Another Acquittal Seems Like Bad Dream From “Groundhog Day” Movie

Time after time, bad things repeat themselves until an enlightened change is realized and employed.

A comedic movie from 1993 entitled “Groundhog Day” seems out of context with the latest news of another acquittal of a man who was finally found innocent decades after a murder in Winnipeg, Manitoba in the mid-1970s. Watching the news conference unfold on October 3, 2024, in front of the Law Courts building in Winnipeg, demonstrated that the two have a bazaar relationship.

At the news conference were lawyers for the convicted/acquitted man, Jerome Kennedy and James Lockyer, director of the Innocence Canada.

Bill Murray, who starred in the Groundhog Day movie, became trapped in a time warp such that he kept reliving Groundhog Day, over and over again, until he came to a special realization about life. This realization released him from his time warp prison and the movie ended. While the movie was just fiction, one could believe that what goes on in many courtrooms in Canada is also just that, fiction, with a large spoonful of deception.

In real life, the news conference was about the acquittal of an indigenous man, Clarence Woodhouse, who was convicted of murder, based on false statements developed by police who reportedly tricked Woodhouse, who was not fluent in English, and “coerced and manufactured the statement from Woodhouse” (statement from Crown Attorney).

This process is a Groundhog Day time warp because it has recurred over and over again, after persons have lived in prisons for many years, before being rescued. Names of past persons who were rescued from murder convictions include Steven Truscott, David Milgaard, Donald Marshall, and Guy Paul Morin. But these high profile cases are just the tip of the iceberg. Many wrongful convictions are never reported, often because they involve lesser crimes than murder.

When news conferences are held announcing an acquittal there is often a collective exuberance, expressing a happy occasion. Little emphasis is given to the point that there was a “wrongful” conviction and therefore that there was a wrongful action, by someone, often in the justice system, who destroyed someone’s life. While apologies are given and government money is passed on to the acquitted, nothing further is ever reported as to who was responsible for the miscarriage of justice.

In the Woodhouse retrial Chief Justice Glenn Joyal reportedly apologized to Woodhouse stating “You were wrongfully convicted, You were innocent”. It was also reported that Joyal determined the conviction involved systemic discrimination. It was reported that the judge then went to some length to discuss past wrongdoings of the justice system.

While I have not spent many days in courtrooms, my three dozen appearances as an expert witness in motor vehicle collision cases have led to my own recognition of what took place during those trials.

In one of the earliest trials in the 1980s I witnessed a female driver convicted of killing another driver solely on the false testimony of “witnesses” who claimed to have seen a red vehicle pass them on a dark and rainy night. In fact, I conducted a detailed study of the two involved vehicles. Transport Canada had purchased both vehicles and brought them to Ottawa. Both vehicles were placed on axle stands, a few feet apart, and I spent a full week exploring the vehicle damage, taking measurements and creating scale diagrams. This led to my typical procedures of identifying “points of mutual contact” whereby I could determine how the vehicles moved with respect to each other. This also led to the determination of the direction of rotation of the vehicles which turned out to be contrary to what the witnesses stated. Yet I recall vividly the reported words of the judge who claimed that the manner in which the vehicles moved was obvious from how the vehicles were positioned at rest. He did not need no explanations from an expert. He believed he clearly understood the evidence even though he never conducted a detailed investigation of a damaged vehicle in his life. He further commented that my report was just a series of unreliable personal suppositions. I later contacted a forensic expert at Toronto’s Centre of Forensic Science and obtained further support from another well-known engineer who also supported my conclusions. Despite our opinions this still did not convince the judge. It took an appeal of the conviction to finally exonerate the female driver who went through years of hell in the process. Naively, I concluded that this case was just an outlier while I continued to believe in the ability of the justice system to perform properly.

It took a number of further incidents in the future where I finally came to the conclusion that, indeed, there are major problems with the proper functioning of the justice system. Some judges, who I believed would be unbiased analysts of evidence, have demonstrated that they are unreliable. And because they are accountable to no one, end up destroying the foundations of the justice system that we must all rely on. Whenever a global comment like this is made it affects the reputation of all judges simply because they wear the same cloth and carry the same title. And that is unfortunate.

