Access to Vehicle Infotainment and Camera Data Complicates Court Evidence and Owner Rights
The technology existing in newer motor vehicles is quickly becoming more complex while causing questions to be asked about ethics and vehicle owner rights. Data from Event Data Recorders (“Black Boxes”) have been available to download from vehicles as early as 1999 (GM products). As technology has evolved so have the complications of what kind of data is captured, who can retrieve it and how this affects the rights of vehicle owners involved in collisions who should be able to use that data in their defense.
The U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration set out rules to be followed by vehicle manufacturers as to what kind of data those manufacturers were required to capture and how that data was to be made available to vehicle owners. That law was to become effective with 2013 model vehicles. The success of that rule was marginal. Although most manufacturers complied with that ruling in terms of capturing the required parameters, the availability of that data has fallen short. Many manufacturers have allowed their vehicles to be compatible with crash data retrieval hardware which has been purchased by almost all police forces, insurers and research institutes, However a number of manufacturers have opted out and created their own hardware. All this hardware is expensive and requires trained personnel to conduct a download which adds more cost to the activity. The bottom line is that the average owner/consumer is in no position to obtain the data from their own vehicle. Yet police can access the data for criminal matters and insurers can access it by requiring the owner to surrender their rights of defense to the insurer. And large research institutions can assess it for “benign” purposes.
In recent years matters have become even more complicated. Vehicles no longer have a single EDR module, but the complete vehicle electronics system is a complex of integrated modules that store a variety of data in a variety of locations. Now vehicle infotainment systems can be interrogated by specialized software (Berla) and many vehicles are now equipped with multiple cameras whose views can also be downloaded by specialized equipment.
As an example, Nissan is offering owners the option to purchase an app which will allow them to download camera data on select 2024 and 2025 vehicles. Some details of the plan are discussed on the Nissan website but the cost is not revealed.
It remains questionable how these complications will apply in court proceedings where a vehicle owner ought to have the right to examine evidence in their own defense. If hardware, software and technician costs are too high does that take away the owner’s right to the evidence? What happens if police do not download all the available data in a criminal case because there could be significant costs associated with that? Will this be a matter of “evidence spoilation” that have been a point of argument in historic criminal cases?
Unfortunately the laws are slow to react to quickly developing technologies and vehicle owners may suffer these consequences for many years before the “wild west” is brought to order. Or it may never be brought to order.
Observed Differences In Cyclist Characteristics & Safety Across City of London Ontario
Cyclist observations by Gorski Consulting in the City of London Ontario reveal important facts. There are large differences in the characteristics and safety of cyclists depending on what area of the City is examined. Such findings could help those interested in cyclist safety. This article will discuss cyclist observations as a whole within London and then this city-wide data will be compared to four sites where obvious differences were observed.
Review of City-Wide Cyclist Observations
Zygmunt Gorski has been conducting road safety research and motor vehicle collision analysis in the City of London and southern Ontario for over 44 years. While the focus of that work has been varied, cyclist collisions and safety have always been a part of that work. In the last 12 years a greater focus has been applied to cyclist safety as society has recognized that it needs to increase the number of persons using bicycles for their mode of travel. Special studies involving synchronized, multiple video cameras have always been part of collision analysis at Gorski Consulting however these became more focused toward cyclists, particularly since 2018. These studies provided details of cyclist motions and characteristics. Some of this testing was conducted along the Thames Valley Parkway in London but also at other sites where cyclist issues needed to be assessed. This focus was increased even further in 2020 as Gorski Consulting began to make specific observations of cyclists, either riding on roads, or existing on roadsides and sidewalks. The data from these roadside observations in the topic of the present article.
Since 2013 over 5000 cyclist observations have been made by Gorski Consulting along various roadways in London. The majority of these observations took place since 2020. The table below provides a glimpse of some of the characteristics of these cyclists. This table also provides some information about the differences found at four sites in London.
In the above table it can be seen that the percentage of observed female cyclists throughout the City of London has been about 13.8%. This is obviously small. There have been a number of theories discussed in the research, much of it based on interviews of females and why they do not ride bicycles.
The above table also shows that the percentage of cyclists wearing helmets throughout the City has been about 35.5%. If one were to relate this to seat-belt usage in motor vehicles the percentage of helmet users is substantially smaller than those wearing seat-belts in cars. Yet occupants of cars are protected by an additionally wide range of safety devices which generally make occupants of motor vehicles much safer than cyclists, beyond the mass difference.
