Safety Technology That Fails Must Be Reported
With the activation of Electronic Stability Control (ESC) more vehicle impacts with roadside objects should involve the front end. When that does not occur an explanation is needed.
It seems logical that, when a technology fails resulting in the crash of an airliner, there should be a public revelation of that fact. Three or five hundred deaths in one incident makes us aware of that importance. But what happens when a technology fails over a number of incidents, such as in motor vehicle collisions, and a similar three to five hundred deaths occur? Does this lessen in importance because the deaths were spread out over a long time and over many incidents? That is an important question.
A few years ago General Motors failed to warn drivers of an ignition failure that resulted (officially) in hundreds of deaths. The public will never know the final tally of destruction. But at least the secret defect was detected and made public even though, for many years, fatal collisions were happening and official investigations were never able to connect the dots.
The public cannot be expected to have the know how or opportunity to document and interpret collision evidence. Our society depends on specialized agencies to perform that work. And when evidence of a failure in a technology is suspected those agencies must make those failures known to the public. No different than the responsibility of airline crash investigators.
There are numerous instances in everyday life where questions arise in collision results. Questions are not raised in the public domain often because there is a lack of recognition that there could be a problem.
As an example, on the evening of Saturday, January 9, 2021, a single vehicle fatal collision occurred on Erin Centre Boulevard in Mississauga, Ontario. Essentially nothing was immediately revealed about the circumstances of the crash. Police placed a tarp covering the full vehicle. The only information made known in the official news media is that one person died and another was injured. It was later revealed that the vehicle had struck a pole and CBC news eventually showed a photo of the damaged vehicle after the tarp had been removed. We are not able to show such a photo due to copyright laws. But why was basic information such as the travel direction (which should have been obvious), or the fact that a pole was struck (which should have been obvious) not revealed? In some instances this is due to timing constraints. But in too many instances fatal collisions occur without even a photo being provided.
In the present collision there was clearly considerable crush to the side of the vehicle indicating that the impact was severe. In many instances severe impacts like these are accompanied by high, initial speeds. And uninformed comments are made that speed must have been a factor. But it is never pointed out that there is no actual basis for that conclusion by simply noting that the collision was severe. As we have pointed out numerous times, the crush shown in the vehicle could indicate, for example, a speed of 80 km/h and that is all. But the vehicle could have been travelling at either 90 or 200 km/h, or more, and we would not know without examining the additional speed losses that occur before and after an impact. This is a mental trap that is left for the public to fall into because no one wishes to provide this simple explanation.
Furthermore, the occurrence of a severe, side impact into any tree, pole or physical object must also come into question. Since the year 2011 Canada has mandated that all new vehicles be equipped with electronic stability control (ESC). This technology is designed to bring “stability” to a vehicle by electronically manipulating the tire force on individual wheels such that the pointing direction of the vehicle lines up with the travel direction of a vehicle. This “stability” is somewhat of a misnomer in that a vehicle may still be involved in a single-single, loss-of-control collision but at least the vehicle will be pointing toward the thing that it eventually strikes rather than striking the object with its side. There are obvious advantages to causing an impact with the front versus the side.
And there are further advantages in that ESC may actually prevent the rotation (yaw) that used to precede almost all loss-of-control collisions. So historically, when we used to see a vehicle that struck a pole we simply accepted it as a normal course of events. But that is no longer true. With the existence of ESC we now must ask why a vehicle was involved in a severe side impact with a pole when ESC is supposed to prevent the pre-crash rotation (yaw). But we do not ask that important question.
With each year motor vehicles are becoming mobile computers with vast electronic hardware. Storage of collision data is increasingly prevalent. While this collision data is available to certain entities such as police and insurance agencies, never is that information available to the public and often not even to the persons involved in a serious collision. When the news media parrot the police news releases that “police are continuing their investigation”, it is extremely rare that the results of a finalized investigation are ever made public. Event data from a crash provide very specific and precise evidence that, with the involvement of a properly trained analyst, can provide a much better explanation of how and why a collision occurred than the initial comments provided immediately after a collision. But that information is never publicly revealed.