In my experience the justice system has always been plagued by inappropriate operators, whether they be civilian witnesses, expert witnesses, police and lawyers (on both sides of the aisle). It was always the judges, who were required to be totally unbiased and independent of these coercions, who kept the system in balance. While I have observed some high-quality triers-of-fact I have also observed the opposite: judges who seemed to purposely ignore objective evidence, or prevented evidence from being entered in as testimony, for the seeming purpose of being able to make their decisions solely on their “inferences”, which do not require any objective evidence for their support. These decisions can be called “Because I Say So” or BISS decisions, because they are based on the often mistaken belief that the judge is perfectly capable of discerning who is telling the truth and who is lying regardless of what additional objective evidence may exist. Many years of bench work can be helpful but it can also be misguiding when a judge comes to the belief that they no longer need to listen to evidence as the conclusion has already been made in their mind.

How is it that, after so many years, Justice Joyal was capable of determining there was systemic discrimination in Woodhouse’s case yet that was not appreciated in the original trial? While many glowing comments are made at news conferences where speakers explain how the system has been changed for the better I, regrettably, do not see it in real life.

What Does It Mean When 99.4 % Of Detected Drivers Are Speeding?

Recent analysis of data from a Speed Display Board (SDB) sign on Hale Street in London, Ontario showed that 99.4% of detected drivers were travelling above the posted 40 km/h maximum speed. Is that a problem, and what is the source of that problem?

On September 1, 2022 the posted maximum speed on Hale Street in London, Ontario was reduced from 50 km/h to 40 km/h. On October 4, 2024 the City of London erected four Speed Display Boards (SDBs) along Hale Street between Trafalgar and Dundas Streets. Gorski Consulting examined the functioning and data from one of these boards located in front of the residence at 361 Hale Street, which is located about 200 metres north of Trafalgar Street.

Background

A previous article on this testing entitled “Motor Vehicle Speed Detection in London Ontario Canada” was posted to the Gorski Consulting website on October 11, 024. This article described the study and provided results from one of the 2-hour video sessions from October 5, 2024. Subsequently the data from 2 additional, 2-hour, video sessions was analysed and this will be reported in the current article. The three analysed sessions are described below:

  1. Saturday, October 5, 2024, between 2050 and 2250 hours.
  2. Monday, October 14, 2024, between 1500 and 1700 hours.
  3. Tuesday, October 15, 2024, between 1700 and 1900 hours.

Results

The results from these sessions showed the following with respect to the observed maximum speeds of northbound vehicles passing through the detection zone:

  1. Oct 5/24: Average Detected Maximum Speed in 87 observations = 54.02 km/h.
  2. Oct 14/24: Average Detected Maximum Speed in 147 observations = 53.90 km/h.
  3. Oct 15/24: Average Detected Maximum Speed in 112 observations = 55.74 km/h.

The percentage of vehicles travelling at 20 km/h or higher above the posted speed limit (i.e. 60 km/h or higher) was also noted:

  1. Oct 5/24: 13 of 87 observations or 14.94 %
  2. Oct 14/24: 16 of 147 observations or 10.88 %
  3. Oct 15/24: 28 of 112 observations or 25.00 %

It was also noted that there were only 2 observations, in all three sessions of 346 observations combined, where the maximum observed speed of a northbound vehicle was at 40 km/h or lower. Thus 99.42% of northbound motor vehicles were observed to be travelling above the posted maximum speed of 40 km/h. This result has taken place over two years after the maximum posted speed was reduced so it is difficult to argue that drivers needed more time to adjust to the change in posted speed.

Discussion

In the City of London, like in many cities, there is an increased number of speed camera installations which identify a speeding vehicle and a citation is sent to the vehicle owner. If such a speed camera was present along Hale Street essentially every moving motor vehicle could be cited for speeding. While road safety is affected by motor vehicle speed it is also important to document other exposure factors such as the numbers and characteristics of pedestrians, cyclists and characteristics of the road segment. It remains unknown what intentions the City of London has with the posting of the SDBs on Hale Street. Unfortunately the City of London has always been secretive in its operations and has never released any useful data to the public to support its actions.