The above table also shows that cyclists observed to be riding in the lane of a roadway or in a designated cycling lane is 34.6%. The rest of the cyclists were found either riding on a sidewalk, walking their bike on a sidewalk of stopped on a sidewalk. Since laws of the City of London and the Province of Ontario prohibit cyclists from riding on sidewalks this result makes for interesting discussion.
The results from the selected four sites shown in the above table will be reviewed in the following segments of this article.
Views of Sites Where Comparisons Were Made
1. Hamilton Road
Hamilton Road is an arterial roadway in the south-east of the City of London. Historically it used to carry motor vehicle traffic out of the City and toward the slightly larger City of Hamilton, Ontario. The area of Hamilton Road selected for study here is about 4.4 kilometres in distance from Maitland Street at the edge of downtown, up to Highbury Ave in the south-east of the City.
Over time many small, independent businesses developed along this road which was originally just two lanes in width. A number of years ago Hamilton Road was widened to four lanes with no median between the two directions of traffic. While this widening helped with the flow of motor vehicle traffic it also created a problem for vulnerable users, such as pedestrians and cyclists, who sometimes needed to get across the four lanes.
Recently several cyclist fatalities have occurred along this stretch of Hamilton Road. While basic information about these occurrences was released by local news agencies nothing of any usefulness was revealed about how these fatalities occurred and therefore how cyclists and drivers of motor vehicles could prevent such incidents.
Observations of cyclists along this roadway revealed that there were slightly less female cyclists (12.8%) than the City average. Larger differences were noted in helmet use (only 25.2% versus 35.5% city-wide) and more cyclists were observed not riding on the road (26.4% versus 34.6% city-wide. When compared to the other three sites these data suggest that Hamilton Road is an unsafe location for cyclist travel.
2. Dundas Street
Much like Hamilton Road, Dundas Street east of Highbury Ave is an arterial roadway with conditions that are unsafe for cyclist travel. The segment of Dundas reviewed in this study is from Highbury Ave eastward to Clarke Road. Dundas has remained a four-lane roadway for well over half a century. It benefits from a centre-left-turn lane which is often used by pedestrians and cyclists when needing to cross this busy roadway.
The above table shows that significantly less female cyclists have been observed on this roadway (9.8% versus 13.8% city-wide). Helmet use is also less than the City average (22.7% versus 35.5% city-wide). And cycling on a lane is very low compared to the City average (10.2% versus 34.6% city-wide). These data indicate that, like Hamilton Road, Dundas Street is an unsafe location for cyclist travel.
3. Ridout – Upper Queens
In contrast to the data from Hamilton Road and Dundas Street, the data from the busy collector road of Ridout-Upper Queens shows far safer cycling conditions. The section of Ridout examined here is from Horton Street at the south edge of the City’s downtown, through the community of Old South and toward the newer community toward Ferndale Ave where Ridout is re-named Upper Queens. This roadway travels north-south. It carries traffic from trendy locations such as Wortley village which is one of the more desirable locations of the City. The City has installed a painted cycling lane along this roadway and the benefits of this can be seen in the cyclist observational data.
Female cyclists along this roadway were observed to be higher than the City average (15.7% versus 13.8% city-wide). Helmet use by cyclists along this roadway was exceptionally high (78.9% versus 35.5 city-wide) and the percentage of cyclists observed using the cycling lane was very high (78.9% versus 34.6% city-wide). Thus female cyclists would appear to have less concern riding on this roadway and all cyclists used their helmets at an exceptionally large percentage.
4. Colborne North Of St James
Results similar to the Ridout-Upper Queens roadway were observed on Colborne Street near St James Street. Colborne Street runs north/south north of the City’s downtown. Colborne travels through the Old North neighbourhood which is also a desirable real estate location. Here observations were made at a point just north of St James Street. This specific location was selected because in 2022 Gorski Consulting was in the process of gathering cyclist data in preparation for the City’s installation of a new, painted cycling lane. The site has been included in this discussion because of the unusual character of the observations made in 2022.
From the 2022 data at the Colborne site the number of observed female cyclists was significantly higher than the City average (25.6% versus 13.8% city-wide).
The number of cyclists wearing helmets at this site was much higher than the City average (62.2% versus 35.5 city-wide. But this average was lower than at the Ridout-Upper Queens site. What was interesting however is that there was a large difference between males and females with respect to helmet use. Only 56.7% of males were observed to wear helmets yet 78.3% of females were observed to wear helmets.
Even though a cycling lane was not yet in existence in 2022 the number of cyclists riding within the road lane was exceptionally high (97.8% versus 34.6% city-wide).
