Red Hill Valley Parkway Judicial Inquiry Completes Witness Phase – Review of Previous Scandals
The Red Hill Valley Parkway (RHVP) Judicial Inquiry has now completed the witness phase of its proceedings. Over 15,400 pages of testimony was logged from dozens of witnesses. The second phase is promised to be much shorter as it will provide summaries and opinions from the small number of Inquiry participants.
The Inquiry was requested by Hamilton’s politicians in the spring of 2019 after it was discovered that a technical report authored by Tradewind Scientific, reporting an inferior level of skid resistance on the RHVP, had become lost, or was deliberately buried. Some delays to the proceedings of the Inquiry were attributed to the Covid pandemic. The credit for uncovering the missing Tradewind report has to go to a number of professional journalists, but mostly to the Hamilton Spectator Newspaper. And there have been several other scandals.
Past Scandals
In early 2013 the City of Hamilton was rocked by news that 29 employees of its Public Works department were fired following an investigation of their illegal practices. There were allegations that these activities reached as far up in the department as supervisors and superintendents. The City’s Manager at the time, Chris Murray, said police would be contacted but no further information became available about further developments. A Hamilton Spectator Newspaper article written in January of 2013 indicated:
“The city is investigating allegations that not only the front-line public works employees, but also supervisors and superintendents, were involved in the dishonesty, including the selling of city asphalt. City manager Chris Murray, who attended Bratina’s speech, said the situation is already starting to trigger questions of whether similar offences are occurring in other departments. He said it’s logical to think that “where there’s smoke, there’s fire. The fact that something like this happens creates concern right across the organization.”
Thus this scandal would have been an opportunity for the City of Hamilton to conduct further investigations about the operations of its Public Works Department, possibly directing how the actions of all employees should follow proper procedures. It is not clear what further actions were taken.
In another scandal in 2019 the Hamilton Spectator Newspaper wrote about the City of Hamilton’s failure to inspect sign structures along the RHVP. They reported that the City had no inspection reports between the years 2012 to 2017. In a Spectator article published on August 16, 2019 the following was stated:
“While the city has said it does not believe the public was at risk due to the delayed sign structure repairs, one civil engineering professor reached by The Spectator called the listed deficiencies concerning.
“By exceeding the recommended time to repair, Hamilton increased the risk of serious harm to the public and to motorists,” said Ahmed Shalaby, municipal infrastructure chair at the University of Manitoba, who reviewed the 2012 and 2017 inspection summaries.
“Any of these (problems), left unrepaired, could eventually lead to failure of a sign structure or components.”
It’s rare for a big metal sign structure to fall down – but it has happened.”
As an example of what could happen, on April 27, 2021 a large overhead sign fell onto the surface of the QEW at Nocola Testa Boulevard. The sign came down on an SUV, killing its driver. The sign was knocked over by excavations at a construction site. It indicates the dangers that exist if an overhead sign were to fall onto a highway and how important it is to conduct inspections of sign anchorages. Again little information is available about what was done to examine the actions of Hamilton’s Public Works department.
In another scandal, billions of litres of sewage was found to have leaked over a period of four-and–half years into Hamilton’s Chedoke Creek and this leak was not disclosed for over a year. The Spectator reported:
“The Spectator revealed city council knew about the full duration and volume of the spill from an overflow holding tank into the creek, which flows into Cootes Paradise, since January 2019 but decided to keep the information secret.
After citizens complained about a stench in July 2018, the city told the public a spill had occurred and put up signs, but the full details were kept under wraps until The Spectator reported on leaked confidential reports.
Councillors have said they opted for secrecy to protect the taxpayers from potential regulatory fines and litigation amid an ongoing provincial investigation into the spill, which has been attributed in part to a gate on a holding tank that was left partially open for four-and-a-half years.
Staff and outside legal counsel advised council against publicizing the estimated 24-billion-litre volume and more-than-four-year span, as well as releasing consulting reports.
The rationale was that doing so could expose the city to financial risk amid a Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks investigation with potential fines of as high as $6 million.“
There is a fine line between the claim of protecting a municipality from litigation and hiding those politicians and City staff from accountability to the public they ought to serve.
The Spectator also reported that one of the City’s councillors, Lloyd Ferguson, wanted an investigation into who leaked the documents that led to the revelation of the spill. The Spectator noted:
“City officials previously refused to confirm that councillors directed senior staff to track down the source of the leaked documents. People have speculated whether the leaker was a member of council or city staffer with access to the confidential reports. Regardless, the fact that the information was hidden by council sparked a gigantic public outcry over the lack of transparency.”
The City’s mayor, Fred Eisenberger, also supported the decision to keep documents and the spill secret. As reported by the Spectator:
“Eisenberger says he stands by the decision to keep detailed information about the spill confidential until the environment ministry’s investigation is complete based on expert legal advice and the obligation to protect taxpayers from potential penalties and lawsuits.”
Not surprisingly Hamilton’s risk management office and external legal counsel have been involved in advising the City’s staff and politicians to maintain secrecy. This was also made clear in the testimony provided by witnesses at the RHVP Inquiry.
RHVP Inquiry – Going Forward
Very few of those outside of the RHVP Inquiry participants would have the opportunity to examine all the evidence in detail. Not only are there over 15400 pages of testimony, there are also numerous exhibits, including a number of long reports that would need to be reviewed. For example, of the 218 exhibits, the first 10 are identified below along with their length in pages.
- Overview Report – 66 pages
- Hamilton Governance & Structure – 50 pages
- RHVP Construction – 82 pages
- RHVP Design & Geometry – 17 pages
- Ontario MOT Friction Testing – 200 pages
- RHVP Safety Studies 2008-2012 – 48 pages
- Cima Report 2013 – 153 pages
- Cima Report 2015 – 204 pages
- Pavement Evaluations 2017-2018 – 103 pages
- Events Leading to Discovery of Tradewind Report – 370 pages
These first 10 exhibits contain 1293 pages. It is impractical to expect anyone to examine the rest of the 208 exhibits if they contain a similar amount of detail. At some point there needs to be a reliable and unbiased entity that can condense all of these details into a more manageable summary.
