Public Deserves Honesty in Collision Reporting
Local news media have reported on an OPP new release claiming that Middlesex County Roads in the Province of Ontario are more dangerous and that fatalities are on the increase. Some of the reported statistics include the fact that in the past 10 years, 115 people died on Middlesex County Roads under OPP jurisdiction. This was claimed to be the third highest in Ontario, behind a region in Toronto and another in Burlington. But what do these numbers really mean. Have they been adjusted for the populations within the compared regions? Has the mix of rural versus urban travel been taken into account in that comparison? Could the OPP conclusion about Middlesex County roads stand up to a rigorous statistical analysis? In 1988 there were 36 fatal collisions in Middlesex County and if this number was multiplied by 10 it would be 360, which is about three times as many as the 115 reported in the current news release. So does that mean that we are doing tremendously well? In fact, fatalities have been dropping steadily since their height in the years 1973-4. In 1973 alone 1959 persons were killed in that single year. This is the kind of context that is needed to allow the public to understand singular statistics like 115 deaths.
The total number of deaths on OPP-patrolled roads was reported to be 2,675 in the past ten years. Again, why is this statistic provided without any context? What is that number supposed to mean to the average citizen who may have no idea whether 2,675 deaths is a lot, or very little. Certainly that many deaths seems a lot but how do they compare to the number of deaths in the previous 10 years? It would be far more effective if the OPP explained how the number of fatalities have been changing in their jurisdictions over the years and what factors have led to those changes.
In another statistic, it was reported that five persons died in Middlesex County crashes so far in 2020. This statistic included parts of the Highway 401 and 402. One news outlet reported that this was “an increase of 67 per cent over 2019”. But clearly an increase from 3 collisions to 5 collisions does not provide a reason to suggest to the public that a tremendous increase has occurred.
Another news outlet reported that, as of May 4, 71 people have died in fatal collisions on OPP-patrolled roads in 2020, compared to just 61 in 2019. But how much variance exists in these numbers from year to year? If the numbers jump up and down because they represent a small sample then the increase of 10 additional fatalities could simply demonstrate the natural fluctuation of such data. The public has no way of accessing the OPP’s data to evaluate where their reported numbers stand in the broader picture.
In another statistic “Inattentive related deaths” were reported to be up by 300%, but then it was added that the total of this number was only 12 deaths for 2020.
An OPP spokesperson was quoted as stating: “It shows the risk to our community and to those who use our roadways”. But reporting that large changes have occurred in percentages without informing the public that those percentages are based on very small numbers of collisions distorts reality. Therefore it does not provide a true indication of the risk to the public.
In contrast to these disturbing statistics another news outlet provided very different data. This outlet indicated that:
“According to West Region OPP, while fatal crashes have rison 9.5 per cent since the beginning of 2020, personal injuries are down 29 per cent and property damage has dropped by 21 per cent. West Region OPP has recorded a 44.5 per cent drop in collisions in their area between March 17 – the day Ontario declared a state of emergency – and May 4, from the same period a year ago. For all OPP-patrolled roads provincewide, crashes are down 56 per cent from a year ago.”
So what is the public to believe? Why would fatalities be increasing while overall collisions have been decreasing? Is that really what has been going on? Is it possible that the small number of fatal collisions fluctuate more than the much larger numbers of Personal Injury and Property Damage collisions? And therefore we are simply seeing a sign of this natural fluctuation? Is it possible that overall, the collision risk is lower rather than higher in 2020 because of the Covid-19 pandemic? Certainly that possibility is not difficult to imagine. But we need a solid and honest appraisal of these numbers from those who have access to the full dataset and are familiar with its meaning.
Historically objective data has been made available by the Ontario Ministry of Transportation (MTO) in their Annual Reports. But for an unexplained reason those reports have stopped being prepared. The last one was in 2016. Since then only general overviews have been provided for 2017 and 2018 and nothing at all has been published since 2018. The 2017 and 2018 overviews contain this cautionary note:
“The following tables were created using the preliminary fatality and injury data from the 2018 Ontario Collision Database. Final numbers will vary.”
But when will the final numbers come? We are two and a half years past the end of the year 2017, should it really take this long to inform the public about incidents that cause so many deaths and injuries?
The public could obtain some objective facts by examining the “Synopsis” portion of the collision facts reported by the MTO. These tables are shown below for the years 2018 (Preliminary Data), 2016 (Last full annual report) and 2011 (five years since the fast full report).
The above tables provide the following basic information about historical fatalities in Ontario:
Fatal Collisions: 2011 = 486, 2016 = 527, 2018 = 531
Persons Killed: 2011 = 498, 2016 = 579, 2018 = 578
Personal Injury Collisions: 2011 = 44076, 2016 = 39685, 2018 = 35215
While the officially-reported number of personal injury collisions have fallen, the numbers of fatal collisions and fatalities have risen. But there is no information about how these statistics have changed since 2018, or even if the 2018 preliminary data can be relied upon.
While there is less opportunity to distort the statistics regarding fatal collisions that is not so for Personal Injury collisions. Since the vast majority of such collisions are made up of minor injuries their numbers can be manipulated if minor injuries become less reported. For example so soft tissue injuries such as neck and back strains could easily be removed from the numbers if police are told to document them using different procedures.
Property Damage collisions used to be reported in the Annual Reports but that is no longer the case. Yet Property Damage collisions far outnumber Personal Injury collisions, as shown in the above tables for 2011 and 2016. A comparison between Personal Injury and Property Damage collisions is highlighted below:
Personal Injury: 2011 = 44076, 2016 = 39685
Property Damage: 2011 = 132497, 2016 = 168192
A similar problem exists with Property Damage collisions as with Personal Injury collisions. The vast majority of Property Damage collisions are of a low severity and those are easily left unreported. The Province of Ontario uses impercise instructions for how such collisions should be reported by using a monetary threshold which can be easily manipulated to permit less reporting.
While the public is provided with various collision statistics caution and a critical eye is needed to keep a lookout for instances where those numbers may be used to confuse an issue.