With respect to the present crash, several local news agencies in the Toronto area reported on the single vehicle fatal collision. None of these agencies reported on the questionable circumstance that a severe, side impact is difficult to explain without the existence of some external force. How could we expect the public to understand that a safety technology might have failed when neither the investigating police, news media, nor anyone else brings that possibility to the public’s attention? This type of failure to question collision consequences goes on continually. It is why instances such as the GM ignition switch defect are able to continue killing vehicle occupants for many years without detection.
Bridge Abutment Impact By Tractor-Trailer on Hwy 401
This OPP Twitter photo shows a tractor-trailer that struck a bridge abutment on Hwy 401 east of Hwy 400 in Toronto. How do we prevent or reduce these incidents?
While the large destruction caused by heavy truck impacts draws our attention, we fail to acknowledge the danger that truckers face when the roadway infrastructure is insufficient to protect them. The above photo uploaded on the OPP Twitter account shows two tractor-trailers that we involved in a collision a few hours earlier and one them struck a bridge abutment. Drivers of smaller vehicles are generally protected from impacts with such immovable objects. That does not hold true for drivers of heavy trucks. In many locations along Hwy 401 heavy trucks reach 50% of the total traffic volume or more. Yet if a truck driver is involved in an incident that carries the truck toward the roadside there is little or no protection from further consequences. In fact, in many instances roadside structures such as guardrails are too low or weak causing the rollover of a heavy truck and increasing the chances of injury or death. This is a reality that we do not wish to discuss because the solution is costly and not easy to implement.
Another Life Lost on the Red Hill Valley Parkway in Hamilton Ontario
Numerous concerns have been expressed over the collisions along the Red Hill Valley Parkway (RHVP) in Hamilton, Ontario. It did not help that the City lost or hid an engineering report that showed the surface of the Parkway was substandard. Once this became public a class action lawsuit of about $250 million dollars was launched against the City – to be paid by its taxpayers.
The City of Hamilton had a plan to bring back the public’s trust. A judicial inquiry would be held. And so on March 20, 2019 began the formal process of creating the inquiry. A year later the Judicial Inquiry spent close to $2 million dollars. The participants in the inquiry have been narrowed to just 4 while, as yet, no members of the public have received official standing. And the process drags on.
A fatal collision occurred once again at a troublesome location of the RHVP – the northbound section approaching the King Street overpass. The fatal collision occurred in the afternoon of January 2, 2021. No photos are available of the actual crash site because those are copyright. So the public does deserve to know, except what official news entities would like them to know. What can be seen in the news media photos is that a car struck the bridge abutment of the King Street overpass with its front end. This is not supposed to happen on a well-designed, high-volume expressway. Various barriers are supposed to be installed to redirect traffic from impacts with such immovable objects. So what happened this time?
A look at site photos in the vicinity of the rest position of the car shows that a guardrail exists but that rail does not appear to be damaged. In the wisdom of news media no photos were shown further back along the guardrail to see if the vehicle made contact. So the public may never know if the guardrail was involved.
It is known however that previous impacts to the guardrail have occurred. For example, in collision reported on November 22, 2018, a northbound tanker truck struck the guardrail as it approached the bridge abutment. The truck tipped over the rail and the abutment was struck. A large quantity of liquid asphalt was spilt on the highway while the tanker truck came to rest on its left side. Gorski Consulting has continued to warn the public of the incompatibility of typical guardrail heights with heavy trucks. When the rail is too low it can accentuate the rollover of a heavy vehicle, sometimes making collision results more severe than if no rail existed. Was the City of Hamilton aware of this? We will never know.
Gorski Consulting has reached back into its historic photo library to pull out some views of the troublesome site. For example the photo below shows a northward view along the RHVP looking toward the bridge abutment at the King Street overpass. This photo was taken on July 19, 2016. Here you can see the short length of guardrail that precedes the location of the abutment.
But still, looking at the above photo, how goes a vehicle pass by the guardrail and strike the bridge abutment? Clearly the guardrail would prevent a vehicle from impacting the abutment. Yet in the fatal collision of January 2, 2021 the vehicle showed no obvious evidence of being disturbed in an initial guardrail impact.
