Crash Retrieval Software Continues to Crash
Old school motor vehicle collision reconstruction methods involved detailed documentation of various evidence at a site and on the damaged vehicles. While some of that process still continues, the modern reconstructionist now attaches a piece of computer hardware (Crash Data Retrieval Kit) and, with the properly functioning software, is able to download multitudes of detailed data such as the vehicle’s speed, collision severity and the status of various driver inputs for several seconds before a crash. So collision reconstruction seems to have advanced, or so it would seem.
Those who are reliant on this downloading process have, on occasion, complained about being unable to obtain data for various reasons. Many of these problems have to do with having the proper cables, back-powering of the system and because the downloading process varies depending of vehicle and manufacturer.
But lately the process has become more complicated as reconstructionists have complained that they cannot get the software to “wake up” for unexplained reasons. The problems occur often when there is an update to the software. It is inconvenient because a reconstructionist may only have one chance to conduct the download as the vehicle is often available for only a single occasion. Even police cannot keep possession of a vehicle forever and must release it to the owner even if a solution is not found in the downloading process. This leads to considerable stress as very important data becomes unavailable.
Crash Data Retrieval is not practically available to the average vehicle owner. While governments have enacted legislation requiring that the data be available, that just does not happen. The costs of hardware and software and additional costs to hire someone to do the work makes it essentially impossible for the average owner to get the data unless they have the resources to spend thousands of dollars. What remains is that the big people: the insurers, the police and various research groups have access and no one else.
Yet when the hardware/software functions unreliably, on too many occasions, even those big people are not happy.
13-Yr-Old Female Cyclist Dies At Rossland & Stevenson At East Edge Of Toronto Ontario
News media provided a very short description of a collision on the eastern outskirts of Toronto Ontario, where by a 13-year-old female cyclist was killed in a collision on Rossland Road Stevensgate Drive on November 6, 2024. No information was provided as to how the collision occurred or even basic facts about what factors might have been involved. Such lack of information is standard procedure throughout the Province of Ontario where cyclists are kept in the dark about dangers that might kill them. No one can conduct any meaningful analysis to evaluate how cyclist collisions might be avoided or reduced in their consequences without basic information about them.
In a roundabout attempt to obtain basic information about cyclist characteristics and factors that may be affecting their safety Gorski Consulting has been monitoring cyclists travelling along the streets of London. Each year approximately 1000 cyclists are documented with still photographs. At the end of each year general summaries of the findings are provided on the Gorski Consulting web site. Cyclist data has been analysed for 2024 through to the end of October and these results are shown below.
As can be seen more cyclists (1073) have been documented in the first 10 months of the year compared to previous years. Over the years it has been observed that females represent about 10 to 15% of the total observations however in 2024 that percentage remains at almost 27%. With two months remaining in the year some fluctuations may still occur but the data about greater female riders is intriguing.
While the official law in Ontario is that cyclists should not ride on sidewalks the observational data in London continues to demonstrate how the law is being ignored. As can be seen above almost two-thirds of male cyclists have been observed on sidewalks whereas the numbers for females is even higher at close to three-quarters. These results are not unique for the year 2024 as the results are similar for previous years. Government dictates are ignored sometimes because they are unrealistic and these cyclist data demonstrate that fact. In many instances cyclists are safer riding on sidewalks and many cyclist know that, leading to the noted observations.
It would help to know how the current fatal collision involving the 13-year-old cyclist in Ajax compares to the collected data. Unfortunately that information will likely remain a mystery.
School Bus Fatal Impact of Pedestrian In Toronto – Another Visibility Issue?
Minimal information was provided after a school bus reportedly struck an elderly pedestrian near Yonge Street and Silverwood Ave in Toronto on November 5, 2024. Because the school bus left the collision site it would seem consistent that an outrage would ensue and the collision would be reported as a purposeful “hit and run” collision. Such hit and runs are frequently reported in other major collisions long before any meaningful understanding has been developed as to what might have happened. News media reported that the school bus driver “fled the scene” but investigators eventually found the driver, but their name has not been released and no charges have been laid while the investigation is on-going.