In the end, the public is not involved in the day to day details of collision occurrence. They must rely on police, the Ontario government and news media to organize and report that data so it is not distorted or exaggerated. When that is done properly the public gains trust in this important information. It is the public’s trust and cooperation that is greatly needed if changes are to occur in road safety that reduce the numbers and severity of these tragic events.
Evaluation of Speed Display Boards in School Zones in London Ontario
View looking east along Brydges Street in London, Ontario on April 18, 2020, showing a Speed Display Board mounted on a utility pole next to Kiwanis Park.
The functioning of speed display boards (SDBs) has been documented at two school zone sites in east London, Ontario.On September 3 and 6, 2019 observations were made on Tweedsmuir Ave in front of St Bernadette’s Catholic Elementary School. On May 17 and 19, 2011 and on April 30, 2020 similar observations were made on Brydges Street near Prince Charles Public Elementary School. Both sites had their posted maximum speeds reduced from 50 to 40 km/h in recent years. The figure below shows the locations of the two sites on a map of east London, Ontario.
The methodology involved the set-up of multiple, synchronized, video cameras at equidistant intervals along the road on the approach to the SDB. As vehicles passed these cameras the time interval of their passing through the known distance allowed for the calculation of average speeds within each road segment. Meanwhile additional cameras directed along the road also allowed for observations of the front and rear of each vehicle as it approached the SDB. A camera was also dedicated to a view of the display from the SDB. By this methodology the positions and speed of vehicles approaching the SDB and the display from the SDB could also be accurately documented.
The reason why SDBs are installed within the City of London can be obtained from the City’s explanation on the official City of London website. This discussion is reproduced below.
Speed and Display Boards
To remind drivers of their speed in residential areas, primarily around elementary schools and parks, the City of London continues to install speed and display boards on streets across the city.
Speed display boards are pole-mounted devices equipped with radar speed detectors and an LED display. The boards are capable of detecting the approaching speed of a vehicle and displaying it back to the driver.
When combined with a regulatory speed limit sign, a clear message is sent to the driver that they may be travelling too fast. The objective of the program is to improve road safety by making drivers aware of their speed.
As of April 1, 2019, four speed and display boards have been installed and will be rotated throughout London as part of the Public Education & Empathy Program (PEEP) program. Locations have been identified through the Active and Safe Routes to School program as well as feedback received from local residents.
Part of this Gorski Consulting analysis is to determine whether the noted objectives were being achieved.
The following sections of this article will provide descriptions of each site followed by the results of the analysis of the functioning of the SDB.
1. Tweedsmuir Ave at St. Bernadette’s Catholic Elementary School
The figure below shows an overall view of the Tweedsmuir Ave site. The green zone is a park located just to the west of St Bernadette’s Catholic Elementary School. The red circle shows the location of the SDB on the south side of Tweedsmuir Ave just east of the school.
The figure below is a closer view of the site and the red circle which shows the location of the SDB.
The close-up view below shows the location of the SDB depicted by the red circle. A distance of 125 metres is shown measured westward from the SDB. This is the zone within which video cameras were placed, spaced out at 25 metre intervals.
The figure below shows an example of the SDB registering a speed of 54 km/h as a blue eastbound vehicle is approaching.
The figure below shows a view looking east along the south side of Tweedsmuir. In this view at least two tripods and cameras can be seen along the edge of the park vegetation. The SDB is not visible but it is located on the south side of the road in the background.
The figure below shows a camera in the foreground, positioned on the lawn of St Bernadette’s School and pointing at the “Zero” marker which is at the position of the SDB. Another camera in the background is positioned in the driveway of the school and it is pointing at the “25 Metre” marker. Additional cameras are located in the background but are not visible.
The figure below shows a view looking west toward the camera in the school driveway at the “25 Metre” marker. Other cameras are located in the background along the brush of the park.
The figure below is a view looking east, showing another camera that is partially screened by a small sapling in the foreground. This camera is pointing toward the SDB in the background and it was able to document whether driver’s applied their brakes as they approached the SDB. Another camera positioned near the SDB was pointing westward and this allowed a view of eastbound vehicles as they approached the SDB. Such views are important to observe if vehicles leave the roadway by making turns into a private residence or road; in that case they need to be removed from the analysis.
The views shown above provide an example of the typical set-up that is used when documenting vehicle motions and speeds.
2. Brydges St Near Prince Charles Public Elementary School
The videotaping at this site on April 30, 2020 was previously discussed in an article posted to the Gorski Consulting website on May 9, 2020 entitled ” Latest Site Where Covid-19 Effect Being Evaluated: Brydges Street in London, Ontario“.
The Brydges Street site is a busy collector road located on the east side of the City. The City lists its traffic volume (AADT) as 9,500 vehicles west of Kiwanis Park and 10,500 vehicles east of the Park. Just east of the testing area Brydges Street takes on a new name, Wavell Street.
The image below is a view of the Bridges Street site with the green zone of Kiwanis Park. Although the roadway runs from northeast to southwest, for ease of discussion we will refer to it running east to west. The curves in the road are located to the east and west of Kiwanis Park. The two elementary schools are located along the south side of Brydges Street east of Kiwanis Park.
The image below is from Googlemaps and shows the same view as the image above. There are bike trails running through Kiwanis Park and riders must cross Brydges Street in the vicinity where the videotaping was conducted.
A closer view of the west end of the site is shown in the image below. During the April 30, 2020 session a video camera was placed at the bus stop (depicted by the blue square) on the south side of Brydges just east of Cornish Street. This camera pointed eastward and documented details such as the activation of brake lights on eastbound vehicles. A second camera was positioned near the same location on the north side of Brydges Street, pointing southward at a traffic cone which was the “100 metre marker” for our testing. This location can be seen near the lower centre of the image below.
Additional cameras were placed at 50 and 75-metre intervals along the south side of the road, eastward, up to a location at the very top of the image above. This monitoring was over a total distance of 250 metres. The SDB was positioned 100 metres east of the cameras at Cornish Street and 150 metres west of the last camera to the east.