But let us pull ourselves back a little as shown in the next photo. The photo below was also taken on July 19, 2016 but it is taken from several hundred metres back and we can see another bridge abutment from the Mount Albion Road overpass and, in the background, you can see the King Street overpass. From this angle the guardrail at the King Street overpass is no longer in a position to protect from an impact to the abutment.
And the view below, also taken on July 19, 2106, shows the situation looking toward the King Street overpass from just under the Mount Albion overpass. Here we can see that the guardrail at the King Street overpass is not long enough to protect a vehicle from striking the abutment. There is a clear path between the position of the camera (taken from a moving vehicle in the right lane) to the bridge abutment. Why would engineers from the City of Hamilton not detect this?
It is not that the City of Hamilton was unaware of safety problems at the site. The local newspaper, the Hamilton Spectator produced several articles about the problem. In a July 17, 2017 article entitled “Highway traffic tragedies: Why are there so many crashes on the Red Hill?” Nicole O’Reilly of the Hamilton Spectator, showed a map of the area and overlaid the numbers of collisions documented in by the City of Hamilton. The segment approaching King Street showed the second most number of collisions and the highest number of fatal collisions throughout the whole length of the expressway system including the Lincoln Alexander and the RHVP. Surely you would think the City of Hamilton would take a close look at their own data and consider what needed changing.
Even high-priced expert reports were prepared by CIMA in 2015 and 2019 explaining what some of the issues might be. For example in their 2015 report CIMA indicated the following:
“Out of the 249 northbound collisions shown in Figure 8, 78 (31%) are concentrated in a 600 metre section around the King Street interchange (between 250 metres south of the King Street off-ramp and the King Street on-ramp), a relatively short section of the 81 km study area. There were also 16 (6.4%) northbound collisions over a short 100-metre section near the Mud Street on-ramp.”
Was that not enough warning for City officials to think about some solutions?
It is now inevitable that the Judicial Inquiry will take a long time to be completed, likely with much more cost than the $2 million dollars spent in the last notification. When the Inquiry put out a general invitation to persons who wanted to participate Gorski Consulting submitted a request. We offered our services free of charge except for travel expenses. To this date no response has been received, not even a denial. Our participation might not have been earth shattering. But with over 40 years of experience in providing independent documentation of road safety issues we would have provided an alternative viewpoint to what the official entities provide. Regrettably the citizens of Hamilton may only receive a narrow viewpoint from the small group of participants officially approved. The citizens of Hamilton deserve better and all those travelers who use the RHVP deserve better.
UPDATE: January 3, 2021; 1155 Hours
Upon further review of the on-site photos the circular characteristics of the struck bridge abutment suggests that this was the abutment to the Mount Albion Road overpass and not the King Street overpass. The news media has also not reported the travel direction of the striking vehicle although it appears the direction is northward.
Looking at our historical photos of the Mount Albion Road overpass, the angle of approach is better such that the abutment would be somewhat protected by the guardrail. However a quick measurement of the guardrail using Googlemaps suggests that it is only about 30 metres in length. A vehicle that goes out of control at highway speed could travel several hundred metres before arriving at a final area of impact. Thus when a highway contains substantial horizontal curves such as the RHVP engineers should recognize a vehicle could enter a median much earlier than the 30-metre distance of guardrail. Thus, regardless of which bridge abutment was struck, both guardrails are not sufficient to prevent the impacts with abutments such as the one shown from yesterday afternoon.
UPDATE: January 4, 2021; 1300 Hours
CHCH-TV has reported that the impact was with a railway bridge abutment. Such a railway overpass would be located south of the Albion and King Street overpasses. Given the dark conditions of some on-site photos and the lack of clear landmarks it is difficult to tell which abutment was struck. Until further information is provided, and that is not guarantee, it may not be possible to resolve these basic facts. And no one has yet reported which direction the impacting vehicle was travelling. The lack of such basic information is not helpful.
UPDATE: January 4, 2021; 2130 Hours
Now other media sources such as the Hamilton Spectator Newspaper have reported that a railway bridge abutment was struck. This abutment would likely be the one south of the Albion and King Street overpasses. The Spectator also confirmed that the vehicle was northbound and that it entered the median approximately 100 metres south of the area of impact. Hopefully these facts are correct. An earlier report provided by the CP24 News in Toronto indicated that the impact had occurred near the King Street overpass. It should not have been difficult for investigating police to provide a specific location of the impact and the travel direction of the vehicle. While the OPP also provide on-site photos of major collisions on their Twitter account nothing similar has been seen from the Hamilton Police.