Discussion
This article has reviewed the results of cycling observations in London, Ontario. Data has been presented from a city-wide perspective showing the characteristics of over 5000 cyclists over a period from 2013 to 2024. These data were then compared to characteristics of cyclists at four local sites in the City. Two sites, Hamilton Road and Dundas St presented evidence of poor safety for cyclists. Two other sites, Ridout-Upper Queens and Colborne Street showed evidence of reasonably good safety conditions for cyclists. The purpose of these discussions is to draw awareness to the importance of studying cyclists as they travel or exist on roadways before conclusions are drawn about what permanent and costly changes are made to the roadway infrastructure to better accommodate cyclists. A thorough understanding of the details surrounding cyclist characteristics, the reasons for their journeys and the actions they undertake are crucial to developing an infrastructure that is sensitive to the unique needs at specific roadway sites.
City of London Has Difficulty Accepting Citizen Advice
To put it in astrological terms the City of London often operates like a black hole. A very large amount of data, analysis and general information is created in its operations but very little escapes into the public domain. A recent controversy surrounding the City’s Mobility Master Plan (MMP) is an example of this black hole functioning.
On the surface the City appeared to be open toward informing the public about its plans for transporting citizens within its jurisdiction through to the year 2050. Billboards were erected through the city announcing that four public information sessions were prepared where Londoners could examine the City’s future plans. In the midst of these arrangements news became reported that one of the City’s advisory committees expressed criticisms about the MMP and how its decisions were generated. The critical report came from the Integrated Transportation Community Advisory Committee (ITCAC). Previous politicians had dissolved several such citizen committees in the past such that the ITCAC was only one of the few left standing. And politicians determined that the ITCAC would also be dissolved in 2025 leaving no official citizen participation.
Why Is Citizen Participation Important?
There are numerous examples where the City of London operates in unaccountable ways that are unhelpful and sometimes dangerous to its citizens. An example is shown in the photos below, taken recently at the road construction taking place along Wellington Road in London.
In recent years the City of London has failed to ensure that road construction projects within its jurisdiction comply with safe practices. While “guidelines” have existed for decades in manuals from various transportation groups the City has recently chosen to ignore them. With respect to roadway markings there are explicit details in existence that explain how these markings need to be created, along with proper signage, to guide vehicles through construction zones. Those procedures are not being followed in London. A number of these problem areas have recently been reported on the Gorski Consulting website. The following photos provide another example for traffic operating westbound on Bradley Ave and travelling through the intersection at Wellington Road.
In scenarios like those shown above collisions occur that are of a sideswiping nature and the threat of major injury is low. But significant costs can be incurred by both drivers from damage to their vehicles. Current mandatory collision reporting thresholds have risen to over $5,000 in total cost so that such an event would be unlikely to be attended by an “independent” police officer who could officially document fault. In reality London City Police are paid by the City of London and their independent assessment of City fault is questionable. Instead fault is determined by insurance companies based on predetermined “Fault Determination Rules” that are based on the geometry at which vehicles collide and not based on the reality of who was actually at fault. The result may be that both drivers could be viewed at fault, their insurance rates will rise but no fault will be placed on the City of London for causing the collision.
The City of London operates a well-equipped Risk Management Department with lawyers whose purpose is to protect the City from liability. Many such Risk Management departments advise city politicians and its staff to hide road safety problems that could bring a claim against the City. In this manner the City comes to prey on innocent citizens of London who are not in a position of financial strength to negotiate with a large Risk Management team. Without independent public scrutiny such operations get out of hand as there is no independent authority to watch over the development of unethical actions. This is just one example as to why citizen participation is extremely important in keeping an eye of City operations. Citizen committees cannot be just puppet structures that rubber stamp every action of the City. These independent committees must be given sufficient information about how City operations take place in order to ensure the proper functioning of municipal government.
Resignation Letter of Vincent Lubrano III
Before the ITCAC could be officially dissolved one of its members, Vincent Lubrano III, decided to write a formal resignation letter effective December 31, 2025 (although this date may have been a typo and possibly was meant to be December 31, 2024). Mr. Lubrano wrote that his resignation was “…in direct protest of the City Council’s decision to dissolve the ITCAC”. He further indicated that he was “…deeply troubled by the process used to eliminate an Advisory Committee, whose primary Term of Reference is to provide advice and guidance on the Mobility issues in this city…”.