Few in the public domain have any access to the details of a collision investigation and often informed judgments are made simply because the event is disturbing and something must be said regardless. In this confused realm the truly innocent are rolled up with the truly guilty as often what matters are the consequences rather than the actual actions of the accused.
Overhead views of the collision site provided by news media indicate that the present collision occurred at an intersection and this leads to a common concern that visibility issues might have been causal factors in the incident.
There is also an issue that, a contact made between a massive bus and the pedestrian, may not be detected by a school bus driver and therefore a driver might continue driving not recognizing that a collision occurred. Not only is such a result possible in school bus collisions but it may occur in any collision between a motor vehicle and a pedestrian or cyclist.
The Gorski Consulting website contains a number of articles dealing with visibility issues, and some specifically dealing with visibility challenges in school buses. In an article posted on February 17, 2023 (“School Bus Visibility Obstruction Could Kill You“) we discussed the details of how pedestrian’s presence could be masked from a bus driver’s view during a left turn at an urban intersection. This article provided specific measurements and the obstructions provided by the mirrors and roof pillars of a school bus and also provided a motion analysis between a bus and a walking pedestrian.
In another article posted to the Gorski Consulting website on February 15, 2024 (“Left-Turning School Bus Causes Pedestrian Fatality in St Thomas Ontario“) we also provided comments about the blind-spots existing on van-based school buses and how these could lead to impacts with a pedestrian at an intersection.
Regrettably important details about how school bus collisions might be affected by visibility issues are never drawn the public’s attention. Many parents, school personnel and school officials do not know about these details and therefore are unable to pass on such important information to school children or to pedestrian’s in general.
Additional Speeding Data & Speed Display Board Evaluation in London Ontario Canada
Background
Recently Gorski Consulting has been involved in a study of speeding and the functioning of a Speed Display Board (SDB) erected on Hale Street in London, Ontario, Canada. Preliminary results of the study were posted on October 11, 2024, in a Gorski Consulting website article entitled “Motor Vehicle Speed Detection in London, Ontario, Canada”. That article discussed the analysis of a two-hour video session conducted on October 5, 2024 between 2050 and 2250 hours. Since then additional video sessions were completed and analysed comprising of 8, 2-hour sessions. The present article will review the results from 7 of these sessions. The dates and times of the 8 sessions are noted below.
October 4, 2024 between 2100 & 2300 hours
October 5, 2024 between 0600 & 0800 hours
October 5, 2024 between 1600 & 1800 hours
October 5, 2024 between 2050 & 2250 hours
October 14, 2024, between 1500 & 1700 hours
October 15, 2024, between 1700 & 1900 hours
October 21, 2024 between 1800 & 2000 hours
October 30, 2024, between 1000 & 1150 hours.
There was a technical problem with a portion of video from one of the cameras in the October 4, 2024 session that prevented last hour of the session from being analysed. Thus the first hour of that session could still be analysed but this has not been done. For the present article only the results from the last 7 sessions will be reviewed.
The table below shows these results.
The SDB was removed on November 4, 2024 or exactly one month after it was erected. Looking at the results in the table there is no indication that the speeds of vehicles were lowed by the presence of the SDB. The average maximum speeds were substantially higher than the Posted Maximum Speed for the road. Also of concern is the high percentage of vehicles found to be travelling at 20 or more kilometres above the posted speed limit.
Because of the erratic functioning of the SDB only a small segment of the northbound vehicles could be included in this documentation. The SDB was confused whenever two or more vehicles existed in the 180-metre detection zone. So the only observations that could be included were those where there was only one vehicle present in that zone. On a number of occasions, even when a single vehicle was present in that zone, the SDB would, inexplicable, fail to detect the presence of the vehicle.
In other instances the SDB would continue displaying a speed well after the observed vehicle had exited the detection zone. In those instances when a second vehicle entered the detection zone the speed from the exited vehicle continued to be displayed and so the data from the second observation had to be aborted because it could not be certain whether the SDB was still showing the speed from the first vehicle or whether it was now showing the speed from the vehicle that entered the detection zone.
In conditions where it was sunny, or partially sunny, the SDB had difficulty detecting a vehicle in the detection zone, even when only one vehicle existed. Thus many observations in those conditions had to be aborted.