One has to be aware that those who wish to hide information from the public can use unexpected methods to accomplish their task. The most direct way is to simply refuse to release the specific information. However a more indirect way is to flood the atmosphere with an enormous amount of detail, effectively hiding the relevant information within this very large forest of irrelevance. Because the review of such massive stores of information is daunting most entities would give up before finding the relevant information that is needed. This method of hiding information becomes more effective in the modern age when very large amounts of data is stored and capable of being released. It is hoped that this is not the process being engaged in the RHVP Inquiry, however it remains to be seen how and if the very large amounts of detail will be condensed to make it practically available to the general public.
Has Road Safety in Ontario Been Deteriorating?
What is going on with injury and fatality causation in Ontario? Has there been a recent deterioration of road safety? How do we know?
In the U.S. the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reported earlier this year that traffic fatalities likely increased by 10.5 percent in 2021 versus 2020, which is a 16-year high. Some of the categories in which fatalities increased the most are shown in the following text taken from the NHTSA report.
“ …traffic fatalities in the following categories showed relatively large increases in 2021, as compared to 2020:
- Fatalities in multi-vehicle crashes up 16%
- Fatalities on urban roads up 16%
- Fatalities among drivers 65 and older up 14%
- Pedestrian fatalities up 13%
- Fatalities in crashes involving at least one large truck up 13%
- Daytime fatalities up 11%
- Motorcyclist fatalities up 9%
- Bicyclist fatalities up 5%
- Fatalities in speeding-related crashes up 5%
- Fatalities in police-reported, alcohol-involvement crashes up 5% “
In reaction to this data the U.S. Transportation Secretary stated “We face a crisis on America’s roadways…”. Those are large words.
Ontario Data
Historically Ontario has not been isolated from the U.S., we share similar cultures, economies, vehicles and roadway systems. Are similarly dramatic deteriorations also occurring in Ontario? What data exists to determine one way or another?
Ontario’s Road Safety Annual Report (ORSAR) has been published by the Ontario government for decades and it should provide an accurate account of the road safety situation in the Province. Checking the Ontario Transportation Ministry website shows that the latest complete version of the ORSAR is for the year 2019. Only preliminary statistics are currently available for the years 2020 and 2021. Here are some general facts in those reports.
Fatal Collisions: 2018=556, 2019=545, 2020=505, 2021=499
Persons Killed: 2018=602, 2019=584, 2020=535, 2021=541
Personal Injury Collisions: 2018=36,331, 2019=33,602, 2020=23,184, 2021=22,573
Persons Injured: 2018=50,973, 2019=47,027, 2020=31,538, 2021=30,715
Based upon the above facts it would seem that Ontario is immune to the traffic catastrophes of the U.S. – but are we?
An article (July 3, 2022) by Robert Williams of the Kitchener Record newspaper described how the documentation of collisions in the Waterloo area has become “complicated”. In part he reported:
“With the addition of the Waterloo Accident Support Services International – who now takes care of nonmajor collisions – the way police count collisions is changing. For example, in two-car collisions where both parties fill out a report, police used to count those reports as two separate collisions. Now, those reports are tracked, merged and counted as one.
Due to the changes in its data management processes, Const. Andre Johnson said the 2020 overall numbers cannot be easily compared to the prior years.”
How many other municipalities have changed their way of collision reporting? Does the above mean that the data in recent ORSARs is not easily comparable to other years?
An interesting revelation is how the Ontario Provincial Police work with Ontario’s news media to announce various collision data. For example, on May 14, 2020, the OPP released collision data which was reported by major news outlets in the London area including the London Free Press, CTV News London and CFPL Radio 980 News (Global News). The London Free Press article was entitled “Middlesex OPP Target Unsafe Drivers as Region Ranks Third in Ontario for Road Fatalities”. This article publicized the OPP assertion, from the previous 10 year’s worth of data, that Middlesex County was third highest in the Province of Ontario with respect to fatalities, surpassed only by “Toronto area and Burlington”.
CTV’s article was entitled “Middlesex Roads Among Deadliest in Ontario” and the article indicated “While the numbers are concerning, they also don’t seem to be improving”. They also provided a misleading comment that “So far in 2020 there have been five fatalities in Middlesex, an increase of 67 per cent over 2019”. Thus there were 3 fatalities in 2019 and 5 in 2020 and this is the grounds for informing the public that there was a massive 67 per cent increase in fatal collisions.
The Global News article was entitled “OPP Report Increase in Fatal Collisions from 2020 Compared to 2019”. It reported that “As of May 4, 71 people have died in fatal collision on OPP roads in 2020, compared to this time last year there were 61 deaths”.
Whether the data high-lighted by news media accurately depicts a worsening safety scenario on OPP patrolled road cannot be known by anyone except the OPP themselves. However some estimate of that accuracy can be gained from examining the 10 year period (2010 through 2019) via the data reported in ORSAR.
For example, the data from Middlesex County is compared in the tables below with several other municipal jurisdictions (Halton, Niagara and Waterloo) that have similar population bases.
Nothing unusual appears to exist in the Middlesex County data that would suggest that its roads “…are among deadliest in Ontario”. It can be observed that Burlington (which is in Halton Region) appears to have lower fatality values than any of the other three jurisdictions yet the OPP claimed that Burlington’s roads were worse than Middlesex. The appearance that Middlesex has slightly higher numbers of fatal collisions and fatalities has not be controlled for the likelihood that Middlesex is a more rural area where fatal collisions are more likely to occur. Travel in the other three jurisdictions could be comprised of more urban travel where fatal collisions and fatalities are less likely.
In another article authored by Jonathan Juha of the London Free Press (“Deaths Spike in London Region Roads This Year, OPP Warn”, September 2, 2020) OPP statistics of fatalities in the London region appeared to be alarming as noted by the following quote: “Middlesex OPP are sounding the alarm with deadly car crashes up nearly 40 per cent from this time last year”. Yet we know the final fatality numbers in Ontario for 2019 and 2020 because those are reported in the ORSARs. ORSAR reported that in 2019 there were 545 fatal collisions and in 2020 there were 505. So the numbers of fatal collisions in Ontario in 2020 were actually down compared to 2019. So the final Ontario data would appear to be completely different from the OPP data. Was there something miraculous taking place in Middlesex County in 2020 that did not occur in the rest of Ontario? We will not know until Ontario releases its full 2020 ORSAR data which will contain the details of the Middlesex County data.
