Toddler Fatality in Richmond Hill After Impact of Day Care Building
Buildings continue to be struck by wayward motor vehicles. The general viewpoint is that this is related to pedal misapplication. The number of these incidents is rarely publicized as many of these result in little or no injury to the driver or occupants in the struck building. Unfortunately this is not always the case.
On Wednesday afternoon, September 9th, 2025 an SUV reportedly crashed into a child day care building and this caused a fatality to a toddler and injuries to 6 other children. Building impacts do not draw the public’s attention until something like this causes official news media to post the findings. But rarely are the details of these incidents ever reported to the proper level that the public can understand what important factors caused the incident.
In the present case views of the day care building showed that there was no protection in the building structure from such an impact. The SUV appeared to strike a large window and there was no other structure around it to prevent the vehicle from entering where the children were. In hindsight this is not a good situation and if sudden accelerations of vehicles continue to be a regular occurrence some thought needs to be put to create barriers in buildings that could be struck.
However a greater concern has to be with the accepted belief that nothing can be done with sudden, unintended acceleration as this is nothing but a driver error issue with no other resolution. Indeed, modern motor vehicles are complex machines with many modules communicating with each other and there is very little information available to understand how vehicle functions could affect unintended acceleration. Increasingly vehicle manufacturers are the only ones who have access to the details of how their vehicles perform and when a malfunction occurs they are very unlikely to make that known.
Ontario’s Booze Baron Gives Green Light To Speed Camera Vandalism
Municipalities have done a terrible job of administering a safety program that could make important contributions to removing dangerous drivers from city roads. But that does not excuse the Ontario government from its threat to remove speed cameras altogether within the Province. Speed cameras have become a political, fall football, kicked around to attract upcoming voters.
As typical with municipal government a lack of transparency regarding speed camera programs has led to many citizens distrusting its intentions and Premier Ford exploited this weakness to his political advantage regardless of the detrimental road safety implications. The net safety benefit of speed cameras is negated by municipal secrecy about how traffic fines are applied including the threshold speed at which those fines are applied. A single truth in Ford’s comments is that speed cameras should not target drivers who just barely cross over the speed limit. But no one knows exactly what the threshold is which causes a fine to be applied. It is no wonder that Ford has been successful in turning many members of the public against speed cameras all due to municipal secrecy.
Road Safety Decisions In London Ontario Are Rarely Explained And Therefore Rarely Challenged
When residents submit requests to their municipalities for safety improvements to their neighbourhood roadways the decisions are rarely explained leaving residents confused and unsatisfied. A detailed study of those decisions reveals that, although they appear to be based on simple rules, road safety is more complicated than applying a set of general guidelines to this issue. An example of this is the subject of this current Gorski Consulting article.
Background
Recently complaints have been publicized in local news media regarding road safety problems in a number neighbourhoods in London, Ontario. One of those complaints arose in the Old North neighbourhood at the intersection of Wellington and Regent Streets. This older neighbourhood contains many intersections with 4-way stops. Based on information provided by Councillor Sam Trosow it is believed that residents were concerned about the existence of a two-way stop at this intersection where there appeared to be problems of drivers becoming confused and passing through the stop sign. A similar problem appeared to exist at another nearby intersection, Colborne Street and St James Street, where a similar, 2-way stop existed, and similar confusion was detected in a Gorski Consulting study in 2022-23.
As an executive summary of the issue Councillor Trosow reported that City staff refused the residents’ petition. Gorski Consulting was notified of this by Councillor Sam Trosow possibly because he was aware of our work in his ward and also because our extensive experience in road safety and collision reconstruction issues. The City Staff had provided Councillor Trosow with some data pertaining to the traffic volumes at the intersection and the traffic volumes were deemed to be the reason why the petition was denied. A study of the intersection was conducted by Gorski Consulting on August 20, 2025 such that similar traffic volume data was obtained and compared with the City’s data. This comparison will be one of the issues discussed in the latter part of this article.
A view of the general area around Regent and Wellington is shown in the Googlemaps view below.
A closer view of the intersection is shown below.
Gorski Consulting was retained in 2014 to conduct an assessment of a collision that occurred on Wellington Street north of this intersection and video was available showing the traffic conditions at the Regent intersection at that time. The available video was taken on June 6 and commenced at 0828 hours. it was for 23 minutes and showed a southward view from the windshield of a car parked on the west side of Wellington approximately 85 metres north of the Regent intersection. A frame from this video is shown below.
Analysis of the video could be completed however it was challenging to see vehicles in the south-east quadrant of the intersection. This difficulty emphasizes the problems westbound and southbound drivers would experience attempting to see each other on approach to the intersection. The video analysis demonstrated the following results: Regent Street contained 37 motor vehicles, 3 cyclists and 7 pedestrians. Wellington Street contained 19 motor vehicles, 2 cyclists and 8 pedestrians. Thus there were twice as many motor vehicles observed on Regent Street than on Wellington Street. Yet the two-way stop signs were positioned to control traffic on Regent, not on Wellington. So eleven years earlier, there was evidence that Wellington Street should have been controlled by a stop sign, but the reverse existed.