In many instances the SDB was late in detecting a vehicle until it was almost leaving the detection zone. It was not clear why this occurred. This often occurred in daylight hours. Yet upon approaching darkness, or in nighttime conditions, the SDB was often able to detect vehicles close to the start of the 180-metre detection zone. Our decision was to include those vehicles in our analysis even though the SDB was late in detecting them, so long as only one vehicle was present in the detection zone and there was no ambiguity as to the vehicle speed being reported by the SDB.
Despite these difficulties previous testing has shown that SDBs were reasonably accurate in displaying speed. This was confirmed on previous occasions by our multi-video camera testing where we could independently compare the SDB’s display to the speed that was calculated from our synchronized video-camera test methods.
So the primary problem is that the results from the SDB would not be reliable if an analyst was attempting to determine the average speed of all vehicles passing through the site. Because of the problems that the SDB had in detecting every vehicle such an analysis would not be possible. It is not known at this time whether the SDBs erected on Hale Street had the capability of recording events and creating a file of all the displays from the SDB. This could be a concern if officials from a municipality were to use such data blindly without knowing that the file would be greatly corrupted by the discussed detection problems.
It is reasonable however, from our experience in assessing the SDB’s functioning, that accurate speed data can be selected from the display by watching its function through video while also watching a vehicle passing through the detection zone, and then selecting those observations where the displayed speed was known to be accurate.
The observations shown in the above table are only those where a driver was not interfered with selecting a speed of their own free will. Thus they were not obstructed by vehicles ahead of them and their reported speed was not corrupted by any other vehicles with the SDBs detection zone. Thus these observations are an accurate reflection of what speeds drivers selected even though a Maximum Posted Speed sign was located, and clearly visible, just beyond 100 metres south of the start of the detection zone. It was noted that of the total of 719 observations there were only 4 in which a vehicle’s maximum speed was 40 km/h or lower. This is only about 0.56%. So one could argue that about 99.5% of northbound drivers on Hale Street were speeding because they were travelling above the posted speed limit. The Maximum Posted Speed sign had been erected in September 2022 or over two years prior to this study.
Discussion
When a maximum posted speed of 5 km/h is posted on any roadway it is highly likely that all motor vehicles travelling through it will be ‘speeding’. But is that a fault of the drivers or is it the fault of posting an unreasonably low maximum speed? Any reasonable person would conclude that the 5 km/h posted speed was unreasonable. So an important component of the issue is whether a posted speed limit is reasonable. Reductions in motor vehicle speed provide obvious benefits. Vehicles travelling at slower speeds are likely to improve traffic safety. But a negative aspect is that they also increase the time required for persons to reach their destinations. These two conflicting issues need to be kept in mind when considering what speed should be legal on any roadway.
Another short-sighted viewpoint expressed by many is that the posting of a lower speed limit will automatically reduce vehicle speeds. This study on Hale Street demonstrates the fallacy of such a belief since the speed limit was reduced over two years before this study yet the observed speeds are elevated.
Even when roadways are designed with speed-limiting features, they may not improve the overall benefit to society. Speed humps, in-lane obstructions and narrowed lanes are believed to improve safety by reducing vehicle speeds. But much of the research does not take into account the complicated factors that are neglected. While average speeds may be reduced there is little information whether the behavior of the small percentage of high-risk drivers is modified. In fact, the reduction of speed by the vast majority of drivers may simply hide the existence of the small percentage of high-risk drivers who continue to drive recklessly.
Also, many ‘minor’ collisions that are caused by speed-limiting features are hidden from official statistics. When a vehicle strikes a hazard marker placed within a lane there could be relatively minor damage but the reality is that it is costly. A vehicle must be taken into an autobody shop to make those repairs. And the owner loses time which is also a cost that is not taken into account. And when such a roadway obstacle is struck it may also sustain damage that needs to be repaired. A roadway repair crew must come to the site and do the repairs but often that cost is not taken into account. Vehicles are also damaged by striking the curb of a narrowed roadway. And collisions can occur when drivers travel too quickly over a speed hump. All these instances are not taken into account yet they are factors in the cost-benefit analysis to society as a whole.