The image below shows a view looking west at the video camera placed at the bus stop near Cornish Street. Eastbound vehicles would be travelling toward the camera. The testing area is located behind this camera.
The image below is a view looking east toward the Speed Display Board (SDB) which is mounted on the closest utility pole on the south side of Brydges. A video camera was placed at the utility pole facing westward so that eastbound vehicles could be observed approaching the SDB. Parked vehicles on the right are at the Kiwanis Park and further in the background is a small bridge over Pottersburg Creek.
The two images below show the location of one of the video cameras positioned at 150 metres east of the SDB.
In the above image a cone can be seen near the road edge. This was the “150-metre-east” marker.
Results at Tweedsmuir Site
The table below shows the results from the videotaping session on September 3, 2019. Cameras were set up at 50, 75 and 100 metres west of the SDB. Thus average speeds were calculated within two distance segments. Only 18 minutes of videotape was analysed and 32 observations of eastbound vehicles were documented. The table below shows all the eastbound vehicles including those that made turns off the roadway within the testing area.
The word “Conflict” along the right edge of the table refers to those instances where another vehicle was present within the detection zone of the SDB and thus the potential existed that the SDB might display the speed of that other vehicle rather than the one of interest.
As can be seen in the above table only one vehicle (Silver car in Observation #9) actually travelled consistently below the speed limit of 40 km/h.
There appeared to be a discrepancy in Observation #13 (Dark Minivan) where the average speeds from the video indicated 61.22 and 58.82 yet the SDB displayed speeds of 52, 52 and 50 km/h. Review of the video confirmed that the average speeds were correct. However it was discovered that the SDB kept reporting the speed of the previous vehicle (Observation #12, Dark Blue Pkp) even though the Dark Minivan was passing through the SDB detection zone. The correct speed of the Dark Minivan did not begin to be reported until just after the Dark Minivan passed the 50-metre-marker. So this is an example of a “Conflict” that was not detected in the original analysis.
As a curiosity, we filled in the SDB row of speeds for Observation 13 will a speed of 58 km/h in all three columns and then observed that the Average for the SDB values at the bottom of the table rose to “47.19, 46.53 47.14”. So the change made a difference in the Average by about 0.5 km/h. This brings the values more in line with the Average at the video analysis.
However, overall, the speeds calculated from the distance intervals were quite close to the instantaneous speeds displayed by the SDB. Certainly we should not expect them to be identical.
The obvious problem in the SDB display is that, even with relatively low traffic volumes, the SDB could display confused speeds whenever two or more vehicles were within its detection range. This is not helpful if the intention is to provide a driver with a true indication of their speed.
The investigation at the Tweedsmuir site continued on September 6, 2019 where more cameras were installed as shown in the previous figures. Videotaping occurred over 40 minutes and 68 observations of eastbound vehicles were documented. Observations were removed from the analysis if the vehicles did not travel straight along the road but made turns or came to stop. Further observations were removed if there was interference to their motion from vehicles ahead.
In one instance a vehicle came to a stop in the “No Parking” zone in front of St Bernadette’s elementary school and the left rear door (the door facing the road) was left open for several minutes as passengers were shuttled in/out of the vehicle. In this instance 6 observations of eastbound vehicles became spoiled because their motion was interfered with by the stopped vehicle.
In the end this left 30 valid observations. The average speed of these vehicles, as they travelled through the four distance segments between 25 and 125 metres west of the SDB, are shown in the table below.
Although the average speeds seemed to be comparable to the September 3, 2019 data, 6 of the 30 vehicles were observed to be travelling above 60 km/h.
The average speeds were then compared to the instantaneous speeds that were displayed on by the SDB. For these SDB values the speed was documented when the front end of each vehicle reached the roadside marker at each camera. This is different than the previous speed calculation which was developed from an average over a full 25-metre distance. The SDB speed data is shown in the table below.
There is a discrepancy in the speed data for Observation #49 (White Car). The average speed calculated between 75 and 50 metres west of the SDB was 60.40 km/h. Yet the speeds displayed on the SDB were 54 km/h at the 75-metre marker and 55 km/h at the 50-metre marker. To be certain there was no calculation error the video was re-examined and the position of the vehicle was observed as it passed through each marker. This confirmed that there was no calculation error and that the speed of 60.40 km/h was accurate.
In evaluating where the problem might lie, it was observed that as the SDB was transiting from displaying 54 to 55 km/h it stopped its display for a brief period and a set of lines began to flash at the bottom of the screen while no speed was displayed. After this short interval the next speed displayed was 56 km/h and then it reverted back to displaying 55 km/h. Such functioning has been observed in other instances when vehicle speeds are approximately 55 km/h. While it cannot be known for certain, it is possible that the 55 km/h value is a pre-set threshold such that when it is reached the SDB enters into a different mode, perhaps to store the value in some sort of storage media. During this delay the SDB fails to display any speed readings. Thus it may have failed to display the full extent of the short and quick acceleration of the subject vehicle. The average speed was reduced to 51.43 km/h in the distance between the 50 and 25-metre markers.
Results at Brydges Site
On April 30, 2020 132 eastbound vehicles were documented between 16040 and 1740 hours on Brydges Street between Cornish Street and Kiwanis Park.
The location of the SDB was selected as “Zero” and cameras and markers were placed at the following locations with respect to the SDB”
- At 100 metres west
- At 50 metres west
- At Zero
- At 75 metres east
- At 150 metres east
From this arrangement four distance intervals could be created allowing for average speeds to be calculated within each interval. The average speeds obtained within these intervals are shown in the table below.
We wanted to know what the effect was of eastbound drivers being prevented from travelling at their desired speed because they were forced to travel behind slower vehicles. Thus we reviewed the 132 observations and selected 34 instances (“Single Vehicles Only”) where it was obvious that they were the only eastbound vehicles within the detection range of the SDB. This usually involved gaps of at least 10 seconds between vehicles ahead and behind the subject vehicle. Thus the average speed of those “Single Vehicles” is shown in the above table along with the full 132 vehicles
The 34 observations of Single Vehicles were reduced to a smaller set when it was required that a full display of correct speeds had to be available from the SDB. In 13 of the 34 observations such data was not available from the SDB. In a majority of instances this was because the SDB continued to display the speed from a vehicle ahead, even though that vehicle had travelled past the SDB. Thus the speed readings being displayed were not related to the subject vehicle of interest.