It was clear that Lubrano was upset with the process as his comments in his letter continued: “The manner in which it was handled reflects a stunning lack of respect for the significant personal time and effort that ITCAC members invest…” and “…It became clear that Council views this Advisory Committee as a road block to be removed as opposed to a valued resource…” and lastly: “This protest is the only means we have to highlight the inconsistency between the Council’s stated commitment to public input and its actual practices.“
These were harsh words. Without context or a detailed understanding of the goings on between the ITCAC and the City it would be difficult to judge where the truth lies. But from the experience of Gorski Consulting much of what Mr. Lubrano stated is accurate. In 2019 Zygmunt Gorski became a member of two City of London Advisory Committees. It only took a matter of a few meetings to reveal that the City was not interested in independent advice. The City Clerk controlled what agenda items were included in any meeting and if the Clerk did not like a proposed item it was simply excluded. So committee members could not even discuss issues of importance amongst themselves. Gorski resigned within a few months for reasons similar to that expressed by Lubrano.
ITCAC Report of December 16, 2024
One can look at the report of the ITCAC from December 16, 2024 to examine if its complaints were valid. It would appear that the City of London created a team that was responsible for generating the MMP and the ITCAC was interacting with this team by providing independent comments and advice. The ITCAC report demonstrated repeated instances where the MMP team provided minimal for no details about how it developed its plans. This was essentially a black hole not allowing information to escape about how the City was operating.
A consulting firm called Arcadis was mentioned as being part of the MMP team. Arcadis advertises itself as a global firm, operating in over 30 countries with over 36,000 employees. It reports to hold an office in London on Oxford Street near Beaverbrook Ave. The role of Arcadis in the MMP team was not made clear, not even by Mr. Lubrano or the ITCAC. And it is possible that they actually know very little about the involvement of Arcadis. The City of London appears not to have provided any public information about Arcadis and if any studies or data have been generated by the firm.
In part the ITCAC complaints about the MMP team process can be encapsulated by the following segment of the ITCAC report:
“On reviewing the reports and presentations from the MMP team, various factual errors, contradictions, and gaps have been noted. This casts doubt on the thoroughness and competence of any analysis that has not been shared with ITCAC or the public. If we cannot trust the analysis without expert review, how can we trust the resulting recommendations? Council is dependent on competent, well-reasoned, evidence-based recommendations from expert and experienced staff and consultants. A very strong case must be made to counter any tendency towards decision-making based on misinformation, emotion, partisan ideology, beliefs based only on personal anecdotal experience, populist politics, etc.“
Again, much like Mr. Lubrano’s resignation letter, these words of the ITCAC represent strong criticisms. There is particular mention of “… decision-making based on misinformation, emotion, partisan ideology, beliefs based only on personal anecdotal experience, populist politics” which seems unusual. It is not clear, and it may not be possible to know what circumstances generated these comments.
Mobility Master Plan Drop-In Public Meetings
Some understanding of the City’s operations can be gained from examining what was reported to the public during its information meetings about the MMP. Gorski Consulting attended one of those meeting and the following was observed.
The attended meeting took place in a large room surrounded by numerous billboards positioned around the room’s perimeter and visitors were encouraged to walk around and view each board. The boards appeared to be grouped into areas reflecting the segments of the MMP. So boards located closest to the entrance door displayed general information about transportation systems in London. Other boards contained more specific information about mass transit, cycling networks and pedestrian issues. Members of City staff stood at various points associated with their areas of expertise.
One of the first boards showed the general philosophy of expected changes in the modes of transportation in the City. The content of this board is shown below.
The displayed data showed that the City was expecting to shift the modes of transportation from personal use vehicles to greater involvement of “walking cycling and transit”. With respect to these categories the billboard showed that in 2019 “walking cycling and transit” represented 23% of the City’s transportation and this was expected to increase to 32.5% by the year 2050, or slightly less than a 10% increase.
It was obvious from viewing the billboard that the categories of “walking cycling and transit” were all grouped together so that there was no information about the current levels of each individually. It would seem reasonable that the City was able to calculate these individual items otherwise they could not report the total of 23%. But it is not clear why they did not itemize these important modes separately. Again, it reflects the general process of the City’s providing only minimal information to the public.
While discussing the mode change with one of the City’s staff it was revealed that there was no specific plan that has been developed as to how the City intended to create the mode shift that they reported. Specifically with mass transit the City official stated that they operated on the basis of “if you build it they will come”. Meaning that, if the quality and quantity of mass transit is increased then ridership will naturally increase. These are very general beliefs without any specifics.
Another billboard was entitled Road Safety, as shown below. This was focused on London City Police data from the year 2023. The data contained in this billboard is misleading.