As shown in the GoogleMaps view below the railway bridge is located about 500 metres south of the King Street bridge. While that may be “near” to some persons it does not provide a very precise description the site location.
As shown below, a guardrail exists on the northbound side of the RHVP leading up to the railway bridge. This guardrail is about 45 metres long so it is longer than the guardrail at Albion and King Street bridges. The GoogleMaps view also shows that there is a second guardrail on the southbound side of the median. Yet in the site photo of the vehicle in the present collision that southbound guardrail does not appear to exist. And this could be important. ![]()
In the GoogleMaps view shown below we show how a lateral measurement is taken across the two guardrails and this lateral distance is just 4 metres. Thus if that second (southbound) guardrail was present it would have been more difficult for the car to pass between the two guardrails and reach the impact of the immovable bridge abutment. So one of the important inquiries would be to confirm that this second guardrail was indeed not present at the time of this collision and, if so, why was it removed?
As expected the information about the vehicle entering the median at about 100 metres south of the impact with the bridge abutment is not surprising. From our examination of hundreds of high-speed, single-vehicle, loss-of-control collisions this distance would be expected. We would add further that that the initial point where the vehicle commenced its loss-of-control actions would be at least another 100 metres further to the south, if not further.
We are saying the the vehicle went out of control because it is the more likely scenario versus a purposeful attempt at suicide. In earlier times before the introduction of electronic stability control (ESC) we would often suspect a suicide whenever a vehicle struck an immovable object with its front end. However, now-a-days, ESC systems will straighten out the pointing angle of a loss-of-control vehicle such that frontal impact is no longer a rarity.
Thus, even though we have a 45 metre long guardrail preceding the abutment this would not be sufficient in most high speed events to prevent a vehicle from exiting into a median and striking an unprotected bridge abutment. As seen in the present case, there is a substantial horizontal curve leading up to the area of impact. It is also accompanied by a downgrade. The combination of these two curves increases the likelihood that vehicles will go out of control and enter the median. This fact is known to anyone who conducts a large number of such investigations. Thus the guardrails at all three bridges, the railway bridge, the Albion overpass and the King Street overpass should have their guardrails lengthened. The rail heights should also be raised and strengthened to match the likelihood that an impact will occur with by heavy truck. Substandard road surfaces may contribute to collisions at curves but they are not the only factors involved. Proper roadside protections can improve the collision consequences when a loss-of-control cannot be avoided.
Why are Vehicle Fires Not Reported In Ontario’s Official Collision Data Reports
We express sincere regrets when vehicle fires kill, but then we seem unable to acknowledge that regrets will not prevent the next incidence. Prevention must be preceded by objective analysis, such as documentation of the incidents and how and why they came to be. This is where we fail.
A glance through Ontario’s Road Safety Annual Report (ORSAR) shows how, every year, the Province boasts: “For more than 20 years, our province has ranked in the top five for road safety among all North American jurisdictions” (ORSAR, 2017). But what about vehicle fires? Are they counted?
The only mention of vehicle fires comes from a table of “Motor Vehicles Involved in Collisions Based on Initial Impact”. There is no other reference anywhere else in the Report.
The figure below shows the number of reports of vehicles fires or explosions in the ORSAR from 2006 through to the latest available report in 2017.
The numbers in the above table demonstrate the reason for the boasting about safety. If we add up the totals of fires for each year there is a downward trend from 206 incidents in 2006 to just 101 in 2017. A remarkable reduction. For an unexplained reason the number of Property Damage incidents took a dramatic downturn commencing in the year 2015. And the fact that there were no incidents involving fatalities from 2006 through to 2016 in also remarkable.
But there is this one, single blemish. In 2017 there were 7 incidents of death.
Strange. Why were there no deaths through all those years and then suddenly there were 7 in 2017? One might examine the injury incidents along with the fatal incidents and arrive at the conclusion that every year the combined total of injury plus fatal incidents ranged between 2 and 9 incidents. Very small numbers. Nothing to be concerned about. Yet, there is a contradiction.