The Rules (Guidelines)
Over many decades transportation researchers and practitioners have developed detailed standards for how roadways will be designed, marked, signed and maintained. The rules in every jurisdiction are not exactly the same but most are very similar. With respect to roadway signage, the rules became progressively formulized such that in the early 1930s the United States began publishing the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). Over the years the MUTCD has become the most well-known and followed set of rules in North America. Some states had their own versions of the MUTCD and Canada has similarly varied versions. The Transportation Association of Canada (TAC) developed its own MUTCD and Ontario has a similar document imbedded in its Ontario Traffic Manual.
The installation of traffic signs has its sets of rules (warrants) that are followed by those responsible for roadway signage in their jurisdiction. Some municipalities in Ontario have developed their own policies so there is no guarantee that every jurisdiction will follow the same rules. The Transportation Department in London Ontario does not publicize what rules they rely on. However from communications with the City Staff Councillor Trosow understood that provincial guidelines were adhered to, however he was not able to obtain any information about what those guidelines were.
The Ontario Traffic Manual contains stop sign warrants in its “Book 5: Regulatory Signs”. These rules will be displayed shortly however there is an important content in the Forward of the Manual which is often overlooked, and this is reprinted below:
“The traffic practitioner’s fundamental responsibility is to exercise engineering judgement and experience on technical matters in the best interests of the public and workers. Guidelines are provided in the OTM to assist in making those judgements, but they should not be used as a substitute for judgement. Design, application and operational guidelines and procedures should be used with judicious care and proper consideration of the prevailing circumstances. In some designs, applications, or operational features, the traffic practitioner’s judgement is to meet or exceed a guideline while in others a guideline might not be met for sound reasons, such as space availability, yet still produce a design or operation which may be judged to be safe. Every effort should be made to stay as close to the guidelines as possible in situations like these, and to document reasons for departures from them.“
“Engineering Judgement” is a phrase that exists not only in Ontario’s Traffic Manual but it exists in almost all publications discussing how practitioners should use the guidelines they are given in the field of transportation safety. A reminder often accompanies this phrase that guidelines cannot cover all the complexities of the real world. So when those guidelines are used they must be accompanied by experienced, common sense with an understanding of what the guidelines are attempting to achieve. Given this caveat the following content is taken verbatim from Book 5 with respect to stop sign warrants.
“Guidelines for Use
Two-Way Stop Control
There are some lower volume intersections for which the current type of traffic control is either no control (following the right-of-way rules in the Highway Traffic Act) or Yield control. The next higher level of control for these intersections is two-way stop control (or one-way stop at a three-leg intersection where the stop control on the stem of a “Tee” intersection).
In the event of congestion, driver confusion, substandard sight distance for the uncontrolled or Yield approach legs or an unsatisfactory collision history, two-way stop operation should be implemented, unless countermeasures such as sight line improvements, street lighting, parking prohibitions, enforcement, or geometric revisions have the potential to improve operations and/or safety to a satisfactory level and can be implemented reasonably quickly. There are certain circumstances under which a minimum of two-way stop must be implemented:
• At the intersection of two King’s Highways;
• At the intersection of a County or Regional road with a King’s Highway in a rural area;
• At the intersection of a County or Regional road with a King’s Highway in a built-up area;
• At the intersection of a city street or township road with a King’s Highway; or
• At the intersection of a minor street or road with a through street or highway
All-Way Stop Controls
In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to install STOP signs on all approaches to an intersection. This results in an all-way stop condition. All way stop controls disrupt the flow of traffic and introduce delays to all drivers using the intersection and should only be considered at the intersection of two relatively equal roadways having similar traffic volume demand and operating characteristics (see Minimum Volume Warrants below). The approaches should be directly opposing (i.e., not offset), should preferably approach at right angles (i.e. no skewed approaches) and have an equal number of lanes. For the vehicle volume counts, bicycles are considered vehicles under the HTA.
All-way stop controls should be considered under the following situations:
• As an interim measure, where traffic control signals are warranted but cannot be implemented immediately. For information on traffic signal control, refer to OTM Book 12 (Traffic Signals);
• At locations having a high collision frequency where less restrictive measures have been tried and found to be inadequate or impractical (see All Way Stop Collision Warrant below); or
• As a means of providing a transition period to accustom drivers to a change in intersection right- of-way control from one direction to another. Installation under this warrant must conform with the Amendment of Intersection Control, discussed under Special Considerations at the end of Section 2.