In one instance (Observation #77: Silver Chevrolet Car) the SDB never activated through the whole distance that the vehicle travelled through the detection zone. The average speeds calculated within the four road segments indicated the following average speeds for this vehicle: 100m to 50m West = 59.41 km/h, 50m West to Zero = 60.61 km/h, Zero to 75m East = 57.82 km/h, 75m to 150m East = 51.92 km/h.
In Observation #17 a Silver Honda Civic entered the detection zone but no speed was displayed until the vehicle had travelled almost 4 seconds past the 100-Metre West marker. Then as the vehicle was well past the 50-Metre marker the SDB displayed its first speed of 55 km/h. It then shut off 2.3 seconds later as it started to reach the SDB’s anchorage location.
In Observation #108 the SDB flashed a speed of 54 km/h about 1.5 seconds before a Grey Hyundai SUV reached the 100-Metre West marker. It then flashed a speed of 55 km/h just ast the Hyundai reached the marker. After flashing the speed of 55 km/h for another half second the SDB suddenly stopped its display until 1.5 seconds before reaching the location of the SDB at which time it began to display the speed of 55 km/h, reducing to 53 km/h on its final display when it approached the SDB location.
The table below shows the remaining 21 observations where the SDB provided sufficient data to allow a comparison with the average speeds calculated from the four distance segments.
The above table shows that, on average, the SDB started to display speeds about 0.45 seconds before the vehicle reached the 100-Metre West marker. But there are some large discrepancies. For example in Observation #14 the Dodge Ram Pick-up was not detected until it had travelled 3.67 seconds past the 100-Metre marker. And in Observation #17 the Honda SUV travelled almost four seconds past the 100-Metre marker before the SDB began to display speed values.
The table below shows the average speeds calculated over the four distance segments for the same 21 Single Vehicles shown above. Although the number of observations is small it shows a slight and gradual reduction in speed, not only during the approach to the SDB but also after the vehicles travelled past it.
There is some agreement between the speeds displayed by the SDB and the calculated average speeds. However one cannot expect that these values should be identical. The instantaneous speed displayed by the SDB cannot be exactly the same as the average speed over a distance of 50 or 75 metres unless in an isolated instance by pure coincidence.
Summary
Overall, the functioning of the SDBs at the two sites has indicated that some problems exist. At times the SDB would continue displaying speeds related to a vehicle that had already vacated the detection zone, even when another vehicle was already passing through the detection zone. In other instances the SDB would fail to display a speed even through a vehicle was travelling for several seconds within the detection zone. In one instance the SDB did not display a speed for the full distance that a vehicle travelled through the detection zone. And finally, the SDB sometimes became confused when there were two or more vehicles in the detection zone; sometimes displaying the speed of the vehicle ahead, sometimes displaying the speed of the vehicle behind.
Latest Site Where Covid-19 Effect Being Evaluated: Brydges Street in London, Ontario
From a traffic standpoint Covid-19 is changing how we behave on our roadways. Previous articles posted on this Gorski Consulting site have discussed lower traffic volumes, higher speeds and lower numbers of higher-severity collisions. These are dramatic changes, not just in Canada, but in many nations where lock-downs have changed society. No single factor has ever changed transportation in the way this global pandemic has. Therefore we continue to gather data while comparing to previous testing when the pandemic was not in effect.
The latest site where testing has been performed is on Brydges Street near Kiwanis Park in east London, Ontario. Interest in Brydges Street comes from the fact that two elementary schools and a park exist within a distance of just 600 meters. This draws many pedestrians and cyclists, particularly children to the area. There are additional problems in that the site contains two curves. Such curves are enablers of driver loss-of-control events that can lead a vehicle to travel onto a sidewalk and potentially strike a pedestrian. On September 20, 2017 the City of London lowered the speed limit through the site from 50 to 40 km/h.
Overall Description of Site
Below is an overall view of London, Ontario and a red circle has been placed in the location of the Brydges Street site. It is a busy collector road located on east side of the City. The City lists its traffic volume (AADT) as 9,500 vehicles west of Kiwanis Park and 10,500 vehicles east of the Park. Just east of the testing area Brydges Street takes on a new name, Wavell Street.
The image below is a view of the Bridges Street site with the green zone of Kiwanis Park. Although the roadway runs from northeast to southwest, for ease of discussion we will refer to it running east to west. The curves in the road are located to the east and west of Kiwanis Park. The two elementary schools are located along the south side of Brydges Street east of Kiwanis Park.
The image below is from Googlemaps and shows the same view as the image above. There are bike trails running through Kiwanis Park and riders must cross Brydges Street in the vicinity where the videotaping was conducted. On May 17 and 19, 2011 video cameras were set up near Prince Charles Public School because a Speed Display Board (SDB) was installed by the City of London adjacent to the east end of the school building. The board flashed the speed of eastbound vehicles and so this was of interest during that testing.
A subsequent videotaping session occurred on April 30, 2020 at a location slightly west of the original location. Again the City of London had set up a SDB to advise eastbound drivers of their speed. The location of the SDB during the April 30, 2020 was located about 370 metres west of the original location on May 17 and 19, 2011.
A closer view of the west end of the site is shown in the image below. During the April 30, 2020 session a video camera was placed at the bus stop (depicted by the blue square) on the south side of Brydges just east of Cornish Street. This camera pointed eastward and documented details such as the activation of brake lights on eastbound vehicles. A second camera was positioned near the same location on the north side of Brydges Street, pointing southward at a traffic cone which was the “100 metre marker” for our testing. This location can be seen near the lower centre of the image below.
Additional cameras were placed at 50 and 75-metre intervals along the south side of the road, eastward, up to a location at the very top of the image above. This monitoring was over a total distance of 250 metres. The SDB was positioned 100 metres east of the cameras at Cornish Street and 150 metres west of the last camera to the east.