Doug Ford Government Teaching Ontario How To Cycle Backwards

Blaming cyclists for traffic grid-lock is a political strategy aimed at increasing tension between cyclists and motor vehicle drivers. Neither cyclist safety nor society as a whole is benefited by removing cycling lanes in Ontario.

Politics is creating a greater rift between cyclists and motor vehicle drivers as the Doug Ford government in the Canadian Province of Ontario is threatening to remove previously installed cycling lanes because their installation by local governments has “gone out of control”. Politicizing such issues as cycling safety is a continued demonstration that some governments will use whatever means are available to attempt to stay in power, even if it means throwing flames on a conflict that jeopardizes public safety.

The creation of cycling lanes should not be an emotional issue but it has become so. Opponents on both sides ought to be looking at good-quality, objective data to understand where their opinions should reside.

At Gorski Consulting we believe and understand that active transportation, including cycling, along with mass public transit, are extremely important to nullify the real effects of climate change. Changes in how we move must be made and these changes need to be made in a way that creates the least conflict, including targeted education that informs why change is needed. Regrettably, the government of Doug Ford is a negative influence in these essential changes.

Ontario Continues To Mis-Report Numbers of Fires in Motor Vehicle Collisions

Vehicle fires must be dramatic and result is serious injury or death before they are reported by official news media. Yet the Government of Ontario provides far less information about the incidence of vehicle fires than news media.

The latest version of the Ontario Road Safety Annual Report (ORSAR) in from 2021 and this is reports collision data that is almost 4 years old. Yet it is the only document that can hold the Government of Ontario accountable for its road safety actions. When new developments arise that affect the public’s safety government data cannot be reliable when it is reporting old data. The issue of vehicle fires is one that is becoming more important and this demonstrates how the Government of Ontario is not properly informing the public able this growing incidence.

Background

Looking back at previous publications of the ORSAR we can see how the government has reported the numbers of vehicle fires as shown in the table below.

We have previously reported that the actual incidence of vehicle fires is higher as demonstrated by the small sample of fire articles that we are able to track from news media reports. That data is shown below.

The graphic shown above is likely a large under-estimate of the actual numbers of vehicle fires occurring because we have limited resources in keeping track of these incidents. The large jump in reports of vehicle fires that is shown after 2015 is likely because we started to become more diligent in tracking news media reports of fires. Yet comparing what is shown in the ORSAR there is an obvious under-reporting of collision fires, even though the news media data are themselves under-estimates of the true incidence.

Data from the latest ORSAR (2021) is shown in the two figures below.

Once again it can be seen that the ORSAR contains a category for “Fire/Explosion” and here we see that there was only one incident of a death, one incident of a personal injury, and 61 incidents of property damage.

Indisputable evidence contradicts what is reported in the ORSAR.

Examples of Fatal and Critical Injury Collisions Involving Collision Fires

As an example, on August 13, 2021 a driver was killed when his vehicle rear-ended a stopped, disabled transport truck on Hwy 401 near Keele Street. The only official announcement was that the vehicle caught fire and the driver died.

Another fatal collision occurred on August 7, 2021 on Blyth Road west of Goderich, Ontario. a single vehicle struck a tree and caught fire. The vehicle was “fully engulfed” by fire.

In another example, a collision occurred at an undisclosed location on a Perth Road near Milverton. New media reported that a person had died at the scene but neither police nor news media reported that a fire had taken place. The only indication of the fire was that a photo was provided by a passerby and included in the news report – That photo showed heavy smoke engulfing a vehicle.

In another example, a fatal collision occurred on June 24, 2021 where a vehicle rear-ended a transport truck on Hwy 400 near the Finch Ave exit. Paramedics indicated that a person was pronounced dead at the scene and police reported that “one” of the vehicles had caught fire.

In another example, a collision occurred on June 17, 2021 near Uxbridge Concession Rod 6 and Ashworth Road. It was reported that a pick-up truck rear-ended a stopped dump truck and the pick-up caught fire. The driver of the pick-up truck was killed.