All-Way Stop Minimum Volume Warrant (Urban Arterial Roads)
All-way stop control may be considered on urban arterial roads where the following conditions are met:
• The total vehicle volume on all intersection approaches exceeds 500 vehicles per hour for each of the highest eight hours of the day; and,
• The combined vehicle and pedestrian volume on the minor street exceeds 200 units per hour (all vehicles plus pedestrians wishing to enter the intersection) for each of the same eight hours as the total volume; OR the combined vehicle and pedestrian volume on the minor street exceeds 150 units per hour (all vehicles plus pedestrians wishing to enter the intersection) for each of the same eight hours as the total volume, with an average delay to all minor street traffic (vehicles and pedestrians) of greater than 30 seconds for the entire eight hour period; and,
• The volume split does not exceed 70/30 (that is the minor street must not be less than 30% of the total volume entering the intersection) as measured over the entire eight-hour count period. Volume on the major street is defined as vehicles only. Volume on the minor street includes all vehicles plus any pedestrians wishing to cross the major roadway. For three-legged intersections a volume split of 75/25 is permissible.
All-Way Stop Minimum Volume Warrant (Collector Roads and Rural Arterial Roads)
All-way stop control may be considered on collector roads, or rural arterial roads, where the following conditions are met:
• The total vehicle volume on all intersection approaches exceeds 375 vehicles per hour for each of the highest eight hours of the day; and,
• The combined vehicle and pedestrian volume on the minor street exceeds 150 units per hour (all vehicles plus pedestrians wishing to enter the intersection) for each of the same eight hours as the total volume; OR the combined vehicle and pedestrian volume on the minor street exceeds 120 units per hour (all vehicles plus pedestrians wishing to enter the intersection) for each of the same eight hours as the total volume, with an average delay to all minor street traffic (vehicles and pedestrians) of greater than 30 seconds for the entire eight hour period; and,
• The volume split does not exceed 70/30 (that is the minor street must not be less than 30% of the total volume entering the intersection) as measured over the entire eight-hour count period. Volume on the major street is defined as vehicles only. Volume on the minor street includes all vehicles plus any pedestrians wishing to cross the major roadway. For three-legged intersections a volume split of 75/25 is permissible.
All-Way Stop Minimum Volume Warrant (Local Roads)
All-way stop control may be considered on minor or local roads where the following conditions are met:
• The total vehicle volume on all intersection approaches exceeds 200 vehicles per hour for each of the highest four hours of the day; and,
• The combined vehicle and pedestrian volume on the minor street exceeds 75 units per hour (all vehicles plus pedestrians wishing to enter the intersection) for each of the same four hours as the total volume; and,
• The volume split does not exceed 70/30 (that is the minor street must not be less than 30% of the total volume entering the intersection) as measured over the entire four-hour count period. Volume on the major street is defined as vehicles only. Volume on the minor street includes all vehicles plus any pedestrians wishing to cross the major roadway. For three-legged intersections a volume split of 75/25 is permissible.
All-Way Stop Collision Warrant
All-way stop control may be warranted for a location experiencing an unusually high number of right-angle or turning collisions, as defined by comparison with similar locations through network screening (TAC Guidelines for Network Screening of Collision-Prone Locations) or over representation analysis (TAC Canadian Guide to In-Service Road Safety Reviews) by conducting a statistical comparison in proportions of target collisions (right angle/turning movement collisions) of the subject location with that of similar locations in the jurisdiction.
If data and procedures are available, employ a methodology that removes regression to the mean and identifies locations that are clearly operating with below average safety compared to similar intersections within a jurisdiction.
If frequency data is the only data that is available, use the following thresholds:
• Local/Collector/Rural Arterial: 3 collisions/year over three years (i.e. 9 collisions in 36 months
• Urban Arterial: 4 collisions/year over three years (i.e. 12 collisions in 36 months)
Only those collisions susceptible to improvement through multi-way stop control must be considered (i.e., right angle and turning type collisions).
All-Way Stop Visibility Warrant
Under some circumstances, sufficient sight distance is not available for traffic exiting the stop-controlled approaches of a two-way stop intersection, based on geometric design requirements. If all efforts to improve the sight distance have been exhausted and the sight distance cannot be brought up to the guidelines, conversion of the intersection to all way stop operation may be considered. Special advance warning or overhead f lashing lights may be necessary to augment the control if vertical or horizontal alignment is a factor.
Inappropriate Use of All-Way Stop Control
All-way stop controls should not be used under the following conditions:
• Where the protection of pedestrians, school children in particular, is a prime concern and the concern cannot be directly addressed by other means;
• On roads within urban areas having a posted speed limit in excess of 60 km/h;
• At intersections that are not roundabouts having fewer than three, or more than four, approaches;
• At intersections that are offset, poorly defined or geometrically substandard;
• On truck or bus routes, except in an industrial area or where two such routes cross;
• On multi-lane approaches where a parked or stopped vehicle on the right will obscure the STOP sign;
• Where traffic would be required to stop on grades;
• As a means of deterring the movement of through traffic in a residential area;
• Where visibility of the sign is hampered by curves or grades, and sufficient safe stopping distance does not exist; or
• Where any other traffic device controlling right-of-way is permanently in place within 250 m, with the exception of a YIELD sign. If required closer than 250 m, all-way stop control should be supported by a traffic operations study and sound engineering judgement. All-way stop controls must not be used under the following conditions:
• As a speed control device (or a traffic calming tool); and
• On roads where progressive signal timing exists.