The COVID Effect
A number of news media articles were published during these Covid years which suggested that a dramatic change was taking place in Ontario’s road safety.
In an article by Ryan Rocca, published by Global News on April 15, 2020 Toronto City officials were quoted as saying that Toronto had seen a 200 per cent increase in stunt driving. The article stated further:
“In a news release Wednesday, officials said as traffic volumes have dropped, from March 15 to 31, there was a 35 per cent increase in speeding tickets and an almost 200 per cent jump in stunt driving incidents compared to the same time last year.
“Taking advantage of low traffic volumes by speeding or stunt driving is not only illegal but threatens the lives of those around you and places an unnecessary pressure on our health-care system,” Toronto Mayor John Tory said.”
However, if there were fewer collisions this could free up the time of a number of police officers who could now focus of monitoring traffic and giving out speeding tickets. Could that be an explanation for the higher numbers of stunt driving infractions?
In an article posted by Chris Fox of CP24 News on April 29, 2020 it was reported that there were “…largely empty roads across the GTA” yet police report that there has been “…nearly a 600 per cent rise in stunt driving charges”. And the number of collisions investigated by the OPP in early 2020 was “…down 62 per cent from 2019”.
Yet ORSAR reported that Estimated Vehicle Kilometres Travelled in Ontario were 145,000 (in millions) in 2019 and 146,832 in 2020. So how did the roads become “largely empty” across the GTA if more kilometers were ridden?
And in another article authored by CBC News on October 10, 2019, it was reported that “Police say speed is the leading factor in vehicle fatalities”. So is it not strange that a 600 per cent increase in stunt driving in 2020 should lead to no appreciable increase in traffic fatalities between 2019 and 2020 as indicated in the ORSAR?
Discussion
Unusual data is being reported by police, news media and the official Ontario Road Safety Annual Report such that many contradictions appear to exist. While the U.S. is reporting alarmingly high collision statistics Ontario is not. The OPP continue to report large increases in fatal collisions and fatalities yet those do not exist in the latest ORSAR data.
Colborne at St James Traffic Study – Results from Session #2
Results have now been tabulated for Session #2 of traffic observations on Colborne Street at St James Street in London, Ontario. This testing was conducted on September 30, 2022 for two hours between 1607 and 1807 hours. A total of 443 northbound motor vehicles and 19 northbound cyclists were documented during this session. The results are as follows.
Session #2 – The Results
The characteristics and speed of northbound cyclists observed during the documentations are shown in the table below.
Looking at the 443 documented motor vehicles, their average speed was 42.49 km/h in the south road segment (i.e. between 15 and 65 metres north of St James Street) and 44.13 km/h in the north segment (i.e. 65 to 115 metres north of St James). While these averages provide some clarity the details reveal more complex issues.
Firstly, the table below compares the frequencies of speed between the south and north road segments. Generally, the speeds seemed to be compacted into a narrower range in the south segment while those speeds along the north segment were slightly more scattered, with both lower and higher speeds.
The table below shows the relationship between motor vehicle volume and speed at 10-minute intervals while comparing the south road segment with the north road segment.
For example, in the first 10 minutes of observations (1607 to 1617 hours) 50 northbound vehicles passed through the observation area. The average speed of those vehicles passing through the south road segment was 39.96 km/h. The average speed of motor vehicles passing through the north road segment was 41.28 km/h. We can also note that in the first hour of observations the average speed of vehicles travelling through the south road segment was 41.95 km/h while the average through the north segment was 42.83 km/h.
There was a marked increase in motor vehicle speeds in the last 40 minutes of observations (noted by the red colour of the values in the above table). This would be a time between 1727 and 1807 hours. It can be noted that during this 40 minutes the average,10-minute, traffic volume was reduced to 32 vehicles whereas the average for the previous hour and twenty minutes was 39.4 vehicles.
It was noted that many traffic disruptions developed from the intersection at St James Street. Many motor vehicles entered Colborne Street from St James but also many motor vehicles exited Colborne at this intersection. As a result some consideration had to be given to the difference between “free flow” traffic on Colborne versus “non-free flow” traffic.
Of the 225 northbound motor vehicles that were observed in the first hour of documentation it was noted that 167 of them experienced “free flow” motion and their average speed was 43.14 km/h in the south segment and 43.54 km/h in the north segment. Of the 218 northbound motor vehicles that were observed in the second hour of documentation it was noted that 138 of them experienced “free flow” motion and their average speed was 44.97 km/h in the south segment and 47.28 km/h in the north segment. The reduced number of vehicles experiencing free flow in second hour should have produced slower average speeds yet this did not occur, particularly in the north road segment. So It may suggest something different about the speed of traffic in the latter portion of this testing.
A flavour for the types of obstructions to traffic on Colborne can be gained by examining the smaller sample of 57 northbound vehicles that experienced “non-free-flow” motion in the first hour of documentations and these are shown in the long table below. The observations high-lighted in yellow represent vehicles that entered Colborne from St James. Since documentation began only 15 metres north of the St James intersection the speed of these vehicles would have to be low as they would just be completing their turns. So this is the reason why we determined that they could not be counted as free flow vehicles.
As can be seen in the above table there were many reasons why the free flow of northbound vehicles did not occur. Another major reason was that pedestrians crossed at the pedestrian crossing located on the south side of the intersection with St James. As such northbound vehicles had to come to a stop and this caused their speeds to be slower as they passed through the south road segment.
A surprising revelation occurred as we were present monitoring the video cameras near the St James intersection. We observed unusual behaviors by many drivers who seemed to be confused by whether they had the right-of-way. For example, drivers on both roadways appeared to believe that this was a 4-way stop. This was evidenced on several occasions as drivers on St James drove into traffic on Colborne as if they expected that the Colborne traffic was going to stop at the intersection. Similarly we observed several drivers on Colborne Street come to a stop at St James for no reason, as if they believed that there was a stop sign for their direction of travel. These unusual behaviours resulted in several close calls where collisions were barely avoided.