In general police data is known to be incomplete. While collisions where fatalities occur are likely to be fully reported, other categories such as injury-producing collisions and property damage collisions are less complete. This has been known throughout the history of collision reporting but in recent years the thresholds at which collisions are required to be reported have risen.
The above data is of greater concern with respect to cyclist collisions. Here the City has reported that only 70 persons were injured in 2023 when riding a bicycle. The City ought to have known that this information is greatly in error. This information is taken from police reported data which is greatly incomplete – something the City would be well aware of. Recent research reported several times on this Gorski Consulting website taken from hospital emergency department data shows that only about 8% of incidents of cyclist visits to emergency departments are reported in police data. So the police know nothing about the 92% of cyclist injury incidents that actually occur. By reporting the police data in the manner that they have the City of London has greatly misinformed its citizens about an important safety issue.
While the MMP is reported to be in its infancy there are additional concerns about its proposed actions at selected safety problems such as the area of Hamilton Road between Maitland Street and Highbury Ave. A billboard shown at the public meeting indicated that changes were being proposed in the near future along this roadway. What those changes are is not clear. When asked about those changes a City staff member could only hypothesize that they might include a reduction in the four lanes of traffic to just two lanes and then new cycling lanes would be installed. Although there is public information that 3 fatal cyclist collisions occurred along this stretch of Hamilton Road in the past 5 years no further information about cyclist collisions was available. When asked if the City was conducting any additional investigations with respect to cyclists on Hamilton Road it was reported that no such activity was taking place. The City staff member confirmed that cameras located at important intersections in the City are able to gather information about traffic volumes, characteristics and patterns. But it was unknown if any such studies were being conducted along Hamilton Road. The data from these permanent locations is likely analysed but it is unknown who does that analysis. It is unlikely that the ITCAC is informed of the results of such analysis.
The City staff member was also asked about their portable “Scout” camera installations which could be deployed to study certain safety-problem locations in the City. The City staff member confirmed the existence of these portable units and that the collected data is taken off-site to a private firm where it is analysed. But the staff member was unaware of any such installations being placed on Hamilton Road.
Summary
As expressed in the City of London ITCAC and in the resignation letter of Vincent Lubrano III the City of London is involved in a secretive, black hole proceeding where little information is being released to the citizens of London about the details of the Mobility Master Plan (MMP). It appears that the City is hiring private firms that conduct a variety of analyses that are not being shared in the public domain. When the City’s advisory committees complain about this process they are being shut down as is the case with the ITCAC.
Over the years a member of the City’s council who has been particularly vocal about shutting down advisory committees has been the Deputy Mayor, Shawn Lewis. In 2019 he was instrumental in attacking a report from the Cycling Advisory Committee, a group of unpaid, citizen volunteers. That committee presented information and ideas that were counter to Lewis’ vision. Instead of accepting that an opposing view is essential to the proper functioning of municipal government he instead went on to attack the committee. As reported by London’s CTV News in a article of February 22, 2019: “The City’s Deputy Mayor, Shawn Lewis appears to have led the charge in removing citizen advisory committees altogether.”
And again in an October 24, 2019 CTV News article: “At Tuesday evening’s meeting, Lewis stated that the advisory committees are there to “advise” and not to direct council. The comment prompted mixed reaction on Twitter…” and further: “The role of advisory committees is to advise us on the stuff we’re working on. It’s not to reinvent the wheel; it’s not to call to question the decisions we’ve made.”
And finally in an October 27, 2919 CTV News article: “Lewis said he wants to see advisory committees reviewed for overlap and effectiveness, saying the cycling group has gone “rogue.”
Through Lewis’ efforts the Cycling Advisory Committee was disbanded by the City. And the various volunteers from several committees transferred into a newly-formed Integrated Transportation Community Advisory Committee (ITCAC) which is now also being disbanded.
Lewis has previously complained that interaction with citizen advisory committees costs a considerable amount of time of City staff and this is wasted time. This is a strange viewpoint. In a society labelled as “democratic” the information about important issues is released to the public which becomes informed, leading to informed opinions expressed by a wide spectrum of the populace. When politicians view this transfer of information as a waste of time, and a needless expense, it is a disturbing development. Dictatorships are highly effective in directing how matters will be dealt with but the problem with such a system is that it only reflects the needs of the dictator, not those of the people as a whole.
School Bus Fatality Needs Transparency To Avoid Future Tragedies
Much like the universe the internet has no bounds. That appears most obvious in areas surrounding rumours, misinformation and gossip. When official information is not released about a collision this does not prevent public speculation about what took place – it merely emphasizes the gossip that is generated. Such may be the case in a recent school-bus-involved fatal collision just west of London, Ontario on December 16, 2024.