Location Criteria
A STOP sign must be installed in accordance with the regulations in order to be effective and enforceable.
The STOP sign must be installed on the right side of the roadway, facing traffic, no closer than 1.5 m and no further than 15 m from the edge of the intersecting roadway, unless it is clearly not practicable to locate the STOP sign closer to the intersection.
The left edge of the STOP sign must be no more than 4 m from the edge of the roadway for all applications. The bottom edge of the STOP sign must not be less than 1.5 m and not more than 2.5 m above the level of roadway.
On divided highways and one-way roadways with visibility problems, a supplementary STOP sign should be installed on the left side of the roadway.
For two-way roadways, if collision records show an unusually high proportion of failure to stop collisions at the STOP sign on an intersection approach, a supplementary STOP sign on the left hand side of the roadway or in the median may be installed. However, practitioners are reminded that overuse of traffic control devices tends to lessen their effectiveness.
Where one roadway intersects another roadway at an acute angle, the STOP sign on the intersecting roadway should be turned or shielded so that motorists travelling on the higher priority roadway cannot read it. Typical locations of STOP signs are illustrated in Figure 1.
Special Considerations
Legal Status
HTA, Sections 136 and 137.
HTA Ontario Regulation 615 (SIGNS).
HTA Ontario Regulation 623 (STOP SIGNS AT INTERSECTIONS).
HTA Ontario Regulation 624 (STOP SIGNS IN TERRITORY WITHOUT MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION).
On roadways under the jurisdiction of a municipality, a municipal by-law is required before the STOP sign becomes enforceable.
Amendment of Intersection Right-of-way Control
Where right-of-way is being reassigned from one roadway to another crossing roadway, through the elimination of an existing STOP sign control and the installation of STOP sign control on the previously uncontrolled roadway, an introductory period is required to safely carry out the transition. The recommended procedure for completing such a reversal is described below. For information on the warning signs noted in the procedure, reference should be made to OTM Book 6 (Warning Signs).
- Install new STOP signs on the previously uncontrolled approaches along with stop lines and crosswalk markings, if required. Oversize STOP signs and/or additional left side installations may be provided where conditions warrant. Install ALL-WAY tabs on all approaches. A painted “STOP” legend on the roadway, in advance of the stop line, may be added for additional emphasis.
Install 900 mm x 900 mm CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP signs (Wa-19), on the newly controlled roadway, in advance of the STOP signs. This is the standard size of sign. A larger size sign may be used where prevailing traffic conditions warrant greater visibility or emphasis, e.g., in complex visual environments where many signs and other devices compete for driver attention.
Install NEW signs (Wb-3) above, and AFTER (month and day) tab signs (Wa-19t) below the CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP signs, in black letters on a yellow reflective background, stating the date that the old control will be removed. The warning sign positions must be such that they do not block the approaching motorist’s view of the STOP signs but command attention and should be read as the driver approaches the stop line. A location approximately 30 m in advance of the stop line is recommended, in low speed applications.
Install STOP AHEAD (Wb-1) signs, with NEW signs above, at the proper location in advance of the intersection on the newly controlled approaches. An oversize STOP AHEAD sign, and a STOP AHEAD roadway marking legend may be provided for additional warning where warranted.
(2) After at least 15 days, remove the STOP AHEAD signs, if any, the STOP signs, stop lines and any crosswalk lines from the previously controlled roadway. Remove the ALL-WAY tabs from all approaches. Remove the NEW signs attached to the CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP signs, and the STOP AHEAD signs. Remove the AFTER tabs. Any roadway marking legends, if provided, should be allowed to fade and not be replenished unless local conditions warrant the continued provision of this additional warning.
(3) After an additional period of at least 15 days, the CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP signs should be removed. Any oversize STOP signs may now be replaced with standard sized signs unless the continued additional emphasis is warranted. STOP AHEAD signs should be reduced from oversize to standard size or removed if their continued presence is unwarranted.
Where existing all-way stop control is to be removed and a through roadway created, the following procedure is recommended:
(1) Install 900 mm x 900 mm CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP signs on the approaches where the STOP control is to remain, at least 15 days before the removal of control. Install NEW signs over the CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP signs and AFTER (month and day) tab signs below, stating the date when the 30 control on the crossing roadway will be removed.
(2) On the appointed date, remove the STOP AHEAD signs, if any, on the crossing roadway. Remove the STOP signs, stop lines and any crosswalk lines on these approaches. Remove all of the ALL-WAY tabs at the intersection. Remove the AFTER (month and day) tabs from the warning signs.
(3) After an additional period of at least 15 days, the NEW signs and the CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP signs should be removed.
In all cases, information regarding the change in right-of-way control should be publicized via local print and electronic media, particularly using radio stations which provide traffic coverage in commuter areas. Local residents should be advised of the revisions, and law enforcement agencies requested to provide stepped-up enforcement and more frequent patrols of the location. Advance notification should also be provided to local ambulance services, transit authorities, bus companies, taxi companies and trucking firms known to use the intersection frequently.