The image below shows a view looking west at the video camera placed at the bus stop near Cornish Street. Eastbound vehicles on Brydges would be travelling around the curve in the background and had the opportunity to see this camera if they were paying attention. There is no reason to believe that the camera’s presence would cause them to increase their speed. In fact it is possible that some drivers might reduce their speed due to uncertainty about whether this was some kind of police speed enforcement.
The image below is a view looking east toward the Speed Display Board (SDB) which is mounted on the closest utility pole on the south side of Brydges. A video camera was placed at the utility pole facing westward so that eastbound vehicles could be observed approaching the SDB. Parked vehicles on the right are at the Kiwanis Park and further in the background is a small bridge over Pottersburg Creek.
The two images below show the location of one of the video cameras positioned at 150 metres east of the SDB.
In the above image a cone can be seen near the road edge. This was the “150-metre-east” marker. As eastbound vehicles progressed past such markers the video cameras captured the time of their passing. The time delay between the vehicle passing each of the markers is how average speeds were calculated. As an example, a vehicle taking 3 seconds to travel between two markers, 50 metres apart, would indicate that the average speed of the vehicle was 16.67 metres per second. Multiplying this by 3.6 gives the speed in kilometres per hour, or 60 km/h.
When multiple video cameras are synchronized the motion of eastbound vehicles is easy to follow from one camera to the next. Information such as brake applications or factors that might have interfered with a vehicle’s travel can also be observed and taken into account. In some instances it might be advantageous to select vehicles that are not obstructed by other traffic to see how a driver selected a travel speed versus being forced to travel behind a slower moving vehicles. These are some of the considerations that were taken into account during our analysis.
Description and Results of Testing on May, 2011
The videotaping on May 17 and 19, 2011 was focused on the functioning of the SDB that was mounted at the east end of Prince Charles public elementary school. The videotaping of May 17, 2011 was taken for approximately 1 hour commencing approximately after 1500 hours. The videotaping of May 19, 2019 was conducted for one hour between 1955 and 2055 hours. No video speed analysis was possible independent of the display on the SDB from either of these two sessions. However it was possible to count the number of eastbound vehicles over each of the one hour sessions.
During the one-hour session on May 17, 264 observations of eastbound vehicles were documented. In the May 19, one-hour session 210 eastbound vehicles were documented.
The May 19 session provided poor imagery of the SDB. Examining the display from the SDB determined that only 2 of the first 10 observations could be deciphered and even those were difficult to determine. It was clear that the low resolution of the video image as well as the distance to the board was not going to allow any reliable readings. Thus further analysis was abandoned.
Review of the SDB video from the May 17 session was more successful. By examining the video outside of the video-editting project the image of the board was clearer but it was also time consuming to shift between display modes. Thus the speed of all vehicles was not documented. Instead vehicles were selected if they were the only eastbound vehicle in the detection range of the SDB. This resulted in 56 observations being selected where the flickering values from the SDB were related a single vehicle. This flicking display of changing speeds often occurred over a time of about 4 to 5 seconds until the vehicle was too close to the SDB to achieve reliable values. For each observation the alternating values of speed were averaged arriving at a single speed. The average speed for all 56 observations was 52.69 km/h.
Description and Results of Testing on April 30, 2020
Speed calculations independent of the SDB were possible during this session because of the multiple video cameras and markers that were placed at equidistant intervals over the 250 metres of observation.
Analysis was conducted over the portion of the video from 1640 to 1740 hours. In that time 132 eastbound vehicles were documented. The location of the SDB was selected as “Zero” and cameras and markers were placed at the following locations with respect to the SDB:
- At 100 metres west
- At 50 metres west
- At Zero
- At 75 metres east
- At 150 metres east
From this arrangement four distance intervals could be created allowing for average speeds to be calculated within each interval. The average speeds obtained within these intervals are shown in the table below.
We wanted to know what the effect was of eastbound drivers being prevented from travelling at their desired speed because they were forced to travel behind slower vehicles. Thus we reviewed the 132 observations and selected 32 instances (“Single Vehicles Only”) where it was obvious that they were the only eastbound vehicles within the detection range of the SDB. This usually involved gaps of at least 10 seconds between vehicles ahead and behind the subject vehicle. Thus the average speed of those “Single Vehicles” is shown in the above table along with the full 132 vehicles. This selection of “Single Vehicles” was similar to the selection process for 56 vehicles in the May 17, 2011 session discussed above.
Discussion of the Effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Site Traffic
To summarize, the posted maximum speed at the site had been lowered on September 20, 2017 from 50 to 40 km/h. Thus the two videotaping sessions of May 17 and 19, 2011 were conducted during the higher speed limit while the April 30, 2020 session was conducted 3 1/2 years after the speed limit was lowered to 40 km/h. The only speed data that is available from May 2011 is from videotaping the Speed Display Board (SDB) and this gave an average speed of 52.69 km/h for “Single Vehicle”, eastbound vehicles.
There was speed data available from the April 30, 2020 session from both the SDB and the independent calculations of average speed within the discussed four distance intervals. The average speed from the distance intervals indicated that the speed of eastbound vehicles was very consistent throughout the total 250 metres of travel. As the vehicles entered the documentation zone at 100 to 50 metres west of the SDB their speed was about 49.28 km/h. Although there was a minimal dip in the average speed while approaching the SDB to 48.88 km/h one cannot believe that this small drop is meaningful given the small sample size of 132 vehicles. As the vehicles drove past the SDB the speed increased to 49.57 and 49.31 km/h. At best, one might say that this suggests that drivers did not change their speed as a result of passing the SDB.
Similar results were shown when looking at the smaller set of “Single Vehicles”. Again “Single Vehicles” are those that did not travel in a line of other vehicles such that, as they approached the SDB, there were no vehicles ahead of them and none behind them during the distance that they were being detected by the SDB. This smaller set of eastbound vehicles were found to be travelling at a slightly higher speed than the full set of observations. Their speed was reduced from 50.83 km/h as they entered the site to 49.36 as they exited. Again, one cannot conclude that this small reduction is meaningful. One should generally conclude that, overall, vehicles tended to travel about 10 km/h above the posted maximum speed regardless of the existence of the SDB.