In another example. an incident occurred on May 8, 2021 on Burnhamthorpe Road and Promontory Crescent in Mississauga, where initial reports did not indicate that a collision occurred, only that a single vehicle travelled off the roadway and caught fire. Subsequently it was reported that a Ferrari sports car had struck a lamp standard and there were reports by witnesses of very large “fireball”. Two persons in the vehicle were reportedly killed.

In another example, police arrived near Howden and Harmony Roads in Oshawa on October 24, 2021 where they located a 2021 Honda Civic that had struck a tree and was engulfed in flames. The lone driver was pronounced dead at the scene.

In another example, on July 7, 2021 a vehicle rolled over and burst into flames outside the Kia car dealership on the Queensway in Toronto. A last report one occupant of the vehicle was in critical condition.

In another example, on January 1, 2021, three vehicles were involved in a collision at the intersection of Wilson Ave and Keels Street in Toronto. One of the vehicles rolled over and caught fire. Officials reported that one person sustained critical injuries but it was not revealed which vehicle that occupant came from.

In another example, on June 29, 2021, police discovered a burning vehicle on the outskirts of Sudbury and they discovered a body in the vehicle. Minimal information was made available with respect to what kind of incident was involved.

In another example, on August 11, 2021, a two-vehicle collision occurred at the intersection of Wonderland Road and Glanworth Drive in South London. One of the vehicles caught fire and an occupant was reported to have sustained fatal injuries. A second occupant sustained life-threatening injuries.

In another example, on December 21, 2021, vehicle struck a backhoe at a construction site on Dundonald Road in Glencoe Ontario. The vehicle then burst into flames and the driver was reportedly killed.

Summary

In summary these are 12 examples where 10 fatalities occurred and 2 persons sustained life-threatening injuries. This evidence is indisputable that fatalities and fires exist that are not being reported in official Ontario statistics such as the ORSAR . In a number of these incidents officials appeared to be lax about confirming whether the fatalities were related to the fires. And this is typical of what is taking place whenever a collision fire is involved. Behind this small list of fatal collisions there is a very large number of injury collisions where fires are involved but are not being reported. And there are even a much larger number of incidents where vehicle fires are not reported because injuries were either minor did not occur.

All this information is based on 4-year-old data because the Province of Ontario has not provided any newer statistics about what is happening now. And that should raise an alarm.

Motor Vehicle Speed Detection in London Ontario Canada

On October 4, 2024 four Speed Display Boards (SDBs) were mounted on various utility poles on Hale Street in East London, Ontario. Independent from the City of London’s activities, Gorski Consulting conducted multi-video camera documentations from one of these displays. The erratic functioning of the SDB was also documented.

Background

Documenting of motor vehicle speeds has become an increasing activity on roadways throughout the world. This has been possible as technology has allowed for for more sophisticated methods. As vehicles become more connected to the roadway infrastructure, and to themselves, accurate and precise speed data will become more pervasive. In the vicinity of London, Ontario, Canada those future connections are still forthcoming, however various forms of traffic surveillance exist. More permanent speed cameras have been authorized by local authorities, primarily at important intersections. However portable traffic monitoring units have also begun to be used at an increasing rate. The City of London has begun posting portable “Scout” traffic monitoring units in designated communities as shown in the example below.

Throughout the spring of 2024 a number of portable Scout traffic monitoring units were installed by the City of London in south London. These units are typically posted for one or two days to provide 24-hour counts of traffic. Such data can also be attached to artificial intelligence algorithms that can rapidly provide detailed information about traffic patterns, volumes and speeds.

As officials have concluded that typical speeding controls by the physical presence of police are expensive, a variety of infrastructure changes have been introduced. Speed bumps, or humps, are a way making it more difficult for the average driver to pass over them at higher speeds and therefore it is believed that this can be a successful method of controlling speed and increasing safety. Various methods of narrowing streets or placing obstacles within the traffic lane are also consistent with the belief that, making it more challenging to pass through them will reduce speeds and increase safety. The success of these changes has never included a detailed documentation of what damage they cause to motor vehicles that pass over or through them and to what degree single vehicle collisions are increased through contacting these structures or by drivers attempting to avoid them. As most such instances result in relatively minor damage they do not make it to official statistics.