Evaluation of the Need For A Protected Cycling Lane
The results from Session #2 showed that 443 northbound motor vehicles were documented over a 2-hour period. Due to the extensive time commitment we determined it was not realistic to conduct the additional documentation of southbound traffic. It is possible to simply double the northbound observations and conclude (with some error) that the traffic volume was about 886 vehicles in two hours, or about 443 vehicles per hour. A common way of estimating AADT is to multiply the peak hour of traffic by 10. This method does not always provide a good estimate on some roadways. However if our results were multiplied by 10 then we would arrive at an estimated AADT of about 4430 vehicles. This is not far off from the AADT posted on the City of London map of traffic volumes for this location. So we could use this estimate in the graph shown in Book 18 of the Ontario Traffic Manual. That graph is copied below.
Next we need to consider the appropriate speed to use in the above graph. As seen in the above graph we have inserted the vertical line representing the estimated traffic volume. We have also inserted the box in red which matches operating speeds between 45 and 50 km/h. Although the graph advises using the posted speed of the road (which would be 40 km/h) footnote #1 indicates the following:
“Operating speeds are assumed to be similar to posted speeds. If evidence suggests this is not the case, practitioners may consider using 85th percentile speeds…”
Our observations indicate that vehicle speeds are higher than this posted speed. In Session #1 we determined that the 85th Percentile Speed was about 51-52 km/h even when “non-free-flow” vehicles are included. The identical analysis with the data from Session #2 revealed an 85th Percentile Speed between 49.0 and 49.3 km/h. So there is some reason to believe that the speed to be used in the above graph should be close to 50 km/h, or slightly greater.
Book 18 suggests that use of the graph is just a starting point for determining the correct cycling infrastructure. A list of heuristics, or rules, in further consideration of selecting appropriate cycling infrastructure is copied in the two charts below.
An issue noted at the Colborne Street site is the existence of a bus route while the City’s decision is to narrow the travel lanes to just 3.3 metres in width. A lane that is 3.3 metres wide is too narrow for typical bus or large truck travel when accompanied by unprotected cycling lanes.
The rules also fail to recognize the danger of the unsignalized intersection of Colborne Street at St James. This is a unique circumstance where drivers are confused about their right-of-way. Although no analysis has been conducted at this time our observations during the peaks hours between 1600 and 1800 hours indicate that there are many motor vehicles using the intersection both from Colborne and from St James.
Other matters need further study, such as the number of pedestrians using the area. Our observations suggest that the number of pedestrians is relatively high.
A third videotaping session was completed on October 5, 2022 however no analysis has been done at this time. There is considerable time required to conduct these analyses manually and without any voluntary help. Anyone wishing to volunteer to help with the analysis can contact Zyg Gorski at the e-mail address: [email protected].
Colborne at St James Traffic Study – Results from Session #1
The first Session of the Colborne Street Traffic Study has been completed and partial results will be reported in this article.
Background
in the late summer of 2022 the City of London Ontario announced that it would extent the cycling lane on Colborne Street north of Oxford Street to Cheapside Street. A protected cycling lane had previously been installed on Colborne south of Oxford. However the City proposed that the new cycling lane north of Oxford should not be protected. Instead the lane should be designated by a painted white line only. Cyclist and some members of the public objected to this decision as it would cause unsafe conditions for cyclists. Gorski Consulting was approached by interested members of the public whether a traffic study could be performed to evaluate the issue. As a result a series of video documentation sessions was commenced. The first Session was conducted on September 20, 2022. The results obtained from this session will be the focus of this article.
The City of London reported that its decision was in compliance with the guidelines offered in Book 18, Cycling Facilities, of the Ontario Traffic Manual. In part Book 18 provided a graph relating vehicle speed and volume that could be used to estimate what kind of cycling lanes should be provided. This graph from the June 2021 version of Book 18 is copied below.
This graph is slightly different from pervious versions. For example a similar graph from the 2014 Version of Book 18 is copied below. One of the differences between the two graphs is that in 2014 the “85th Percentile Motor Vehicle Operating Speed” formed the vertical axis whereas in the newer version the vertical axis is the “Posted Speed Limit”. In the text of the June 2021 manual the authors advise that the 85th Percentile Speed can be used when data suggests that the operating speed is higher than the posted speed.
In speaking briefly with a representative of the City of London at an information meeting it was stated that the City of London did not conduct any specific studies on Colborne Street and mainly relied upon the traffic volume in their decision to select the painted cycling lane. A handout provided at the meeting indicated that the traffic volume in the corridor was between 4000 and 6400 vehicles per day.
A copy of the traffic volumes taken from the City of London map is shown below. This shows that the traffic volume (AADT) between Oxford and St James is 6500, whereas the volume between St James and Cheapside is 4500. So there is a marked reduction is traffic north of St James. It suggests there is likely exit of Colborne Street by many northbound drivers onto St James. And there could also be a likely entrance from St James southbound onto Colborne Street. Either way it suggests there is a considerable interaction of traffic at the Colborne and St James intersection.
While the above graphs are not the only information needed to select a proper cycling facility they represent major inputs in the process. Knowing the specifics of the operating speed and traffic volume are key points in using the guidelines. As such video documentation at the Colborne site would provide valuable data the selection process.
Session #1 of Colborne – St James Traffic Study
Selecting the location of the study needed some consideration as the operating speed should be documented in a location where vehicles are moving at a constant, uninterrupted rate. Selection of a location where vehicles are stopped, turning, accelerating or braking does not provide a true indication of the speed of vehicles on the road. The best location appeared to be away from the busy area at Oxford Street and also away from the end of the proposed cycling lane at Cheapside Street. It also needed to be away from the motions occurring at the St James intersection.
The final decision placed the documentation just north of St James. The Google Maps view below shows an overall view of the Colborne and St James intersection. The “Zero” location of the documentation is shown as 15 metres north of the north curb of St James. It can be noted that a pedestrian crossing existed on the south side of the intersection and this caused an interruption in the normal traffic flow. Also a bus stop was located further south which also caused some interruption.
