an opportunity for the general public to be represented via an independent entity that had no special interest in the Inquiry’s outcome. As a result questions essential to the public’s interest were likely not asked of the witnesses and experts.
Many issues have arisen from testimony and not all can be mentioned here. But here is an example.
Mr. Dewan Karim was one of the expert witnesses who gave his testimony on February 23, 2023, the last day of the testimony phase of the Inquiry. Mr. Karim described his traffic and collision analysis from the five years 2014 thru to 2018. From this he reported that the collision experience along the RHVP was no different than other expressways in Ontario. Through further questioning it became revealed that his analysis excluded “self-reported” collisions that would have originated from sources such as collision reporting centres. While his analysis discussed the 499 “reportable” collisions that came from police investigations, an equal number of about 500 self-reported collisions were excluded from the analysis. The following exchange is taken directly from the transcript of Mr. Karim’s testimony at the Inquiry:
“EXAMINATION BY MS. HENDRIE:
Q. there’s 499 collisions that were excluded from your calculation of the total Red Hill collisions between 2014 and 2018?
A. If I understand correctly, you’re referring the self-reported data is excluded?
Q. Yes.
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. But you’ll agree there’s 499 collisions that don’t make it into your total?
A. 499 is used for the collision rate analysis. The self-reported is not included in the collision analysis.
Q. Okay. Maybe we can go piece by piece. The number that the spreadsheet returns when you exclude self-reported collisions — or when you include self-reported 13 collisions is 1,003?
A. Yes, I think we agreed with that point.
Q. Yes, okay. But the number that you include in your total, which I know excludes self-reported collisions, that’s 504?
A. Yes.
Q. So the difference between that is 499?
A. Yeah, if you compare with the non-reportable and reportable or self-reportable, that would be the difference.
Q. 499 is about half of 1,003?
A. Roughly, yes.
Q. You’ll agree with me that excluding the non-reportable collisions, you’ve excluded roughly 50 percent of the collisions that occurred on the Red Hill mainline in that five-year period from 2014 to 2018?
A. There is reason the non-reported is not included. I think I explained in the morning. If you want me to repeat, I can repeat that.
Q. No, I’ve got your reason. I just want to talk about the numbers. So I don’t think you actually answered my question that you’ll agree with me that by excluding the self-reported collisions, there’s approximately 50 percent of the collisions on the Red Hill mainline that were excluded from the total?
A. Yeah, it was excluded because of the unreliability of the locations that is in the self-reported.
Q. But it was excluded?
A. It is excluded for unreliable information.
Q. And you’ll agree with me that directionally, by excluding that 50 percent of collisions, that would also have the effect of reducing the Red Hill collision rate that you calculated by approximately 50 percent? If there’s half the collisions, half the rate?
A. That might be the way you’re looking at. I’m looking at the reportable collision perspective, which has far more detailed information which will be farther accurate compared to the non-reportable data which is, for example, Greenhill has a lot of non-reportable. If I include that, it will show the Greenhill section is much higher collision rate, which in reality that may be just an error of coding or whoever information is provided. So in general, professional practice, whether it’s Ministry of Transportation, City of Toronto, where I work all my professional life that I worked on all types of collision, we make a decision based on the reportable collision data, not always –“
Even persons with the least experience with drawing conclusions from numerical analysis should have difficulty with this exchange. How can you reach a reliable conclusion from your data when 50 per cent of it contains “unknowns” or statistical error? The easy way to do it is to pretend that those data points containing “unknown” simply did not exist. And Mr. Karim informed the Inquiry that, as a result of this acceptable methodology the collision rate was .69 per million vehicle kilometres for the northbound direction and .43 for the southbound direction.
Mr. Karim defended his methodology by referring to the Ontario Ministry of Transportation (MTO) which, he claimed, does not use self-reported collision data in its analyses:
“Usually in my 26 years of data dealing with MTO, I have never seen the Ministry of Transportation disclose any self-reported data for professional use, so it’s extremely rare, and I have never used or received the self-reported data.“
And this raises an additional concern. Collision reporting centres were created in Ontario in 1994. So since that time a percentage of collisions occurring in Ontario began to be reported by those involved in them, not by police who are presumed to be independent parties. Furthermore, many of the facts reported in police reports are not reported in self-reported collisions. So since 1994 the reported characteristics of a large number of collisions became unreliable. Yet every year, for decades, the Ontario Ministry of Transportation has published the Ontario Road Safety Annual Report (ORSAR) which is described as an accurate reporting of the status of road safety in Ontario. But how accurate is the ORSAR? With respect to the vast number of self-reported collisions, are they included in the ORSAR analysis or are they simply ignored like Mr. Karim’s analysis? If they are included in the ORSAR, how is the likely inaccurate content of these reports dealt with?