Another option has involved the use of Speed Display Boards (SDBs) that display the speed of an approaching vehicle in the hope that this will reduce the driver’s speed. Gorski Consulting has conducted several observational documentations of SDBs in the past with mixed results. A new opportunity revealed itself when, on October 4, 2024, the City of London set up four SDBs on Hale Street in east London, Ontario. This allowed Gorski Consulting to attend at one of the SDBs to document the speeds that the SDB displayed. This also allowed for an assessment of the functioning of the SDB.

Description of the Current Speed Display Board (SDB) Study

In our recent studies on Hale Street two-hour video sessions were completed on four dates:

October 4,2024 between 2100 & 2300 hours

October 5, 2024 between 0600 & 0800 hours

October 5, 2024 between 1600 & 1800 hours

October 5, 2024 between 2050 & 2250 hours

These sessions documented northbound vehicles in the distance from the north end of the roundabout of Hale, through to the location of the SDB, just past the north end of the property at 361 Hale Street, as shown in the graphic below.

This is a Google maps view of the zone on Hale Street in London, Ontario where the Speed Display Board was able to detect northbound vehicles. First detection occurred just as vehicles were near the bottom of the slope at the roundabout. The detection ceased at the north end of the property at 361 Hale Street where the SDB was located. This detection distance was approximately 180 metres.
This is a photo of Hale Street showing a northward view of traffic during rush hour on Friday, October 4, 2024. The Speed Display Board (SDB) can be seen on the closest utility pole, above the roofs of the southbound vehicles. Another SDB also exists on the third pole in the distant background but this was not the focus of the study.
This is a view looking southbound on Hale Street on the morning of October 8, 2024. Note the vast difference in traffic volume compared to the previous photo. The SDB can be seen on the closest utility pole on the right. The up-slope in the background is where the roundabout exists at the intersection with Trafalgar Road.

For this present article only the data from the last session, October 5, 2024 between 2050 and 2250 hours, will be reviewed.

Throughout the present study the SDB was noted to function erratically. Its display would become confused when there was more than one vehicle within the 180-metre detection zone. At times the SDB would continue displaying a speed for several seconds after the last vehicle already exited the detection zone. At other times the SDB failed to detect the presence of a vehicle even when there was no interference and there was only a single vehicle approaching through the detection zone.

However It is believed, based on previous experience, that these detection failures do not carry over into providing inaccurate displays of actual approach speed of the vehicles that have been detected. On several occasions the speed displayed by a SDB has been compared to the speed calculated from our multi-vehicle camera procedures and it has been found that the two methods come to substantial agreement with respect to the actual speed of vehicles.

Results From Current Traffic Study

A review of the speed data showed that, in the two-hour session from 2050 to 2250 hours , a total of 87 observations of northbound vehicles were documented. There were actually many more northbound vehicles present however, due to the known problems that the SDB had with reliable detection, documentation was made only in those occasions where a single vehicle was present within the detection zone. This was done to be certain that the displayed speed data was not contaminated by confusion of the SDB when more than one vehicle was present in the detection zone. Thus there were a number of occasions where a line of several northbound vehicles passed through the site but they could not be documented because it was known that the SDB would not be able to distinguish between the speed of each vehicle in the detection zone.

The speed data that was collected included the speed indicated by the SDB when the vehicle first became detected. At night-time it was observed that the SDB could first detect vehicles at a distance of about 180 metres. In daytime hours this distance was much shorter. While it cannot be known for certain it is believed that during nighttime the contrast between the headlights of approaching vehicles and the dark surroundings made it easier for the SDB to detect a vehicle.

A second speed was documented which was the highest speed detected during the time that the SDB was displaying the approaching vehicle’s speed. In a very large percentage of times the speed at first detection was also the highest speed that as detected.

A third speed was documented which was the final speed displayed on the SDB as the approaching vehicle exited the detection zone.

The posted maximum speed in this zone of detection was 40 km/h. It was found that the average speed of northbound vehicles at initial detection was 52.72 km/h. The average maximum speed detected during the full travel distance was 54.02 km/h. And the average speed when the vehicles exited the detection zone was 43.21 km/h.