Any actual removal or revision of the control at an intersection should occur prior to the start of the morning peak on the specified date, both to preserve the integrity of the AFTER (month and day) tab message and to permit the revision to take place during a period of reduced demand.“
Traffic Data From Site
Councillor Trosow provided Gorski Consulting with traffic data that he was given by the City of London Transportation Department. This data had been provided in supplement to the decision to deny the petition for installation of a stop sign at the intersection of Regent Street and Wellington Street. The data was with respect to traffic counts taken by the City on April 10, 2025. The meaning of the data was not explained and therefore it would be difficult for Councillor Trosow to explain to his residents why the petition was denied. Also the rules (warrants) used by the Transportation Department to decide on the petition denial were also not revealed. It would be difficult to explain to residents why the petition was denied when residents could not examine those warrants.
In light of these developments Gorski Consulting decided to attend the subject site and conduct its own traffic documentations. This was done on Wednesday, August 20, 2025. The time of the documentations was between 1515 and 1730 hours. This time was chosen because the City data indicated that the peak traffic volume occurred between 1630 and 1730 hours. The City also provided break-downs of traffic every 15 minutes between 0700 and 1800 hours. So the Gorski Consulting data could also be broken down into these 15-minute time segments and a comparison could be made with the City data.
There has been a limited analysis of the Gorski video data. Through the first pass of the video only the presence of motor vehicles has been documented. Further work would require that cyclists and pedestrians be documented but this has not been done at this time. Review of the Provincial stop-sign warrants shows that additional video sessions should be made so a total of 4 hours or 8 hours of observations should be completed depending on the requirements of the warrants. At present only 2 hours and 15 minutes of video has been completed.
The table below shows the results of the Gorski Consulting traffic data and the City data for the noted times of 1515 to 1730 hours. Again, the only difference between the two datasets is that the Gorski Consulting data does not include the small number of pedestrians and cyclists that are included in the City data.
For clarification the above data indicates the number of vehicles approaching the intersection. It does not include what actions took place afterward. So it does not show if the vehicles made turns or travelled straight through the intersection. However the following observations can be made.
Overall, the number of vehicles passing through the intersection was slightly higher in the Gorski Data (611) versus the City data (580) and this is even though a small number of cyclists and pedestrians are not included in the Gorski data.
Looking more closely it can be seen that in both datasets the traffic volume was substantially higher on Regent than on Wellington. Yet the stop sign was posted to control traffic on Regent, not on Wellington. The total traffic volume on Regent was 415 vehicles in the Gorski data whereas the total was 414 vehicles in the City data. However the total traffic volume on Wellington was only 196 vehicles in the Gorski data and only 166 in the City data. So clearly, both datasets are in agreement that there is a substantially higher traffic volume on Regent than there is on Wellington. This finding is also supported by the traffic documentation 11 years ago discussed earlier in this article. This is an unusual finding. It does not make sense that the roadway with the higher traffic volume has had a stop sign posted in its direction of travel yet the road with the lower traffic volume is uncontrolled. It is likely that neither Councillor Trosow nor the local residents were made aware of that fact.
This finding confuses the content of the Provincial stop-sign warrants because those warrants assume that the major roadway with the higher traffic volume will be uncontrolled whereas the minor roadway with the lower traffic volume will contain the stop sign. So when the Provincial stop sign warrants discuss the installation of a 4-way stop they assume that Wellington Street in the one with the stop sign and the issue is whether a stop sign should be added on Regent Street. But obviously Regent Street already contains the stop sign. Clearly the City of London Transportation Department needs to explain how they proceeded with their analysis in light of this.
The above data also show how the results can vary from one day to another. With respect to traffic on Regent on April 10, 2025 the City data shows more eastbound vehicles than westbound vehicles (EB = 252, WB = 162). However the opposite is shown in the Gorski data, obtained on August 20, 2025, where there are less eastbound vehicles than westbound vehicles (EB=177, WB=238). So it needs to be recognized that the results will change when data from one day is compared to another. Therefore analysts must not read too much into the results from a single day and conclude this is representative of what exists throughout the year. And when one is focused on the specific criteria shown in the Provincial stop-sign warrants one must be cognizant that the fluctuation of the data could mean that minimums for traffic volume could be met or not met because of that fluctuation.
The City Staff identified that the peak afternoon hour for traffic volume was between 1630 and 1730 hours. In that hour on April 10, 2025 a total 262 vehicles passed through the intersection. No cyclists were observed in that time but there were observations of another 12 pedestrians. In contrast the Gorski data obtained on August 20, 2025 identified 296 motor vehicles although no counts were made of cyclists or pedestrians. The Provincial warrants for installation of 4-way stop indicate that:
“The total vehicle volume on all intersection approaches exceeds 200 vehicles per hour for each of the highest four hours of the day“
It would appear that this minimum traffic volume has not been met and this could be the reason why the City’s Transportation Department denied the petition. However if the Gorski data of 196 motor vehicles was supplemented by observations of cyclists this could put the traffic volume over the minimum. However we would have to continue gathering more hours of data until a full 4 hours of observations was obtained as required by the Provincial warrant, and cyclist observations would also have to be included.