Official news media and certain police twitter accounts give notice when significant collisions occur. Those postings were examined between the years 2012 and 2020 resulting in the table shown below.
The above table is not complete because it is not possible to keep track of the reports of all collisions from all news media outlets in Ontario and its many regions without dedicating a substantial number of man-hours. In many of the news media reports the occurrence of a fire is often not reported and so the occurrence is difficult to detect. And in other instances there is very little information reported, even in instances of major, fatal collisions. So the above numbers are most likely under-estimates of reality. Even though these data under-estimate the extent of the vehicle fires, there is a contradiction with Ontario’s official data.
The perplexing contradiction is that, in the ORSAR there were no reports of fatalities through the years 2012 through 2016, yet the news media reported that a total of 39 fatal collisions occurred where a vehicle fire was involved. The news media reports clearly showed photos of the vehicles involved and the existence of fires was unquestionable. Some of these reports were by police departments such as the OPP and municipal agencies.
Furthermore, there appears to be an inflection point in news media data partway through the year 2015. The numbers are reproduced in the chart below to enable a clearer view.
In the three years of 2012, 2013 and 2014, there were 5 fatal collisions in each year. Then in 2015 there were 9 and this rose to 15 fatal collisions in 2016. As can be seen in the remaining years the number of fatal collisions involving fires have remained at this higher level. We can see in the newer data since the year 2016 that deaths and injuries from vehicle fires appear to be increasing yet no data is available from the provincial government beyond the year 2017.
Why are such important and tragic incidents not reported in provincial reports such as the ORSAR? Also the public distribution of the ORSAR continues to be delayed. The Ontario government has only recently uploaded the 2017 version of the report while it is now 2021.
Is there a safety problem with an increased number of vehicle fires? Are more vehicles catching fire in collisions and are more persons dying in these collisions? Clearly the numbers of fatalities reported in the news media would suggest so. Will we have to wait another 4 years before the official data from 2020 becomes available from official government sources?
Accountability To Public Required When A Missing Warning Sign Causes Collisions
This eastbound Chevrolet Equinox SUV struck various objects including telecommunications instruments, fencing and trees on Brydges Street at Cornish Road in east London, Ontario on the evening of December 17, 2020. No mention of the collision was made in local news media outlets. But further investigation reveals much more.
How does an important warning sign go missing and, even though major collisions occur, this does not prompt municipal officials, police or news media to detect, publicize and correct the problem? The following discussion of several collisions is a smaller issue compared to the much broader problem of how road safety problems come to be hidden from the general public. Let us first conduct a detailed review of the historical safety problems at the Brydges Street site in London, Ontario and then we will return to the broader issue.
On the evening of December 17, 2020 a single vehicle collision occurred at a curve of Brydges Street in London, Ontario. An eastbound Chevrolet Equinox SUV collided with several roadside objects just east of the intersection with Cornish Street. It was not the first time that such a collision occurred at this location. Was it a coincidence or was it a safety problem with the road? These are common questions that crop up in neighbourhoods across North America. But often there are no real answers. Yet, at this site, we can conclusively determine that a warning sign became missing for many months and nothing was done about it.
The two photos below show further results of the collision on the evening of December 17, 2020.
The aftermath of the collision included the flight of a large Bell Canada communications terminal and the uprooting of a tree stump.
The four GoogleMaps views below show the collision site on Brydges Street at Cornish Street in London, Ontario. The first photo shows a location just past a curve where the above impact occurred and it also shows an area preceding the curve where a warning sign became missing.
The next photo shows a view looking east with an orange oval showing the area where the impact occurred on December 17, 2020. The three street views below were reportedly taken by Google in July, 2019.![]()
If we move backwards (westward) from the collision site we see the view that is shown below. The collision site in in the distant background.
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We want to focus on the last Googlemaps street view shown below. In particular, we want to focus on the new utility pole that is highlighted by the orange oval. Note that this pole does not contain any signage on it. We will return to this matter later once we review some historical photos of the site.
We also want to draw the reader’s attention to the bottom of the pole shown in the above photo. There is a clump of earth surrounding the pole that suggests that the pole was recently replaced. Remember that this view by Googlemaps was taken in July of 2019. Later in this article we will be showing our own photos taken around April 9, 2019 where we observe a similar clump of earth at the base of the pole.