From an official standpoint London City Police are the entity that should have the most knowledge about how a 7-year-old boy, Dante Caranci, was struck and killed after exiting a school bus on Longwoods Road near Murray Road just before 1600 hours on December 16th. The problem originates with the lack of information about what transpired. In their post on the London City police website police indicated: “Members of the LPS Traffic Management Unit continue to investigate the serious collision involving a pedestrian that occurred earlier this week. The young boy transported to hospital by paramedic services, has succumbed to his injuries.” The fact that the collision involved a school bus was not even mentioned in the police notification.
Official news media have also not reported any useful information although they are at a disadvantage if police refuse to release that information. Yet in the past when professional, investigative journalism was in existence, news persons were able to snoop around the official circles and exteract the details that were not officially released. That is no longer the case.
Objective, unbiased information about what happened is not just for the purpose of satisfying the curiosity of the public. Such information plays a crucial role in determining if mistakes were made, if policies and procedures need to be changed and in educating the public about preventing future tragedies.
Traffic collisions are complex events. They are advertised as being caused by one or two major factors while the reality is that many others have an influence that could have prevented a collision from occurring. This reality never reaches the public psyche. Information that is spread through unofficial sources provides some benefits but it is often unreliable. The source of unofficial information may be a “witness”, or someone who claims to be so. But it may also be someone who has no knowledge about the incident and is simply spreading rumours for many reasons. Information that is actual misinformation is not just a nuisance but it can be detrimental to public safety when the unsuspecting public comes to believe something that did not occur or could not occur.
Without any knowledge about what happened in the actual event it is the duty of Gorski Consulting to refrain from spreading gossip and provide some broad comments, without suggesting that they apply to this actual case.
Some School Bus Safety Facts
School buses operating in the Province of Ontario are required to be of a minimal safety level that is beyond the norm for typical, privately operated vehicles. Unlike drivers of private vehicles school bus drivers must complete a “circle check” of their vehicle every morning before taking it onto the road. Import issues views such as the status of what exists in the engine compartment, the condition of the steering system, suspension system and the bus wheels/tires.
The lighting of most modern school buses can be checked by simply pressing a lamp-check button on the instrument panel. This button activates all the lights on the bus in succeeding/alternating fashion. So the school bus driver needs to step outside the bus and walk around it as the lighting comes on and off. Every light that functions on the bus is turned on and off when it is functioning properly during this test. When a driver sees that a particular light is not coming on he/she must report it is a log book and to the bus operator/mainenance so that the problem can be repaired. Some malfunctions can be minor and some major. If a major malfunction exists, such as the failure of the red, flashing, overhead lights, the bus cannot be driven until the malfunction is repaired.
School buses are generally large vehicles. They are as wide as a typical tractor-trailer truck combination and they are about 2 1/2 times longer than a typical passenger car, or about 12.5 metres in length. Even the smaller, 20-seater, van-based school buses are of the size and weight of the heaviest, full-size passenger van.
The floor of a full-size school bus is just over 1 metre above the ground and thus the seats of the bus are well above the height of a typical passenger car. This means that when an impact occurs with most cars and light trucks there is minimal likelihood that the side of the bus will be crushed into where the students are seated.
The front axle of a full-size school bus is located up to a metre behind the front bumper and its engine also exists in front of the driver’s seating position. The bus driver generally sits about 2.4 meters behind the front bumper. These features protect the school bus driver in many serious, frontal impacts that may involve substantial crush.
The height of a typical school bus may be a little more than 3 metres. The overhead lights on a typical, full-size school bus are generally about 2.8 metres above the ground. While this is higher than almost all light-duty vehicles it is not as high as some heavy trucks. Many tractor, semi-trailer combinations are operated with a typical, box, semi-trailer whose height is taller than the height of the overhead lights of a school bus and this can be a problem.
When coming to a stop a bus driver must activate certain lights that warn other drivers of that imminent action. Typically amber warning lights are activated usually more that 5 seconds before the actual stop but how early that occurs is dependent on the preferences of the individual driver.
Once the bus has come to a stop the driver presses an “Open” door button or toggle switch. Older buses still exist where the doors are opened by the driver pulling on a manual handle that is attached to the doors. Regardless, once the doors begin to be opened the stop sign located on the left side of the bus rotates outward and flashing lights on the perimeter of the stop sign begin to flash. Also there are alternating, overhead, red lights that come on. The actual arrangement of actions and responses varies slightly from one bus to another.