As can be seen in the Provincial stop-sign warrants there are additional warrants that could be considered other than minimum traffic volume. For example, if more than 75 units (motor vehicles, cyclists and pedestrians) pass through the minor road on four of the highest-volume hours then a 4-way stop could be considered. If the focus is on Wellington Street, as it should be, then the City’s data indicates that this minimum would be close to being reached.
Another warrant focuses on the number of collisions documented at the intersection. So if 9 collisions have been documented over a period of 36 months a 4-way stop could be considered. In the experience of Gorski Consulting, in this age of poor collision reporting, this warrant could be substantially compromised. However Councillor Trosow could request a collision summary of the intersection keeping in mind that a large number of these collisions would be from the collision-reporting centre where proper details of the incidents would be unavailable.
Other Safety Considerations
The stop-sign petition denial at Regent and Wellington has additional ramifications that could lead to potential civil suits against the City of London. Three safety problems exist as a result of the status quo:
1, An increased crossing time by eastbound and westbound vehicles on Regent,
2. A limited visibility of southbound and northbound vehicles caused by vegetation in the centre boulevard of Wellington, and
3. Driver right-of-way confusion due to the mix of 2-way and 4-way stops in the Old North neighbourhood.
With respect to increased crossing times the width of Wellington Street is about 14.3 metres whereas typical two-way streets may be 7 to 8 metres in width. This additional width of Wellington means that eastbound and westbound vehicles on Regent need more time to cross Wellington than at a typical local intersection. This becomes more problematic at the far end of the intersection where opposing traffic on Wellington could arrive while vehicles on Regent have still not completed their crossing. It becomes more problematic for slower-moving “vehicles” such as cyclists on Regent as their crossing time would be longer than motor vehicles. Such a characteristic is not discussed in the Provincial stop-sign warrants and this requires “engineering judgment” to understand this increased exposure to harm.
With respect to limited visibility, when the crossing time along Regent is longer than normal, it is crucial that sufficient sight distance be available north and south of the intersection with Wellington. With the presence of shrubs and trees in the centre boulevard of Wellington that essential visibility is limited. Therefore it exacerbates the danger posed by the increased crossing time.
With respect to driver confusion about right-of-way, studies by Gorski Consulting at the nearby intersection of Colborne and St James include video examples where a number of drivers stop or slow down even though they have the right-of-way on Colborne and in other instances drivers on St James enter into Colborne after stopping believing that vehicles will stop on Colborne because it is a 4-way stop. Video of the Regent-Wellington intersection taken by Gorski Consulting on August 20, 2025 has shown similar confusion.
The above-noted three facts are easily documented and reported through a typical expert analysis that could be presented to a plaintiff lawyer in a civil suit. This is how civil suits against the City of London become generated. As almost all such suits are negotiated between opposing lawyers, and never reach trial, the details are rarely independently evaluated by a trial judge. Not only do these civil suits create expenses to city taxpayers they also pay the salaries of plaintiff and defense lawyers alike who are happy that disputes are available for their existence.
Summary
The most reasonable solution for the safety of the public is to install a stop-sign on Wellington Street. This would be a minimal cost item. It would cause a minimal disruption to the the current drivers on Regent Street. The smaller number of drivers using Wellington Street would have their travel disrupted by having to formally stop at Regent. However, given the present conditions, many drivers on Wellington are already approaching the intersection with caution and are slowing down, and sometimes stopping, likely because they are aware of the confusion at the intersection. So the additional time required to come a stop should not be a large inconvenience. As noted in the Provincial stop-sign warrants drivers would have to be warned of the new stop sign installation.
It needs to be emphasized that the reasons why traffic safety decisions are made by municipal representatives must be made available to the public who request roadway changes in their neighbourhoods. The data that was collected by a municipality needs to be released and the technical rules/guidelines/standards relied upon by those municipal representatives must also be made available.
A common argument is that the release of such technical information will lead to the public not understanding it. It is our view at Gorski Consulting that such an opinion will not stop nuisance petitions from being submitted. Indeed, by keeping the public in the dark in this manner, nuisance petitions will only be enhanced. Yet what is needed for the benefit of all is the reporting of suspected safety issues by the public because municipal representatives cannot be on top of every safety issue in a larger urban environment. Those reports can be useful and helpful when the public is informed and educated.
As shown in this example on Regent and Wellington “engineering judgment” must be properly applied using common sense and experience that is required beyond the generalities discussed in documents of stop-sign warrants. The intent must be to create the most safe environment for the driving public and this cannot be done by strict focus on what is stated in these documents. This often requires a thorough examination of what unique characteristics exist at the site of dispute.