Yet there is reason to be concerned about the elevated, observed speeds on Hale Street. Our estimate indicates that Hale Street has a width of about 11.4 metres. When we consider that most lanes on collector roads would be about 3.5 metres wide, then a typical street would be about 7.0 in width. The additional 4.4 metres of width on Hale Street means that those attempting to cross it will experience some challenges when motor vehicle speeds are high. It is also likely that vulnerable persons might be in danger. Pedestrians crossing Hale Street may have difficulties so there has to be some research done to determine how many pedestrians exist in the area, how many of them cross Hale Street and whether their characteristics (age, frailty) might need additional attention. There is a transit bus route on Hale Street which might also attract pedestrians. And the volume of cyclists using Hale Street must also be taken into considerable.
In all this study has demonstrated some challenges on many fronts. However it also provides some useful data about the existence of motor vehicle speeding in London and how the functioning of Speed Display Boards may need a second look.
Four-Fatal Telsa Impact & Fire on Lakeshore & Cherry in Downtown Toronto
Not unexpectedly many questions will not be answered regarding the cause-of-death of four occupants of a Tesla that reportedly struck a guardrail and pillar while subsequently catching fire on Lakeshore Boulevard near Cherry Street in downtown Toronto early Thursday morning, October 24, 2024. News media that reported the tragedy did not answer basic questions that ought to have been asked if the public were to be properly advised about what occurred.
The news media were able to obtain a quick response from police when it came to blaming the Tesla’s speed for the results. However there was not evidence provided to support that comment. Any event data that might exist in the Tesla’s control modules would take time to download, more time than normal because the vehicle’s burned condition would make it harder to locate the relevant modules and “dig them out” of the fire debris. So it is highly unlikely that police conducted any such download before commenting on the speed. Traditional methods of estimating speed of a loss-of-control vehicle would involve examining any evidence on approach to the impacts, estimating how much crush existed on the vehicle as a result of the impacts, and then considering what additional speed loss occurred after those impacts. These three areas of evidence are difficult to judge/calculate in a short time so once again, it is doubtful that any proper speed estimate was determined at this early stage of the investigation. But news media seemed to take that information blindly, and report it to the public, without questioning it.
Another issue is that a guardrail was reportedly struck yet the Tesla also struck a “pillar”. Generally, that is not supposed to happen. We spend considerable money to erect guardrails for the specific purpose of preventing vehicles from striking something dangerous that is beyond those guardrails. So why was the “pillar” struck? And did news media even try to find out what pillar was struck? Even without knowing the precise location of the impacts a previous visit to the area in February of 2024 confirmed that the area was under construction and that guardrails were positioned essentially against the pillars that held up the Gardiner Expressway. Anyone with even minimal knowledge of roadside protections would understand that a guardrail is meant to deflect errand vehicles from stiff and immovable objects such as concrete pillars but, in doing so they need space so they can be deformed laterally. This is what protects vehicle occupants during the re-direction phase of contact. But when a guardrail is placed directly against a concrete pillar it is essentially useless because the guardrail has no time or space in which to complete that re-direction. Driving along Lakeshore Boulevard confirmed that many pillars were far too close to guardrails in the area. But news media never seemed to recognize that or question it.
Furthermore there was the issue of road construction and whether it existed at the time that the collision occurred. Nothing was mentioned about this yet it is common that re-directing traffic in construction zones is one of the ways in which dangerous vehicle motions are generated.
And the matter of the occurrence of a vehicle fire seemed to be a commonplace event in the minds of news media. As if vehicle fires should be expected, regardless of any circumstances. Yet one of the Canadian Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (CMVSSs) deals specifically with preventing vehicle fires in crashes. New vehicles that catch fire in controlled tests would not be allowed on Canadian roads if they failed those tests. Did the news media ever ask anyone whether it was reasonable for the Tesla to catch fire in this collision?
One of the ways one can assess collision severity is by looking at the extent of deformation or crush to a vehicle. While there was obvious fire damage to the Tesla, what few images of the vehicle existed did not show a massive extent of crush. Nothing that should mean that a fire was inevitable. But did the news media question that?
A lot of questions, no answers and likely no answers ever in the future.
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