Speeds and traffic volumes were documented over two, 50-metre segments north of St James. At this initial stage it was decided that only northbound traffic would be documented and that southbound data would be obtained from analysis of the video at a later date.
The Google Maps view below is looking northbound on Colborne Street from just south of the intersection with St James. The northbound bus stop can be seen on the right side of the view (blue sign on pole) and the pedestrian crossing is also visible in the background.
The next Google Maps view below is looking southbound from just north of the St James intersection. There is a fire hall located on the south-west quadrant of the intersection. Also note the rather wide boulevards located on each side of Colborne. Our measurements indicate that the east boulevard is 5.2 metres whereas the west one is 4.9 metres.
It can also be noted that the southbound lane is much wider than the northbound lane. Our measurements indicate that the southbound lane is 6.1 metres wide whereas the northbound lane is 3.85 metres. This difference is because parking is allowed along the west side of Colborne. In the handout provided by the City (copied below) the proposal is that the west side parking lane will be removed. Two 3.3-metre wide lanes will be created for motor vehicle traffic and then 1.7-metre wide cycling lanes will be created on each side of Colborne. It would appear that the boulevards (i.e. painting strips) will remain as they are without any widening of the road.
With the existence of a city-transit bus route there is concern about the proposed 3.3-metre-wide lanes which are narrower than the 3.5-metres, or wider, that would typically be seen. A city transit bus would be in the neighbourhood of 2.6 metres in width and this would cause a gap of only about 35 centimetres between the side of the bus and the left and right edges of the lane. Given the propensity for motor vehicles to stray from a perfectly aligned position in a lane and given the similar propensity for cyclists to wander left and right as they balance the cyclists, there is an increased likelihood of possible contact between these units. Even slight contact of a cyclist or cycle can create considerable problems to the safety of the rider.
Session #1 – The Results
The image below is a frame taken from the Premiere video project showing the synchronized output of six video cameras. It can be recalled that average speeds are obtained by noting the time taken for a vehicle to travel over a 50-metre distance segment. It is a simple process to take the 50-metre segment and divide it by that time to arrive at an average speed in metres-per-second (m/s). Metres-per-second are then multiplied by 3.6 to transfer to kilometres-per-hour (km/h).
Documentations commenced at 1020 hours on September 20, 2022 over a period of one hour.
The table below shows the results of the documentations of northbound cyclists. Only 15 northbound cyclists were observed during this time. Only three of them were females. The fastest speed was at Observation #8 where a male rode a road bike at an average of just over 28 km/h. The slowest speed was at Observation #7 where a female rode at an average speed between 14.8 and 15.7 km/h.
The overall average speeds of the cyclists was just over 22 km/h in both segments of roadway. This is somewhat high compared to speeds on other cycling facilities such as the Thames Valley Parkway and none of the 15 cyclists appeared to be riding an e-bike. Yet it is not unusual for situations of uninterrupted travel where cyclists do not need to slow for pedestrians and other obstructions.
The next table shows the results of the motor vehicle volumes and speeds. Each cell shows the observation number followed by the speed in km/h up to two decimals. As an example, the first observation fell into the 41-45 km/h column and can be seen at the very bottom of the table. The “1-44.75” means that the precise speed of the vehicle in Observation #1 was 44.75 km/h.
A total of 136 observations of motor vehicles was made. Eighty-five percent of 136 is 115. So in determining the 85th Percentile Speed we need to find the value of the 115th observation. it is a simple process of adding up the frequencies in the columns up to the speed range of 46-50 km/h, arriving at a cumulative frequency (4+4+30+34+38 = 110) of 110 observations. We now need to find the 5th slowest observation in the column of speeds 51-55 km/h. That 5th observation shows a speed of 51.10 km/h and therefore this is the 85th Percentile Speed.
A similar process was conducted for the second road segment, between the 50-metre and 100-metre markers. This analysis showed that the 115th observation contained a speed of 51.87 km/h and so this was the 85th Percentile Speed for that distance segment.
Not enough analysis has been completed at this time to obtain an estimate of the motor vehicle traffic volume since only northbound vehicles were documented. A temporary (though possibly errored) estimate could be obtained by multiplying the 136 observations by 2. Thus we might estimate that a total of 272 motor vehicles passed by the area in one hour. If this was the peak hour then we might estimate the AADT by multiplying by 10, resulting in an estimated AADT of 2720. However the counts were taken between 1020 and 1120 hours and this would clearly not be the peak hour. So based on the present data we can only say that the AADT at the site is higher than 2720.
Another approach is to accept the City of London traffic volume data which was estimated to be about 4500 AADT. Combining this with the 85ht Percentile speeds (about 51 to 52 km/h) we can look at the graph of speed and volume prepared in Book 18, shown previously.
Two additional Sessions have already been conducted on September 30th and October 5th and the data from these Sessions are in the process of being developed.
Session #2 on September 30th was undertaken for two hours, between 1612 and 1812 hours. This session would include the peak hour. At time of writing a total of 443 northbound vehicles have been documented, or about 222 per hour. This is almost twice as many vehicles per hour than an in Session #1. Further details from this Session #2 will be revealed in a separate article shortly.
Colborne at St James Traffic Study Underway
Three videotaping sessions have been completed by Gorski Consulting on Colborne Street just north of Oxford Street in London. Sessions were completed on September 20th, September 30th and October 5, 2022.
The impetus for this study was the result of Dr. Colin Evans who contacted me with an inquiry whether I would consider conducting a traffic study on Colborne Street. Details are still unknown but Dr. Evans works with the London Health Sciences Centre and appears to be interested in the decision by the City of London to develop a “paint only” cycling lane along Colborne Street north of Oxford Street in London. A protected cycling lane already exists on Colborne proceeding northward to Oxford however the decision to create an non-protected lane north of Oxford has raised the concerns of some. While I already had thoughts of performing such a study it was Dr. Evans who caused that thought to develop into action.
In the first session which occurred on September 20th, Dr. Evans also invited another person who has been interested in cycling safety in London. Andrew Hunniford, the manager/partner of the London Bicycle Café also attended. This was our first meeting and we got through introductions quickly before the videotaping commenced.