Returning to the collision of December 17, 2020, on the following afternoon the extent of the devastation could be appreciated as noted in our photos below. The next three photos show the tire marks of the eastbound Equinox as it left the roadway and struck the area where the Bell Canada trucks are shown in the background.
The photo above shows the tire marks approaching the camera. The Equinox did not appear to change direction much but appeared to follow the straight line of the road without following the curve.
The extent of the devastation in the vicinity of the impact is shown in the seven site photos below, taken on the afternoon of December 18, 2020.
Now we will revert back to the history of this site by looking at a number of photos. Two photos from the years 2013Â and 2015 (shown below) establish that a yellow, curve, warning sign has existed at least since that time. This sign was mounted on the second pole west of the intersection with Cornish Street.
This photo taken on August 15, 2013, shows a view looking eastward on Brydges Street toward the curve at Cornish. A yellow, curve, warning sign can be seen posted on the 2nd utility pole west of the Cornish Street intersection.
In this photo taken on August 13, 2015, the yellow warning sign can be seen anchored to the second utility pole west of Cornish Street.
Detection of collisions at the curve is not always easy. As an example the following five photos from May 26, 2018 reveal that an eastbound motorcycle collided with the Bell Canada junction box, leaving minimal evidence of the occurrence.
A tire scrub at the south curb of Brydges, east of Cornish, is shown in the two photos below. This established the point where the motorcycle left the roadway.
Evidence of the motorcycle collision could be seen as the fence at the Bell Canada junction box was knocked over and there was minor damage to the junction box itself. An oil stain in the parking lot behind the fence demonstrated that the motorcycle has passed through the fence.
On other occasions the occurrence of a collision was more obvious. At approximately 1300 hours on November 15, 2018 a single vehicle collision occurred when an eastbound BMW car struck down several utility poles at the curve. The photo below shows an eastward view on Brydges, looking toward Cornish taken on the evening of the collision date. The yellow warning sign can be seen attached to the second utility pole west of Cornish.
The extent of the devastation at the site can be noted below as power was knocked out to a large part of east London and work crews had to work quickly to restore order.
The path of the BMW’s travel could be followed by noting that the bus stop sign located just east of the Cornish Street had been deformed, as shown below.
It was reported that the driver of the BMW was alcohol-impaired. This demonstrates that collision causation at such a curve is not just related to the absence of a warning sign. There are many causes. However single-vehicle, loss-of-control collisions are more prevalent at curves. It is apparent that this important fact has never been understood with respect to the curves on Brydges Street. Over the years our monitoring of this road segment has demonstrated that the presence of the curves on Brydges Street at intersections at Cornish Street and also at Spruce Street further to the east has never been properly understood.
Changes to the accident site after the November 15, 2018 collision can be seen in the four photos below, taken on November 29, 2018. In the westward view shown below one of the utility poles east of Cornish has been supported by an additional pole. Traffic cones are also strewn on the roadside closer to Cornish.
The three views below show the presence of a Speed Display Board that was installed on the same pole as the curve warning sign. The posting of this board raises the question why the City of London needed to install it. For example, the collision on November 15, 2018 involved an eastbound vehicle. Yet the speed board faces westbound traffic.
This last photo above clearly shows the Speed Display Board on the east side of the second utility pole while the warning sign is mounted on the west side of the pole. We are not capable of detecting every collision that might have occurred throughout the history of this road segment. Therefore there could have been other collisions that the City of London was aware of and this could have prompted them to install the speed board. The presence of the curve at Cornish Street could logically cause collisions to occur from both eastbound and westbound traffic.
The next view of the site is from a photo taken on December 17, 2018, as noted below. Note the height of the warning sign on the pole. The height can be compared to its height in the photo taken on February 1, 2019 below.
In the photo taken on February 1, 2019, shown below, the warning sign is anchored at a lower level on the pole than what is shown in the December 17, 2018 photo. Furthermore, the shade of the wood of the anchoring pole in the February 1st photo appears lighter and newer. So was the pole struck down by a collision and replaced? Or was the pole replaced for some other reason? Unfortunately our lack of photos of the site between December 17, 2018 and February 1, 2019 prevents us from knowing why the pole appears to have been replaced.