Some Details About The Longwoods Crash Site
While no information has been released about how the 7-year-old boy was killed at the Longwoods Road crash site, some comments can be made based on the known features of the site.
Longwoods Road is the new name for the old Provincial Highway #2. This road was the primary artery for carrying vehicles east/west in South-Western Ontario for many years until the Highway 401 expressway was built in the early 1960s. To this day Longwoods Road still carries a substantial amount of traffic including heavy trucks. City of London traffic volume data indicates that approximately 6 to 8 thousand vehicles pass along Longwoods Road near Murray Road every day. While the setting is generally rural it has progressively been changing to suburban elements as the edges of the City of London have grown progressively closer to the site. A Googlemaps view of the site’s location with respect to the City of London is shown below.
A closer view of the site is shown in the next Googlemaps view.
The Googlemaps view below is a street view looking eastward along Longwoods Road towards Murray Road. It shows that the roadway contains a gentle curve in the vicinity of Murray Road.
A traffic volume of 6 to 8 thousand vehicles per day in an 80 km/h speed zone represents a challenging scenario for picking up and delivering students by school bus. When the roadway contains a curve additional complications develop whereby visibility becomes an added problem. In such circumstances attention must be paid to the selection of a proper stop location.
In the London region Southwestern Ontario Student Transportation Services is an organization that is responsible for organizing school bus services to the public and Catholic school boards. Their website provides the following description of their responsibilities:
“STS is responsible for planning and coordinating school bus service for close to 50,000 who live in Elgin, Middlesex, and Oxford counties and in the city of London. STS contacts school bus companies who are responsible for the daily service and the bus drivers are their employees.”
While several school bus companies operate in the London area it is actually the personnel at STS who design the routes and stop locations for every school bus. Each year the school bus routes are changed and prior to the start of the school year school bus drivers make preliminary “drive through” runs of the new routes to ensure that they can be completed in the times estimated by STS. Routes may involve as little as one stop or as many as 15 or more depending on what STS deems reasonable.
Often a school bus will complete a morning route to deliver children to high schools and then they will complete a second route for delivery of younger children to elementary schools.
In the afternoon school buses arrive at local high schools generally between 1400 and 1440 hours. After these routes are completed the buses then travel to the elementary schools around 1525 to 1535 hours where they pick-up the younger children. School buses generally leave the property of elementary schools around 1535 to 1550 hours.
It is not known for sure however the child who was killed may have attended Lambeth Public School which is just over 2 kilometres from the area where the reported collision occurred. The direction in which the school bus was travelling just prior to the collision would depend on the actual route assigned by STS.
Potential Collision Causal Factors
There are many factors that could potentially affect what occurred. One is driver distraction. It is generally agreed in bus driving circles that routes driven for elementary schools are more distracting. Not all situations are the same however high school students have been socialized over the years so that they generally stay in their seats while riding a bus. Elementary school children are often more difficult to keep in their seats and bus drivers must often keep an eye in their mirrors and tell children to sit down. Elementary school children are also more noisy, especially during the afternoon ride home. These distractions are more common when there are more children on a bus and they are more common in the early portion of a route when children have not yet been let off. As the route progresses and more children depart the level of noise and distraction generally dies down. Given the rural nature of the Longwoods Road collision site, the number of children exiting at any particular stop would be smaller than in the condensed areas of an urban stop. So it would generally be easier for a school bus driver to pay attention to any students exiting the bus because there would be fewer children to monitor.
STS goes to great lengths to create bus stops where a child exits “door side” rather than having to cross the road. That becomes more important on rural highways. News media reports and the content of the police news release suggest that there could have been other vehicles involved in the collision other than the school bus. But that has not been officially stated. Why such basic information is kept secret does not appear to make sense. If the boy was struck by another vehicle, and not by the school bus, then it is most likely that the child had to cross the road after exiting the bus. This is of particular concern because such a stop is highly avoided by STS, for good reasons. This why information about how and why the bus stop was selected needs to be publicly revealed.
A common procedure has been established that, where a child crosses in front of a school bus, the child is told to wait and get a signal from the bus driver before proceeding out onto the roadway. This is because the bus driver can see traffic behind and in front from an elevated position and the bus driver’s experience can help a child make a safe crossing. Again, nothing is known if the bus driver was ever aware of such a procedure or if it was taught to the school children at the school where the boy attended.
The photo below was taken several years ago at another site on the outskirts of London. It shows a typical example of a rural school bus stop. We can see an example of a child being escorted across the road by a parent. Behind the bus is a large tractor-trailer which has stopped a considerable distance away from the stopped school bus. This action by the truck driver, of stopping a long distance away from the bus, is an important action because the height of the truck could block the visibility of the school bus lights from the drivers of vehicles behind.