UPDATE: September 1, 2025, 1820 hours
There is an error in this article in the paragraph discussing traffic volume thresholds. The paragraph is reprinted below:
“It would appear that this minimum traffic volume has not been met and this could be the reason why the City’s Transportation Department denied the petition. However if the Gorski data of 196 motor vehicles was supplemented by observations of cyclists this could put the traffic volume over the minimum. However we would have to continue gathering more hours of data until a full 4 hours of observations was obtained as required by the Provincial warrant, and cyclist observations would also have to be included.”
The wrong data was referenced in the phrase “…Gorski data of 196 motor vehicles…”. That 196 refers just to the traffic volume on Wellington St while the correct reference should have been to the total traffic passing through the intersection and that number was 296 motor vehicles. So for the peak hour the intersection met the traffic volume threshold of 200 vehicles.
A further review has been made of the City data and this shows that there were four hours in which the total traffic volume through the intersection was greater than 200 vehicles. Those four hours were:
0745 to 0845 hours = 228 vehicles
1115 to 1215 hours = 208 vehicles
1530 to 1630 hours = 251 vehicles
1630 to 1730 hours = 274 vehicles
So this indicates that City Staff had data which met the traffic volume warrant for a four-way stop.
Resident Traffic Concerns Continue In London Ontario
Concerns about traffic safety have been a key issue in North America for well over 100 years. In that time there have been great strides toward improving public roadways and motor vehicles. Our roadways contain advanced designs that few persons in the public domain are aware of. Signage and roadway markings have been standardized for decades. Vehicles have improved tremendously through numerous federal motor vehicle safety standards. And recent technological improvements have greatly increased collision avoidance. It is rarely understood that, since the mid-1970’s, the numbers of fatalities on public roadways have fallen year after year. That is the good news.
The bad news is that the general public has not kept up with their knowledge of road safety. Very basic facts that ought to be known are, for bazaar reasons, kept from public awareness. This may appear innocuous because no one can see how a lack of knowledge can be life-threatening, but it is. What is a life-threatening incident? And what is something that may appear dangerous but is likely to cause only minor injury? Knowledge of these basic things could change behaviors but that will not happen.
In the vicinity of London Ontario there are many transportation issues that pose safety concerns. But there is no reliable source that can publicly differentiate the really bad things from those less dangerous. Officials in the Province of Ontario do very little to create this awareness. Municipal representatives do little because they themselves do not recognize how to prioritize safety concerns. Local police are more tied up with dangerous criminals and have far less resources, or focus, on programs that prevent accidental injury and death. And official news media are so concerned with the threats of social media that they have shrunk in numbers and influence. All these representatives of our society seem very incapable of providing any useful knowledge to the public about what safety issues are important.
As the CTV News news agency in London Ontario has essentially become the only official news-reporting group in the City, whatever it reports is widely distributed. Recently CTV news has made several reports on citizen concerns about traffic safety.
In an article published on February 28, 2025 CTV news reported on concerns expressed by residents after a collision occurred on the curve of Western Road just north of Oxford Street. Quotes from several persons demonstrated that the collision site was unacceptably unsafe.
In another CTV News article posted on March 24, 2025 residents were quoted again about their safety concerns after a fatal pedestrian collision occurred at the intersection of Bradley Ave and Ernest Ave in the White Oaks area. One resident stated: “It’s ridiculous how many incidents there are, and I really hope something improves, so this area is a lot safer.”
In an article published on July 9, 2025 CTV reported on concerns expressed by residents about safety concerns in the Old North neighbourhood north of the City’s downtown.
A week later, on July 15, 2025, CTV reported once again about citizen complaints with respect to safety at the intersection of Wortley Road and Emery Street in the Old South neighbourhood.
On July 21, 2025 CTV News posted another article about concerns expressed by residents with respect to the intersection of Hyde Park Road and Fitzwilliam Boulevard in south-west London. This was after a fatal collision involving a motorcycle occurred there on July 16, 2025. Once again several residents indicated this site “…has long been a safety concern…”
On July 31st CTV reported on complaints expressed by a resident about dangerous driving in the SoHo neighbourhood south-east of the City’s downtown.
On August 13, 2025, CTV news reported that the intersection of Viscount Road and Steeplechase Drive was “extraordinarily dangerous”. The article indicated that a pedestrian was struck at that intersection “earlier this year” but that collision was not reported by any news agency.
Some of these resident concerns may reveal genuine safety problems but it is difficult to be certain. This is because there is absolutely no objective data provided either by the City of London, nor by the London City Police, as to where safety problems are revealed in their collected data.
The old adage “The squeaky wheel gets the grease” is a cute way of saying, if you want something just shout loudly. In terms of road safety that type of functioning should not apply. For the benefit of all, roadway improvements should be based on solid objective data, not on who shouts the loudest. However, very often, it is those loud shouts that are the canaries in the coal mine that reveal a safety problem long before it is officially recognized.