We are now entering a time when the warning sign disappears sometime during the spring of 2019, thus we want to provide more detailed views around that time period.
We see the site again on March 15, 2019, as noted in the westward view shown below. The orange oval highlighting the second pole shows that the pole looks to be of a lighter, newer shade than the first pole closer to Cornish Street. Even though the pole may have been replaced, the backside of the warning sign can still be observed anchored to the pole. The sign appears to be anchored at similar (lower) level similar to what was observed in the February 1, 2019 photo.
It can be observed that in three photos, December 17, 2018, February 1, 2019 and in the photo above on March 15, 2109 there are some traffic cones strewn on the south roadside just east of the intersection with Cornish Street. It is not clear why these cones exist as there does not appear to be any road construction.
The site is viewed again on March 27, 2019, as noted below. The warning sign is still visible on the pole in the distant background.
Next we see the site four days later, on March 31,2019. Although the pole and sign are very far in the distance they are both still present. It is difficult to see from this view whether the traffic cones still exist therefore this view has been cropped in the next photo below.
In the cropped view shown below we can see more clearly that the traffic cones are still there and the warning sign is still anchored to the second utility pole west of Cornish.![]()
Now comes the important photo taken on April 9, 2019 and shown below. Although the second utility pole is far in the background there does not appear to be warning sign attached to it.
We cropped the above photo so a closer view can be had of the utility pole and this cropped view is shown below. This cropped view clearly shows that the warning sign is not anchored to the utility pole. We can also note the difference in shade of the wood of the second pole which is more tan coloured as opposed to the other poles that are grey. Clearly this pole looks new.
So sometime between March 31 and April 9, 2019 the warning sign had gone missing. If one looks closely enough in the cropped photo at the location where the second pole touches the ground one might be able to detect a lighter shade of substance that is not the same shade as the surrounding grass. It suggests that this is the earth that was upturned when the pole was installed. This evidence was also shown in the Google Maps views of July, 2019 shown earlier.
In the photo taken on May 9, 2019 shown below we can clearly see that the second pole west of Cornish Street does not have a warning sign anchored to it. It is also of a lighter shade than the other poles. And when we look down to where the pole connects with the ground we can see a mound of earth that would be expected if the pole had been recently replaced.
Let us summarize these somewhat confusing set of events. Shortly after the major collision of November 15, 2018 involving an eastbound BMWÂ car a Speed Display Board was installed for westbound traffic while no reason was found for its installation. There was no obvious evidence that collisions were occurring from westbound traffic travelling around the curve at Cornish even though such a possibility would not be expected. By December 17, 2018 the Speed Display Board was removed. Then sometime between March 31st and April 9th, 2019 the curve warning sign goes missing and the utility upon which it was anchored appears to have been replaced.
We now move a year later to the date of May 9, 2020 and we can see in the photo below that the second utility pole is still visible and that it still does not contain a warning sign attached to it. But there is more information from the photos on this date.
In the next photo, also taken on May 9, 2020, we can see that a blue tarp has been placed over the Bell Canada junction box east of Cornish Street and that there are several Bell Canada vehicles parked nearby.
As this tarp was placed at this location for a substantial time we finally approached the location on foot on June 6, 2020 and made the discoveries shown in the photos below. There had been an impact to the Bell Canada junction box, the fence and to a tree that was partially uprooted as shown in the photo below.
A second tree was also struck but only sustained surface damage. This surface damage can be seen in the photos of December 17, 2020 shown at the beginning of this article where this tree sustained more substantial damage.![]()
So when this collision occurred sometime before May 9, 2020, there was no warning sign posted on the second pole that we have been discussing. That warning sign was missing for over a year, as noted in the April 9, 2019 photo shown previously. Due to the severity of this collision just before May 9, 2020, one would assume that someone would make note that the warning sign was missing and that this could have been the reason why the collision occurred. For example, Bell Canada would have sustained a substantial cost in repairing their junction box since workers were observed conducting repairs at the site at least until June 29, 2020. And the driver of the vehicle that caused all the damage would also have sustained damage to their vehicle and possibly sustained some injury. So surely the driver or their insurer should have taken action against the City of London for failing to place the warning sign before the curve. And even the City of London would surely see that a warning sign was missing and make a quick correction. But it appears that this is not what happened as we shall soon see.