Recent analysis at several sites in the vicinity of London, Ontario has shown that average speeds have increased during the Covid-19 pandemic. Below is a previously-shown table of findings from those sites that compares speeders at a pre-Covid session versus a session during the pandemic. Two levels of speeding are shown, 1) those who travelled at least 20 km/h above the speed limit and 2) those that travelled at least 30 km/h above the speed limit.
In comparison, the data from May 17 and 19, 2011 showed that no vehicle travelled 20 km/h or higher above the posted speed limit of 50 km/h. This was out of a total of (264 + 210) 474 vehicles.
For the April 30, 2020 session, 9 of the 132 vehicles travelled at 20 km/h or higher above the posted speed of 40 km/h. This represents a percentage of 6.82 %. Furthermore, there were no vehicles that travelled at 30 km/h or higher than the posted speed. These results are similar to the results from the other urban site of Hamilton Road west of Gore Road shown in the table above. This suggests that the increased number of speeders may be occurring on higher speed highways and not within urban centres. This suggestion is supported when we look at the data from the three sites containing highway speeds.
Highway speeds were at the Clarke Road, Highbury Ave and Highway 401 sites, as noted in the above table. At those sites the percentage of speeders travelling at 20 km/h or higher were 31.50, 9.12 and 46.15 per cent respectively. And those travelling at 30 km/h or higher were 6.00, 0.68 and 9.89 per cent respectively. While the results are not unanimous a trend seems to exist.
With respect to traffic volumes the Brydges Street site continued to show that traffic volumes have decreased during the Covid-19 pandemic. The data from May 2011 show that the traffic volumes in the two, one-hour sessions were 264 and 210 eastbound vehicles respectively. In contrast, during the April 30, 2020 travel volume of eastbound vehicles during the one-hour session was only 132 vehicles. The drop in vehicle traffic appears to have been in the range approaching 50%.
The table below has been shown in several previous website articles however it has now been updated to include the Brydges Site. This table shows a comparison of the sites where videotaping has been conducted during the Covid-19 pandemic along with data about the pre-Covid-19 session. This table shows how the reduction in traffic volume at the Brydges site is mirrored in the other sites except the Hamilton at Gore site. The Hamilton Road site is the only one where a substantially higher traffic volume was observed during a Covid-19 session.
Another table that has been shown in previous articles is also updated below with the Brydges site. This table summarizes the average speeds of vehicles observed during the various videotaping sessions.
The Brydges site data shows the speed of the “Single Vehicle” observations rather than all the observations because that is the only data this is available for both sessions. And unlike all the other sites and dates the May 17, 2011 data was taken from the Speed Display Board (SDB) as no other speed calculation was available.
The functioning and effectiveness of the SDB is another issue of research interest. Previous testing was conducted at another school zone site in London (Tweedsmuir Ave at St Bernadette’s Catholic Elementary School) where a SDB was installed. This issue will be addressed in a separate article soon to be posted to the Gorski Consulting website.
Police Push-Bar Advantage in RCMP Stevenson Crash Clarified
An example of a push bar on a police vehicle damaged in a collision. Many factors are involved when assessing the benefits of such attachments in an individual crash.
In a May 3, 2020 article published by several CBC journalists about the head-on collision between Constable Stevenson and the mass murderer Gabriel Wortman in Nova Scotia, a substantially inaccurate quote from a road safety expert exaggerated the safety advantage of front bumper push bars on police vehicles.
The substance of the article dealt with the fact that Wortman’s replica police vehicle was equipped with a push bar and Stevenson’s vehicle was not so equipped. The inaccurate quote reportedly came from “a professor emeritus…who is a pedestrian advocate and road safety expert”.
The article indicated that, according to the expert “When their cars collided on the morning of April 19 on a Nova Scotia highway, the gunman would have had a ‘massive’ advantage”.
That comment could be allowed if there was sufficient information about this specific crash. But it is understood that little of the details are known. But further in the article came the following:
“The person in the vehicle that does not have the bars would feel, in effect, the equivalent of 100 per cent of the impact,” the expert reportedly told CBC News. “The person with the push bar, the amount of impact felt by the vehicle driver is minimal relative to the person who’s getting hit. Huge difference”.
Unfortunately the above statement is an obvious exaggeration. While the Professor may have been exaggerating to prove an important point, the extent of that exaggeration needs to be clarified.
Push bars do not, and cannot, prevent a vehicle from experiencing the force of an impact. Newton’s Third Law has clearly stated for centuries that “for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction”. This simply means that two collision partners in a head-on collision experience the same magnitude of impact force. Wortman may have sustained some advantage from his push-bar-equipped vehicle but that has been poorly explained.
We build crushable vehicles so that they absorb or dissipate the total kinetic energy of a head-on impact. Thus the structures of both vehicles have the job of dissipating that energy while also prolonging the length of time when this dissipation occurs.
An important observation can be made by examining the results of a hypothetical, very-stiff Sherman tank impacting a car in a head-on impact, with both vehicles travelling at 60 km/h. In such an impact, given the likely, very large, mass difference, the driver of the Sherman tank would experience a minimal change-in-velocity while the car could experience one almost equal to the closing speed of 120 km/h. And the soft structure of the car would be used up until there was massive intrusion into the car driver’s occupant compartment. Thus the death of the car driver would result from both, a much smaller mass, and due to the structural intrusion that would defeat modern safety features.
But if the Sherman tank then struck an immovable, concrete wall of a bridge at 60 km/h the opposite would occur. The much more massive bridge wall would stop all of the tank’s forward motion, and it might even push the tank backwards due to the elastic nature of the impact (i.e. where there would be a high co-efficient of restitution). The additional point is that, due to this high stiffness of both structures (the wall and the tank) the change-in-velocity would be almost instantaneous. It is this very short time interval of change-in-velocity which is crucial. The very short time of velocity change means that the acceleration experienced by the tank might also result in very high acceleration experienced by the driver of the tank so he would surely die.