Since 2015 the threshold for collision reporting has changed. Where that threshold had been $1000 in damage, it was increased to $2000. So this change should reasonably have resulted in a reduction in the number of reported property damage collisions between the years 2015 and 2016 in the ORSAR data. Property Damage Only (PDO) collisions should represent a vast percentage of all collisions. But that did not happen. The numbers below show the rates of collision occurrence (per 100 million travelled kilometres) reported in the ORSAR between the years 2004 and 2019 (with a few years missing):
2004 = 189.67
2005 = 184.06
2006 = 165.84
2008 = 183.84
2010 = 166.26
2012 = 135.85
2013 = 142.51
2014 = 161.22
2015 = 159.32
2016 = 147.75
2017 = 145.22
2018 = 145.64
2019 = 152.96
Note that there is no inflection point between the years 2015 and 2016 where the number of reported collisions should have been drastically reduced due to the threshold change. So what happened? Did the authors of the ORSAR fudge the data? Or do they explain this through a methodology of “industry accepted massaging of the data”?
But there’s more. Whether collisions are officially reported or self-reported they still represent a small number of incidents compared to those that never get reported. One can look at collision severities as a pyramid where the very small top is made of fatal collisions. Below that are the larger number of injury-producing collisions. And below that are the larger number of property damage collisions. But there is a larger number of unreported collisions at the base of this pyramid and this layer is never revealed. Experts will claim that the numbers of such minor collisions do not need to be known because they are of minimal consequence. But is that truly the case? That additional layer may provide additional clues as to what factors may be causing collisions.
How many minor collisions or incidents occur that never become reported? Research on this issue has been conducted by Gorski Consulting since 2009 at a site in London, Ontario where physical evidence of minor incidents has been documented on a frequent basis. This data has been compared to the official data of collisions collected by the London City Police. In a Gorski Consulting website article posted in April of 2018 (“Historical Patterns in Loss-of-Control Events At Specific Road Locations”) it was shown that “more than 80% of loss-of-control collisions and incidents did not exist in police records of reported collisions”. If such numbers of unreported incidents existed in the RHVP data what does that say about the official data on which experts rely to support their conclusions about collision causation?
The reality is that, when you do not collect reliable data on a very large percentage of collisions the accuracy of the conclusions you draw from that data becomes suspect, at best. So when experts claim that they have a good appreciation of the collision rate on the RHVP those claims must also be suspect. And this is not helpful in coming to an understanding of how the surface of the RHVP may have affected the incidence of collisions.
There are many issues that have cropped up resulting from the testimony of the various witnesses in the RHVP Judicial Inquiry. Only one issue has been reported here and even that has led to a long article that threatens the interest of the reading public. Unfortunately details are necessary to prove a point yet details can sometimes be boring. For this reason no further discussion with be attempted at this time.
Cyclist Fatal Collision In Oakville – No Information of Educational Value
First, a cyclist died, and now we turn your attention to more important views of pretty flowers. As Charlie Brown said “Don’t you know sarcasm when you hear it?”
Albeit, our sarcasm is not exactly appropriate, as a death of a cyclist occurred on Thursday, morning, March 9, 2023, on Upper Middle Road and Eighth Line in Oakville, Ontario. What leads to this sarcasm is that this loss of a life is going to be just another statistic, in the long line of many, because we do not share crucial information about its occurrence, thus ensuring that another similar death will occur.
While it is early, there is little doubt that investigating police will reveal no further evidence as to how and why this collision occurred. No photograph of the collision site has been provided by police. The only mention of the occurrence is in the Twitter post by Halton Regional Police that goes as follows:
ROAD CLOSURE: Eastbound Upper Middle Rd from Golden Meadow Tl to 8th Line, Oakville (eastbound lanes only) Investigators on scene for cyclist struck by vehicle. Anyone with dash cam or who witnessed incident is asked to call 905-825-4777 ext 2210.”
No context is provided. While readers will argue that this is because this is very early in the investigation, this is not the point. Two months from now it is very likely that nothing further will be provided by police expect whether a charge has been laid against the car driver that struck the cyclist. We know this because this is how the process has functioned over and over again.
There is some help in that news media attended the site and some photos were uploaded to their various digital sites. Of particular mention is that DR @Media371 provided some very good quality photos showing the rest positions of the damaged cycle and the car. But these photos cannot be shown here. What is clear in these photos is that this was a multi-lane roadway and there was absolutely no provision at the right edge of the right lane for any cyclist to ride safely.
The rest positions of the cycle and car suggest that the impact may not have occurred at the right edge of the lane. But this is difficult to say with certainty without being at the site and being able to look at the details of the evidence – details that only the police have access to. And these details will never see the light of day.
The obvious question is this: Why was this cyclist riding along this road? Who do you blame? Had anyone ever informed this cyclist of the danger of riding on this road? The Ontario Ministry of Transportation and municipalities in Ontario have all stated that cyclists should ride on the road and not on the sidewalk because this is the safer alternative. But where are the data? Where is the data, for the last 10 or 20 years for example, which confirms the correctness of this policy? Where is the data that demonstrates how many fatalities of cyclists have occurred from riding on the road versus riding on a sidewalk? There is no solution that fits all, and risks exist in all situations, but surely why is such basic data not available?
As we publicize the economic and climate-change benefits of active transportation we are likely to place more and more cyclists on roadways where they are not safe. Yet we refuse to educate those cyclists with basic facts about how previous cyclist fatalities and occurred. This is simply unethical.
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