Since this inaugural meeting Dr. Evans indicated that he had arranged to have a number of other doctors to join in the study. So we now have the beginnings of a group who are interested in gathering objective data. I hope to be conducting some training sessions so the participants can become familiar with the procedures. Once this occurs it may be that the time-consuming process of conducting the video analysis will be sped up. Preliminary results from these sessions are likely to be posted on this website within the week. Please stay tuned to these developments.
Traffic Study Commenced at Colborne Street North of Oxford in London Ontario
Discussions developed recently when the City of London announced its intentions to extent the Colborne Street cycling track north from Oxford Street to Cheapside Street. The criticisms of the plan appear to centre around the City’s intention to create a painted cycling lane rather than the protected one that exists south of Oxford.
The City indicated that the painted cycling path “…avoids costly construction of road widening and its related impacts to things like trees, hydro poles and properties”. The City also indicated that the plan was consistent with design guidance provided in Ontario’s Book 18 of the Ontario Traffic Manual. The City also indicated that protected cycling lanes will to installed for streets with higher traffic speeds an volumes. Yet, when a representative of the City was asked whether any specific traffic studies were conducted that would reveal traffic speeds, it was denied that any such study was conducted or available.
The proposed cycling lanes on Colborne will allow the continued existence of broad boulevards on each side of the road.
A figure taken from Ontario’s Book 18 is shown below. It describes how the level of cycling facilities might be planned by noting the speed and volume of vehicles on the road of interest.
Presumably the City of London considered this nomograph when selecting the painted cycle path option. But if the City did not conduct a specific study to obtain data on speed for example, how could they use this nomograph properly?
It is an interesting question. But it has been observed on a number of previous occasions that the City denies that it has any specific data on these issues. And one cannot know because the City is not obliged to be clear to the public on such issues.
As a result Gorski Consulting has decided to conduct a study on Colborne Street to obtain base data to evaluate whether the painted cycling lane is the best option. Stay tuned as these matters develop.
Following The Chaos of A Detour – Part 3
The creation of a detour that involves cyclist traffic needs to take into consideration the typical behaviour of cyclists as well as their capabilities. This observation has been demonstrated in the creation of a detour around the construction at the Thames Valley Parkway (TVP) in London, Ontario.
The TVP is a busy and popular multi-use pathway that meanders through London, generally following the banks of its Thames River. The area of construction was located just north-west of the City’s downtown. The map below shows the area of construction as well as the route of the detour. Several areas of concern were noted along this route. In particular, three areas are highlighted in the map: 1.) a left turn from Ann Street onto the busy Talbot Street, 2.) a passage through the narrow Canadian Pacific Railway underpass just south of Oxford Street, and 3.) a steep downgrade of Grosvenor Street into the busy parking lot at Gibbons Park. Two previous articles have discussed the first two areas of concern.
The present article will focus of the last of the dangers: the downslope of Grosvenor Street into the parking lot of Gibbons Park.
Over the years Gorski Consulting has been monitoring the motions of cyclists riding on downslopes of roads and paths in the City of London. The results of these observations have bee posted in a number of earlier articles. The general conclusion drawn from these observations is that downslopes are related to high cyclist speeds and these high cyclists speeds can be a danger, both to riders, and to those who might interact with them. It would not be surprising therefore that we would express concern when the detour of the Thames Valley Parkway created by the City of London would cause cyclists to travel through such a steep downgrade.
Shortly before the detour was in effect on August 22, 2022 measurements were taken of the downslope on Grosvenor Street as it entered into the Gibbons Park parking lot. Using the nearest intersection (St George Street) as a “zero” reference, painted markers were produced at 25-metre intervals and then a digital level was placed on the road at each marker as shown in the two photos below.
While cyclists may have used this route on previous occasions, the problem with the detour is that it would increase the volume of cyclists and thereby increase the likelihood that a collision might occur. At the end of the downslope there was a large parking lot. This lot was used by persons attending the popular Gibbons Park. There is a danger when cyclist speeds are increased as they enter such a parking lot because driver’s of motor vehicles would not necessarily be attentive to their approach. Many drivers would be focused on the local vehicles around them as they moved in and out of their parking spaces. The extent of the potential danger needed some objective evaluation and so this was the reason to conduct observations of cyclists.
The results of the slope-measuring procedure is shown in the table below. As can be seen the severity of the slope increases as the road reaches the bottom of the slope.
On August 31, 2022 video documentation was conducted of cyclists travelling on the downslope of Grosvenor Street. The documentation occurred between the hours of time of 0946 and 1230 hours, or for approximately 2 and 3/4 hours. Forty cyclists were observed during the time. The table below shows the details of the 20 cyclists who travelled westbound on the downslope. These twenty represent an average of just 7.3 cyclists per hour. At a distance of 225 metres the downslope leveled out and this location was several metres within the parking lot.
As can be seen in the above table there were not many full observations made available. Westbound cyclists reaching the parking lot had a choice of two entrances and we chose to follow those cyclists who took the most popular and direct route along the north portion of the lot. However some cyclists opted to turn left and into the south portion of the lot where there were not cameras. So the speed of some cyclists as they entered the parking lot was not documented. Seven observations are denoted at the 225-metre marker with the words “Into other lane”, meaning their speed could not be documented at this location. This resulted in only 13 remaining observations. Observation #2 occurred before we had a chance to complete our camera set-up so this observation was also incomplete at the 225-metre marker, so this caused a further deduction of full observations, down to just 12.
The table shows that four cyclists were observed to be travelling above 30 km/h. While not many these four would pose a safety problem if moving motor vehicles were in their presence. Particularly Observation #23 where the male rider of a road bike was not wearing a helmet yet he was travelling at the highest speed of almost 39 km/h.
Discussion
I can summarize the results of reviewing the details of all three areas of concern along the noted detour.