Now an additional mind experiment. What if the tank had a very large volume and was soft? Even though the bridge wall was very stiff the tank’s large volume could be “crushed” over a long time and distance, the driver could experience low levels of acceleration and the driver could survive, even though the same change-in-velocity was experienced.
Now another mind experient. The soft tank with the large volume now stikes a police cruiser with a push bar on its front bumper. We assume that the push bar is properly attached to a stiff portion of the police cruiser equivalent to an old-school frame. In such a case the push bar makes the cruiser’s front end stiffer. When the impact occurs with the soft and voluminous Sherman tank we would expect a great deal of crush of the structures of both vehicles. But we do not know the exact extent of crush because that would be dependent on the ratio of stiffness between the two partners. So if the police cruiser was slightly stiffer it would crush less while there would be more crush in the structure of the soft tank. But the point is that both drivers could benefit from this crush, not just one driver. Remember Newton’s Third Law. It is the overall softness of the structures of both vehicles that are involved in the impact that decides what safety benefit can be potentially achieved by both drivers. So even though the driver of the car would experience a very large change-in-velocity due to the mass difference, the greater time and the greater distance over which the velocity change is experienced could be a benefit to that driver.
The quoted comment by the expert Professor is an obvious exaggeration in the present context as the driver of the car that does not have push bars would not experience “the equivalent of 100 per cent of the impact”. That is a regrettable error. The exaggeration was likely made to emphasize that a benefit would be gained by the stiffer vehicle and, conversely, its driver. If the stiffer vehicle sustained less crush there was less chance of defeating the benefits of air bags, seat-belts, etc by reducing the potential of structural intrusion into the driver’s seated space.
In the above text we purposely used words such as “could” and “potentially” with respect to injury causation for an important reason. There is a difference between the “severity” of the impact to the vehicles versus the “severity” of the impact experienced by the occupants. It is the safety features in each vehicle which decide how the collision force is applied to the occupant’s body. Thus thee driver of a vehicle equipped with modern air bags, seat-belts and other features will experience a much different force than the driver riding in a vintage car with none of those features. So the existence of any push bars would only be one factor amongst many in determining what would happen to the driver.
The important point that the expert Professor was making is that there are many vehicles on the road with very different structures. These differences have an effect on an occupant’s safety when an impact occurs. A police cruiser with a push bar gains an advantage over the same vehicle without one, given a certain type of head-on collision. However such advantages exist on a constant basis with all vehicles. We do not pay enough attention to reducing those differences when it is possible to do so.
We talk about our freedom to choose the vehicle we drive and its features. Thus we decide that we will purchase a large and tall, 4-wheel-drive, pick-up truck for example. We then lift its suspension. Yet perhaps all we needed was a high-payload work vehicle for our business use. In almost all severe, head-on impacts mass always wins. But, additionally, higher stiffness often wins. And if the structure of your vehicle is higher than the structure of the opposing vehicle then height also wins. But these wins only apply to the fact that you will kill someone and not yourself. You have a choice whereby a collision might result in the survival of you and the other driver but you reject that choice. A very selfish act.
Taller vehicles give an advantage to their driver in a severe head-on crash but they pose an needless safety risk to the drivers of lower vehicles.
This is not much different than buying an automatic, rapid-fire, “AK-47” style weapon when a single-shot rifle might do for rural, farm purposes. This was the mindset of Gabriel Wortman.
It is our aggressive mindset that results in needless injury and death to others because we believe we have the right to do as we please.
Ontario Expressway Collisions During Covid-19 Pandemic
View looking west toward Highway 73 (Elgin Road) showing Highway 401 traffic in late April, 2020. Lower traffic volumes may have increased overall speed but the number of major collisions appear to be reduced on Ontario’s expressways.
In an article (“Overall Safety of Ontario’s Expressways Hides Chronic Safety Problems”) posted on the Gorski Consulting website on January 9, 2020, we listed 21 collisions that were reported by official news media which occurred on Ontario’s expressways in December of 2019. That list is reproduced again below, followed by a similar list of collisions for April, 2020.
Ontario Expressway Collisions in December, 2019
- On December 1, 2019, a female driver was killed when her vehicle “came to rest in a treeline” on the north side of Hwy 401 near Orford Road in Chatham-Kent. Since forested areas are located a substantial distance of the travel lanes it was unusual, and unexplained, how this fatality occurred.
- On December 1, 2019 a multi-vehicle pile-up, involving 30 to 40 vehicles, occurred in the westbound lanes of Hwy 401 in Kingston near Hwy 15. One person was killed while 16 persons were taken to hospital. The OPP indicated the collision occurred in whiteout conditions.
- On December 1, 2019, a 24-year-old female driver of an SUV was killed when her vehicle was struck by a tractor-trailer near Jordan Road. It was reported by the OPP that the collision occurred just as freezing rain was starting to fall.
- On December 1, 2019, the OPP reported that there were about 400 vehicles involved in collisions in the GTA. These collisions were caused by winter-like road conditions with a mix of ice pellets and snowfall.
- On December 1, 2019, complaints were made by the OPP that drivers on Hwy 403 were turning around and driving the wrong way within a construction zone in the Mississauga area. It was confirmed that there were winter roads conditions as evidenced in video showing vehicles making the U-turns but it was never explained what prompted the vehicles to make these turns.
- On December 6, 2019, a female pedestrian was struck by transport truck on the QEW near Dorval Drive in Oakville. It was reported that she exited a stopped passenger car just before she was struck. There were conflicting reports whether the female was critical condition or had passed away.
- On December 6, 2019 a passenger car was rear-ended by a small truck on Hwy 401 near Warden Ave, causing critical injuries to two children. The collision occurred when traffic was slowing and OPP indicated “It appears the collision was the result of either driver inattention or a driver not responding to change traffic patterns ahead”.
- On December 6, 2019 a wheel separated from a commercial motor vehicle on Hwy 401 in Southwold Township, south-west of London, Ontario. The separated wheel passed through the median and struck two oncoming vehicles but no injuries were reported.