Unfortunately those officials responsible for road safety are not the best gatekeepers of the public’s interests. The litigious society in which we live is full of plaintiff lawyers who make money by submitting claims and taking a percentage of the money. In response there are lawyers working for the defendants against those claims. Plaintiff lawyers pad their case wherever possible and defendants hide themselves from plaintiff discovery whenever possible. This combination emphasizes minor safety problems while also hiding important and legitimate ones. The public does not recognize how this legal interplay prevents legitimate safety problems from being identified and corrected.
Amongst the many things held in secret, the number of traffic complaints processed by the City of London is unknown. So again, those citizens complaining about their traffic problems are unaware whether their concerns are unique and important or whether they are one of many competing demands from across the City.
While official news agencies such as CTV news ought to be informing the public about legitimate safety problems that is often not the case. As investigative journalists have been moving toward extinction their objective assessments also move in that direction. Articles that are published about road safety should be based on a thorough knowledge of the subject matter, however, with the increased complexity of our society, journalists cannot be experts in every field being reported. And in terms of road safety substantial expertise is needed to properly inform the public. Journalists cannot just report on the “squeakiest wheels” but on whether those wheels actually need fixing. That is difficult to do when you have little expertise in the matter.
Increasingly, the public receives its news from internet social platforms where anyone can post anything and the success of those posts depends on whether enough of the public is accepting of the sermon being preached. This fake news is built on a fake foundation which jeopardizes the proper functioning of a democratic society.
It has been the long-standing opinion of Gorski Consulting that many traffic complaints could be satisfactorily resolved if there was greater transparency in official circles about what the objective data says about those complaints. Educating the public is key to removing frivolous complaints while strengthening the public’s voice when a genuine traffic safety issue has not been officially recognized.
How Aware Are OPP Of Creating Dangerous Traffic Conditions?
There are times when police must act swiftly to react to situations where the public, or other emergency personnel, including themselves, may be in grave danger. At times this puts a police officer in harm’s way until proper reinforcements and equipment can arrive. Regrettably that can be a circumstance of policing. However each circumstance needs deep evaluation as some decisions can needlessly create dangers that need not occur. An example of this occurred on Monday, August 18, 2025 on westbound Highway 403 on approach to Highway 401 on the outskirts of Woodstock, Ontario,
A single vehicle rollover occurred causing a passenger car to come to rest in the median of Highway 403. Upon approaching the site from a westbound position it was observed that an OPP police SUV had come to a stop in the westbound passing lane, as shown in the dashcam photo above. Although the overhead emergency lights from the police vehicle could be seen from a distance, due to the curve in the highway, it was not possible to obtain a clear understanding of where the police vehicle was located, with respect to the travel lanes, until a driver was relatively close to the police vehicle. As traffic slowed that unusual position became evident and westbound vehicles successfully passed the stopped police vehicle.
But such successful scenarios do not always unfold as expected. The traffic volume at the time that the above photo was taken was relatively light and, given the Sunday afternoon, the volume of heavy trucks was much less than on a weekday. However that traffic volume, and its composition is important. If traffic volume was higher and if more heavy trucks were present the ability of approaching drivers to see the stopped police vehicle would be hampered. Heavy trucks have the tendency to block the view of other drivers of highway conditions that lie ahead. So much so that, given the uncommon conditions of several heavy trucks in the vicinity, visibility ahead could be greatly obscured. Also heavy trucks cannot change lanes on a dime, especially when other smaller vehicles are in the vicinity and changing lanes cannot be done immediately.
Two other dash-cam photos are shown below which demonstrate what existed in the westbound lanes on approach to the collision-involved vehicle. As can be seen, there is nothing in the westbound passing lane that would create an immediate danger to westbound drivers. And there are no longer any emergency personnel in the median. So this collision had to have happened some time earlier. So why was the police vehicle still stopped in the westbound passing lane? Was it not possible to call the Ministry of Transportation to bring a blocker truck to block the westbound passing lane instead of using a police vehicle?
What becomes evident in the photo above, and in the photo below, is that the eastbound passing lane on the other side of the highway has been closed by pylons and there is a blocker truck positioned in that lane along with some Ministry of Transportation vehicles. These are the types of resources that should have been applied in the westbound lanes if the passing lane was to be safely closed. But why did this not occur? Was a second blocker truck not available?
Decades earlier another incident took place in the westbound lanes of Highway 401 near the Putnam interchange which is less than 30 kilometres west from the present site. In that incident a collision-involved vehicle had come to rest in the grass median (this was before a concrete median barrier had been put in place). In darkness a police officer attempted to divert traffic out of the westbound passing lane by using the flash light that he was equipped with. This could have been the best equipment that the officer had on hand but it was insufficient and a second collision occurred. At that time the deficiency could have been observed and steps could have been put in place to ensure that more traffic-diverting equipment was available. But that did not happen for many years until blocker-trucks eventually began to be used. However, how often are such trucks available in current times? If a blocker-truck was not available at the currently-mentioned site, why not?
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