Mercifully, the numbers of cyclists using the detour was diminished compared to the number of northbound cyclists that where observed approaching the area of construction of the TVP near Blackfriars bridge. Before the construction the number of cyclists at the Blackfriars Bridge numbered 39 per hour. Just after the closure of the TVP at Ann Street the number of northbound cyclists at the Blackfriars Bridge was reduced to 24 per hour. This was reduced again at the intersection of Ann and Talbots Streets to just 10.5 per hour. And then the number of cyclists was reduced again to just 7.3 per hour at the Grosvenor Street downslope. One can only imagine what developments could have taken place if the number of cyclists using the detour was not diminished.
As of writing the detour is still in effect and it may be lifted, perhaps near the end of September, or later. This is not a long time since the detour began on August 22nd, 2022. Hopefully the deficiencies that have been highlighted will not result any tragic consequences. However the discussion needs some clear-headed thought. Before a detour in finalized there must be certainty that the behaviour and capabilities of cyclists have been taken into account. One cannot just apply one’s theoretical knowledge or rely on published guidelines that may not necessarily apply to the unique specifics of an individual site. A solid understanding of cyclists and their expected actions in needed but also observational data at the site should be gathered as a way of monitoring for problems that may not be apparent at the commencement of the detour.
Following The Chaos of A Detour – Part 2
Gorski Consulting has been following the repercussions of a decision by the City of London Ontario to create a detour route around some construction that was being done on the Thames Valley Parkway (TVP) in an area just north-west of the downtown of the City. The TVP is a popular, multi-use, pathway that generally follows the three-pronged Thames River in London.
In an earlier article we described how the detour contained three area of concern (See map below): 1.) a left turn at Talbot and Ann streets, 2.) a passage through the narrow underpass of the CPR railway crossing on Talbot south of Oxford Street, and 3.) the passage of cyclists down a steep downslope of Grosvenor Street at Gibbons Park. Cyclists who attempted to follow the designated detour met up with obstacles that could have caused collisions, injuries and/or worse. Each of these dangers is highlighted in individual articles.
In an article entitled “Following The Chaos of A Detour – Part 1” we focused on the first danger: The left turn of cyclists from Ann Street onto Talbot. The actions of 21 cyclists who were eastbound on Ann Street and made a left turn onto northbound Talbot Street were described.
The current article will focus on the second danger encountered when cyclists attempted to pass through the narrow opening of the CPR underpass on Talbot Street just south of Oxford Street.
Passage of Cyclists Through The Narrow CPR Rail Underpass
In analysis of video from August 24, 2022, 21 cyclists were observed eastbound on Ann Street and making a left turn onto northbound Talbot Street. Of those 21, 10 cyclists never crossed Talbot Street in the expected manner. Instead these ten cyclists opted to turn northbound onto the west sidewalk of Talbot, presumably because they determined it was either unsafe or too difficult to cross Talbot Street. This decision might have been reasonable if the west sidewalk of Talbot continued underneath and past the CPR underpass. But that was not the case. The west sidewalk ended at the underpass. And this caused a dilemma that these cyclists had not expected. The video provided a clear indication of the difficulty they experienced during this revelation.
Rather than describing the actions of all 10 cyclists, we have chosen only two examples. If the actions of all 10 cyclists were displayed in this article it would make for a long description with a large number of figures. Yet the two examples provide a reasonable summary of the actions of all ten.
Example #1
In the first example we focus on an adult male accompanied by a young female, likely of pre-teen age. The male led the child eastbound along Ann Street and then northbound on Talbot Street. Reconsiderations had to be made and the riders backtracked as shown in the map below. The details of their actions are also summarized in the following text:
Come to stop at timecode 00;08;15;00 at Talbot Street on south sidewalk of Ann Street next to pedestrian crossing button. Does not press button. Waits for couple of minutes. Begin crossing Ann St NB at 00;09;55;00 toward CPR underpass. Begins riding NB along W sidewalk of Talbot. Stops at Piccadilly St. Then continues NB past Piccadilly toward CPR underpass. Stop before reaching underpass. Discussion between male and female. Both riders dismount get back on bikes and return southbound crossing Piccadilly at 00;11;33;40. Return to Ann St at 00;11;57;00. Wait again on Ann St then cross Talbot at @00;12;15;00 via pedestrian crossing. Begin riding northbound along east sidewalk of Talbot and continue through CPR underpass.
In total it has taken the two cyclists over 4 and 1/2 minutes delay to pass through the CPR underpass from their first approach to the intersection of Ann and Talbot Streets. There could have been instances where they might have attempted to cross Talbot Street where crossing could have been precarious and this is a result of the City of London guiding them to take this detour.
Next we have a second example of another cyclist who chose not to cross Talbot Street when he first arrived from eastbound Ann Street. Again, the cyclist chose to travel northbound along the west sidewalk of Talbot and he also encountered the problem that the sidewalk ended at the CPR underpass. His decision to deal with this problem was unexpected, as will be shown in the video frames shown below.
Example #2
First we can see the male cyclist travelling eastbound on Ann Street and approaching the stop sign at Talbot Street, as shown in the first frame below.
Discussion
The male cyclist in the second example shows how cyclists will invent ways of achieving their goals through unorthodox ways. But this dangerous action was influenced by the advice given by the City of London to use the detour that created the cyclist’s difficulties. In the vast majority of instances there are no serious consequences in these actions. Just like in many instances of alcohol impairment, speeding, many drivers avoid detection, collisions, injuries, etc. Poorly maintained roadways or defective vehicles also escape detection for many occasions before a tragic event occurs and the problem is uncovered.
Through video observations of cyclists passing through this detour we can uncover deficiencies that could be corrected before a tragedy occurs. But this requires serious attention to these dangers by those officials whose responsibility it is to keep our roadways safe.
Following The Chaos Of A Detour – Part 1
When the City of London developed a detour around construction at the Thames Valley Parkway (TVP) unknown planners failed to understand how cyclists behave in their normal progression through their urban environment. The result is that several dangers were created along the route. This article will discuss the first of three locations where those dangers exist: A left turn from Ann Street onto Talbot Street.
A Map of the Detour
Below is a map showing the area of the Thames Valley Parkway construction and the original detour route around it. There are three areas of concern along the route: 1. A required left turn onto Talbot, 2. A passage through the narrow Canadian National Railway (CNR) underpass, and 3. A steep downslope on Grosvenor St into a busy parking lot at Gibbons Park.