We now fast-forward to a date of December 2, 2020 and the photo below shows the eastward view on Brydges Street toward Cornish. As usual, the second utility pole west of Cornish Street still does not contain a warning sign attached to it.
And we finally return to the collision events on the evening of December 17, 2020 where began this article. On the afternoon of December 18, 2020 photos were taken on approach to the accident site and two of these are shown below. Not surprisingly these photos show that on the afternoon after the collision there was no warning sign anchored to the second pole west of Cornish Street.
Another observation of the site was made on the morning of December 23, 2020 and the photo below shows that the warning sign was still missing.![]()
However a further observation in the afternoon of December 21, 2020 showed that a warning sign had been installed on the second pole west of Cornish Street, as shown below.![]()
When the site was observed again on December 23, 2020 additional arrow-hazard signs were installed on the south roadside just east of the Cornish intersection, as shown in the photos below.
With respect to damages, it was noted that seven Bell Canada vehicles were packed at the area of impact and at a church parking lot next to it, as shown below.
And a number of Bell employees were at work to repair the damage to the telecommunications junction box, as shown in the two photos below.
The utilization of these manpower resources should have incurred a substantial expense. And by all logic this expense should be claimed in legal proceedings against the driver of the Equinox, the City of London or both. But will that happen? Clearly if that had occurred in the previous collision, at the beginning of May 2019, then the City of London would have reinstalled the warning sign that had gone missing. But that did not happen. It would be difficult to believe that, if a civil suit had been launched the City of London would simply ignore its obvious negligence and continue to ignore the missing warning sign. One possibility is that the civil suits are still forthcoming. Claims can be delayed up to two years of the date of the occurrence. So it is possible that legal counsel for the parties involved could still be preparing their Statements of Claim.
However there are wider concerns that need to be addressed beyond the safety issues at this single site. One concern has to do with the lack of police notification of this safety problem. When the collision occurred in early May of 2019 police should have made note of the absence of the warning sign. In the obligations of police the danger of the missing sign should not be any different than the danger posed by a drunk driver or a defective commercial vehicle or any other safety concern. The safety concern should have been made public and it should have been corrected. In the many months from the spring of 2019 up to the collision of December 17, 2020 that safety problem was not corrected. Police vehicles would have travelled past the safety problem on numerous occasions but nothing was done about it. Why did this occur?
The undiscussed fact is that police in London, like any other jurisdictions in Ontario, Canada and elsewhere are paid by the municipality that could be held liable for unsafe road conditions. This is a conflict of interest. If the conflict of interest cannot be avoided then legislation needs to be enacted causing the conflict to be nullified. Legislation must require police to publicly report and act upon all matters that endanger the safety of the public and that legislation must have teeth.
The second concern is that the public was not made aware of the safety problem at the Brydges Street site because no one in the news media properly informed the public. Neither the collision in May, 2019 nor the collision of December 17, 2020 were ever revealed in the official news media. And even if an article was published or presented in a newscast it would be unlikely that the problem of a missing sign or other roadway safety issues would be revealed. Part of this problem may be the lack of investigative journalists in the field. The problem may also be with the concentration of the official news media into a much smaller pool of news conglomerates. When news is provided by a wider base of independent sources it is less likely that inconvenient findings can be snuffed out and more likely that one or two independent sources are able to leak a story that cannot be snuffed out.
And lastly, the public deserves to be made aware when the negligence of its municipal staff and/or politicians have created a safety problem that endangers its citizens or that results in a civil claim against the municipality. Voters have the right to be informed as to who they will place in office to represent them and why. The public cannot demand change when it is unaware of the actions that occur behind the closed doors of its municipality.
The actions of a small consulting firm such as Gorski Consulting cannot keep track of all the road safety problems that exist in the City of London or Southern Ontario. By virtue of our independence stories that do not reach the official news media will land in our news articles but these are small results that reach very few viewers. It requires the dedication of more persons to recognize some of the problems, such as the one presented here, and to spread the message that change is required for the benefit of all of the public.
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