The conclusion drawn from this study is that drivers were travelling substantially faster than the posted maximum speed when they entered the detection zone. Some of those drivers travelled even faster as they passed through the detection zone. However the data shows that the average driver responded well to observing the speed shown on the SDB and average speeds were reduced to just above the posted maximum speed by the time that vehicle exited the detection zone. However not all the news was good.

Thirteen of the 87 northbound vehicles were observed to be travelling above 60 km/h or over 20 km/h above the posted speed limit. Thus about 15 per cent of drivers were driving at 20 km/h or faster than the posted speed limit. This is fairly consistent with results obtained by Gorski Consulting from other sites in past studies. However, of the 87 documented vehicles, not a single vehicle was ever observed to pass through the detection zone at a maximum speed of 40 km/h or lower. Thus it could be argued that 100 per cent of the documented vehicles were “speeding”.

However, at the end of the detection zone 23 of the 87, or 26 per cent, vehicles were observed to be travelling at 40 km/h or less. This may indicate a temporary success or it may also have some longer lasting effects that would need further study.

Other Speed Studies At Site

Previously Gorski Consulting had conducted several, multi-video camera studies on Hale Street. Several sessions were conducted in June, 2021 when Hale Street was still signed with a 50 km/h maximum speed. In these sessions the purpose was to document traffic (motor vehicle and cyclist) and pedestrian volume. Thus speeds were not calculated.

The Maximum Posted Speed on Hale Street was reduced to 40 km/h on approximately September 1, 2022. Before this change took place two speed studies were conducted by Gorski Consulting in May of 2022 at the same site of Hale Street where the current SDB analysis was conducted. On Wednesday, May 11, 2022 synchronized, multiple video cameras were set up and speeds were documented over a one-hour period. In that study only non-interfered vehicles were documented. Both northbound and southbound vehicles were documented, commencing at 1335 hours. The results showed that, over the one-hour period, 226 southbound vehicles were documented and their average speed was 57.67 km/h. Ninety-one of these 226 vehicles were observed to be travelling at 60 km/h or more. This percentage is just over 40 per cent. In contrast 245 northbound vehicles were documented and their average speed was 51.56 km/h. Only 17 of those 245 vehicles were observed to be travelling at 60 km/h or higher, or about 6.9 per cent. Thus on this afternoon the average speed of southbound vehicles was much higher than northbound vehicles.

In the second study, on May 21, 2022, vehicle speed documentation was commenced at 1825 hours for one hour. Of the 199 southbound vehicles their average speed was 54.69 km/h. Forty-two of those southbound vehicles were observed to be travelling at or above 60 km/h, or 21.1 per cent. For northbound vehicles 205 were documented with an average speed of 53.51 km/h and 38 of those vehicles travelled at or above 60 km/h, or 18.5 per cent. Thus during these session conducted during the evening the average speeds of northbound and southbound vehicles was similar.

Additional data was also obtained on two other dates but this data has not be analysed up to this time. Thus a speed study was conducted on May 12, 2022 when the posted speed limit was 50 km/h, and another was performed on May 26, 2023 after the posted speed limit was reduced to 40 km/h. Because speed analysis is so time consuming we have not found time to review this data, although this may be done sometime in the future.

Summary

It has been suggested by many that road safety can be improved by posting a reduced maximum speed. Studies by Gorski Consulting suggest this belief is not supported by our traffic data. On Hale Street vehicles were observed to travel substantially above the speed limit of 50 km/h however the speeds varied in terms of time of day and direction of travel. Once the speed limit was reduced to 40 km/h the SDB data showed that, when first detected, motor vehicles continued travel at about the same speed in the new 40 km/h zone as they did when the area was a 50 km/h zone. As the SDB data showed that not a single documented vehicle travelled at or below the 40 km/h speed limit one could argue that 100 per cent of drivers were “speeding” when they were first detected. Yet the SDB data also showed that the vast majority of drivers reduced their speed as they passed through the detection zone. This success may be temporary, or it may have longer lasting benefits. Conclusions can be made if further traffic studies are performed.

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