When school bus drivers see that a large truck has stopped behind the bus then a greater focus must be applied to be certain that the bus lights are not blocked by the truck. While uncommon, drivers can see a stopped truck in front of them and, without understanding why, they may try to pass the truck because they do not see the school bus. Again complications like these need to be considered and corrected if they apply.
Weather conditions might also need to be considered. On the afternoon of the collision date the temperatures were unusually high in the area of London: 7 to 9 degrees Celsius. While there were concerns that fog may have been one of the causal factors that does not appear to be obvious. The photo below, although out-of-focus, was taken on the collision date shortly after 1600 hours at a location on the west side of London. It shows that rain was falling and the presence of fog is not obvious. It is known that fog can exist, and can be more intense, in rural areas like Longwoods Road even though it is not obvious in the city itself.
Summary
The safety of children riding in school buses is understood by all involved. School personnel understand it, parents understand it, bus drivers and operators understand it, police understand it and so should all drivers on the road. Children are vulnerable to dangers that they cannot comprehend, often due to their lack of experience in the world. It is up to all persons and organizations to create the environment that is safe for children.
When a tragedy occurs it is often the regrettable response that persons are afraid that focus will be placed on them, their actions and their organizations for something that they may have done incorrectly. This is commonly seen in transportation collisions. The common response is that all those in control of information about what happened attempt to hide the information. The regrettable result is that, when a problem needs to be corrected, and a safety hazard needs to nullified, it becomes a tedious process, even the basic information is hidden. Such is likely to be the case with the current tragedy as it has been repeated numerous times before. It seems that even the safety of innocent school children is not important enough to change this cloak of secrecy.
2024 Cyclist Observations Now Available For London Ontario
New data is now available from observations of cyclists in London, Ontario carried out by Gorski Consulting in the year 2024. This data is obtained from a dashcam mounted at the windshield of a car. It shows the status of cyclists riding on the roadway or adjacent to it, on a sidewalk for example. This data can be compared to previous years, since the year 2021.
Below is the data from 2024.
The summary shown at the bottom of this table shows that 1204 cyclists were observed in 2024, 1032 of those were male and only 151 were female. In 21 instances the gender of the cyclist could not be identified.
Sidewalk usage was defined as all those cyclists who were observed either riding, walking on standing on a sidewalk accompanied by their cycle. This also included cyclists who were observed riding or walking through a pedestrian crossing because any such cyclists almost exclusively entered the pedestrian crossing from a sidewalk. It can be seen in the summary that 62.8% of males and 70.9% of females were observed on a sidewalk.
In 2024 only 12.54% of observed cyclists were females. This is fairly consistent with results from previous years as shown in the tables below.
Data From Previous Years
The following table shows cyclist observations from the year 2023.
The next table shows data from the year 2022.
And the final table below shows the data from the year 2021.
Discussion
As shown in the above tables, a total of 3884 cyclists were documented in the 4-year period of 2021 to 2024. These observations can be broken down to the following categories:
Male = 3221
Female = 501
Gender unk = 162
Thus, in the 3722 observations where gender was known, the 4-year average for female cyclist observations was 13.46%. While minor variances exist from year to year the general conclusion is that the female percentage of cyclists has remained relatively stable. Or there is no indication that the percentage of females has been increasing over the past 4 years. This conclusion is stubbornly concerning. If the cycling mode of transportation is to be increased the greatest opportunity to do so is through an increase in the low values of female participation. Yet the observations documented by Gorski Consulting indicate that female cyclist participation is not improving.
Yet the observations shown here are not a full indicator of what is happening with respect to cycling in the City of London. Gorski Consulting has also been involved in targeted traffic studies at specific locations these provide different results. For example, several studies have been performed along London’s Thames Valley Parkway (TVP), and sites such as Blackfriars Bridge in downtown London, and at the site of a new cycling lane on Colborne Street at St James Street. These targeted studies show that female participation is higher than the City average. Further articles need to be posted on the Gorski Consulting website to provide more detail about these findings.
Cyclist usage of sidewalks is often an indicator of the lack of safety perceived by cyclists who are required, by law, to ride within a lane designated for motor vehicle traffic. As seen in the above tables the percentage of cyclists observed on sidewalks is substantially above 50%. On some roads that percentage of sidewalk usage is much higher. Various public officials and police do not officially recognize this discrepancy. This reality needs to reach the general public and a discussion needs to be had about what safety improvements need to be made to keep cyclists safe.
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