- On December 11, 2019 OPP reported the occurrence of a multi-vehicle pile-up in the westbound lanes of Hwy 401 near County Road 15 east of Brockville. A second pile-up occurred near Deseronto Road. One person died in the crashes. The environmental conditions were described as “snowy” and this was supported by photos showing a substantial amount of snow covering the road surface.
- On December 11, 2019 a tractor-trailer rolled over on Hwy 401 between Colonel Talbot and Union Roads, south-west of London. No injuries were reported and no explanation was provided as to how the rolled truck came to be resting across all three lanes of the highway.
- On December 11, 2019 the OPP reported that one of their cruisers was struck in the westbound lanes of Hwy 401 between Cobourg and Brighton, east of Toronto. The collision was blamed on the formation of “black ice”. No other details were provided.
- On December 18, 2019 the OPP reported that six crashes had occurred, involving multiple vehicles, on Hwy 401 between Putnam Road and Ingersoll. The collisions occurred in both the eastbound and westbound lanes. An OPP photo of the area showed a substantial amount of snow on the road surface. No further information was provided with respect to any injuries.
- On December 19, 2019 the OPP reported that approximately 50 vehicles, including 6 transport trucks, were involved in a pile-up on Hwy 400 near Hwy 88 north of Toronto. An OPP photo of the area showed that the road surface was snow-covered.
- On December 20, 2019 the OPP reported that a pedestrian was struck on the Garden City Skyway in St Catharines. It was reported that the pedestrian had stepped out of vehicle from an earlier collision and was struck by a vehicle passing through the site of the earlier collision.
- On December 21, 2019, A three-vehicle collision occurred in the westbound lanes of Hwy 401 near Hwy 6, east of Cambridge. Two persons died in the crash. No information was provided as to how the crash occurred.
- On December 21, 2019, four vehicles were involved in a collision in the eastbound lanes of the QEW east of Winston Churchill Blvd. Six persons were transported to hospital but none of the injuries were life-threatening. No information was provided as to the cause of the collision.
- On December 26, 2019 a serious rear-end impact occurred in the eastbound lanes of Hwy 401 approaching Dixon Road in Toronto. Three persons were sent to hospital but no further details were available.
- On December 26, 2019 a four-vehicle collision occurred on the QEW east of Dorval Drive. Five persons were transported to hospital and one driver was charged with impaired driving.
- On December 27, 2019 a hit-&-run, rear-end impact occurred on the westbound off ramp from Hwy 401 to Liverpool road in Pickering. No further details were available.
- On December 30, 2019 a vehicle became disabled in a live lane of the eastbound express lanes of Hwy 401 at Allen Road. A occupant from the vehicle was subsequently struck by a tractor-trailer and was killed.
- On December 31, 2019 two trailer-trailers were involved a collision in the westbound lanes of Hwy 401 at Furnival Road between London and Chatham, Ontario. No injuries were reported.
Ontario Expressway Collisions in April, 2020
- On April 3, 2020 an eastbound tractor-trailer drove off the lanes of Highway 401 and came to stop partway into the Cataraqui River near Kingston. The driver had to swim to the shore. While the extent of injuries was not provided, no fatality was involved.
- On April 6, 2020 the OPP Twitter reported that a tractor-trailer drove into a ditch after it was involved in a collision with a pick-up truck that was hauling a trailer. The OPP reported that there were no injuries.
- On April 6, 2020 the OPP Twitter reported that a car struck a double-trailer transport truck. The transport subsequently rolled onto its side over the concrete median barrier of Highway 401 at Ritson Road. The OPP reported there were no injuries.
- On April 9, 2020 the OPP Twitter indicated that a car struck the rear of a transport truck on Highway 401 at the James Snow Parkway. Although injury information was not provided, photos of the vehicle showed damage to its right front corner which was of moderate severity. It would be highly unlikely that fatal injuries would have occurred.
- On April 11, 2020 the OPP Twitter reported that a transport truck has struck a crash barrier in the eastbound lanes of Highway 401 at Highway 407. Damage to the truck was minor and there were no injuries.
- On April 12, 2020 a tractor-trailer struck a construction barrier on Highway 401 at Mississauga Road. The truck rolled over and caught fire however the driver only suffered minor cuts.
- On April 15, 2020 an impaired driver travelled the wrong way on Highway 402, somewhere in Strathroy-Caradoc, and his vehicle struck the median barrier. The extent of his injuries was not indicated but he was arrested at the scene of the collision rather than being transferred to hospital so any injuries were likely no serious.
- On April 21, 2020 the OPP Twitter reported that an SUV had rolled over in the eastbound collectors lanes of Highway 401 at Warden Ave. Three persons were taken to hospital but no further information was available as to the extent of their injuries. Photos showing the SUV upside down with a collapsed roof suggested that there could be major injuries.
- On April 21, 2020 a westbound tractor-trailer rolled over onto its side on Highway 401 near Victoria Road in Chatham-Kent. No injuries were reported.
- On April 24, 2020 a driver sustained serious injuries when he was “partially ejected” from his vehicle when involved in an unidentified, single vehicle collision on the ramp from Highway 401 express to collector lanes east of Allen Road.
The above lists were taken from an informal review of news media and OPP Twitter reports focused more toward the south-west and central parts of southern Ontario. While the lists may be incomplete there is no other way of obtaining official information of collisions unless the OPP or Ontario’s Ministry of Transportation are willing to provide it. The news media tend to report on serious and fatal collisions thus these lists likely reflect the general numbers of such occurrences.
The general conclusion gained from this review is that, while speeding on Ontario’s expressways has increased during the Covid-19 pandemic, the number of serious collisions appears to have decreased.
The December 2019 summary indicates that there were 7 fatal collisions and 8 fatalities. Conversely, the April 2020 summary shows that no fatalities occurred during that month. Furthermore, of the 11 incidents cited in April 2020, 4 involved specific references that no injuries occurred. Again, while these summaries are likely incomplete and do not contain details of the injuries the overall impression is that both the number of collisions and their severities were decreased during the Covid-19 pandemic month of April, 2020 versus the Covid-19-free month of December 2019.
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