This present article will focus on the first of the three dangers: The left turn from westbound Ann Street onto northbound Talbot.
The Left-Turn Problem
The figure below shows an overall view of the area of the original detour where cyclists are asked to turn from the TVP onto Ann Street and progress eastward to the intersection with Talbot Street. They are then asked to make a left turn onto Talbot to take them toward the narrow underpass of the CNR underpass.
The next figure below shows a closer, overhead, view of the intersection of Ann and Talbot. The red lines indicate the required motion that cyclists need to take to continue along the detour route. But the figure also shows the presence of a pedestrian crosswalk.
The figure below shows another view of the intersection looking north along Talbot Street. The red lines indicate the left turn required of cyclists to continue northward toward the CNR underpass. Again it can be noted that there is a pedestrian crossing at the intersection.
And again, the figure below shows a view looking eastward along Ann Street toward Talbot. This view also shows that there is a pedestrian crossing installed at the intersection. Those travelling eastbound on Ann and wanting to cross Talbot simply needed to press a button mounted on the pole and flashing pedestrian-crossing lights would be activated requiring all traffic on Talbot to come to a stop. So there should be no problem for cyclists who need to make the left turn: All they need to do is press the button on the pole. It appears that this may have been the logic of the unknown planners who developed the detour route.
But what happens in practice? Never mind the theory, what did the planners know about what would happen in practice? Before answering that question we need to review some observations of cyclists in the area.
Video Observations of Cyclists
Throughout the summer of 2022 Gorski Consulting was involved in a traffic study at Blackfriars Bridge where it connected with the TVP. This location is just south of the area of construction at TVP. Five, 2-hour, videotaping sessions were conducted between May 29th and August 9, 2022. The actions of cyclists were monitored to determine the direction from which they entered the study area and the direction they took when exiting the study area. The table below shows the results of these observations.
The above table shows that 390 cyclists were observed to travel northbound toward the area of construction in the 10 hours of video observations, or 39 cyclists per hour. Also 68 cyclists were observed to travel westbound across Blackfriars Bridge, or about 6.8 cyclists per hour.
We wanted to explore how the detours affected the motions of cyclists so we conducted another 1-hour of video observations on August 23, 2022, or one day after the detour became active. This session revealed that only 24 cyclists travelled northbound on the TVP toward the area of construction, but 16 cyclists travelled westbound across Blackfriars Bridge. In other words a reduced number of cyclists used the original detour and this is noted in the drop in observations from 39 per hour to 24 per hour. And the observations seemed to support that some cyclists used the alternate detour route of crossing Blackfriars Bridge and travelling onto Gunn Street – and this is supported by the increase in observations from 6.8 per hour to 16.0 per hour. So these data provide some context to what is happening along the original detour route.
Next we conducted video observations at the intersection of Talbot and Ann Streets on August 24, 2022, over a period of 2 hours. At 15-minute intervals we noted the actions of cyclists passing through the intersection. The results from that study are shown in the table below.
As can be seen in the table, a total of 55 cyclists were observed in the 2-hours of observation. Those cyclists who were following the detour route toward the CNR underpass are located in the column “EB Ann Turn NB on Talbot” and there were 21 such observations, or 10.5 per hour.
So we can summarize by saying that during the summer of 2022, about 39 cyclists were travelling northbound on the TVP per hour before the construction began on the TVP. Just after the TVP was closed the number of northbound cyclists was reduced to 24 cyclists per hour. And then we see a further reduction in cyclists at the intersection of Talbot and Ann Streets to just 10.5 per hour. So the number of northbound cyclists using the original detour route dropped dramatically compared to the number of northbound cyclists before the construction began. In a way this reduction is helpful from a safety viewpoint because fewer cyclists became exposed to the unsafe conditions of the original detour.
We can now return to the issue of the the left-turning cyclists as they travelled eastbound on Ann Street and approached the left turn onto northbound Talbot. Recall, all they had to do to cross Talbot was to press the button located on the pole on the south-west corner of the intersection. Our testing confirmed that, as soon as that button was pressed the flashing lights became illuminated immediately and there would have been very little delay for cyclists. So what actually happened when these 21 cyclists were observed on video?
Of the 21 cyclists not a single one actually pressed the pedestrian-crossing button to cross Talbot Street. Eleven of the 21 cyclists waited patiently at the west edge of Talbot Street, some for a considerable time, before a gap was made available in traffic and they completed their left turn.
The remaining 10 cyclists never attempted the crossing. Instead they turned left onto the west sidewalk of Talbot Street and began riding northbound toward the CNR underpass. But the sidewalk on the west side of Talbot came to an end at the underpass. And this caused a dilemma. Since Talbot Street was filled with heavy traffic how were these cyclists going to get through the CNR underpass? In the next article we will present several examples of what took place.
Discussion
What were planners at the City of London thinking when they created the original detour? Did they believe that cyclists approaching eastbound on Ann Street, and wanting to make the left turn to northbound Talbot, would deviate from their position on the road and come onto the south sidewalk to press the pedestrian crossing button? No one can read their minds.
However, if cyclists were expected to cross Talbot Street using the pedestrian crossing then that presented another problem. Cyclists are prohibited from riding within pedestrian crossings. So what next? After moving onto the south sidewalk and pressing the pedestrian crossing button was a cyclist expected to shimmy their bike over away from the pedestrian crossing and then cross from the eastbound lane of Ann Street? Clearly that would be impossible to believe because, from a practical sense, it just would not happen. That is not the way cyclists behave in the real world.
It was fortunate on the afternoon of the videotaping that traffic on Talbot Street was extremely dense such that on many occasions northbound vehicles were crawling forward at very slow speed. This improved the cyclists’ chances to enter the stream of traffic. But that favourable outcome would not always be there. It is likely that there would be occasions where traffic was less-dense and northbound vehicles could be travelling at the posted speed or higher. Then the ability of left-turning cyclists to enter the northbound stream could be worsened.
In such chaotic situations both drivers and cyclists learn to adapt and accommodate. Many drivers are alert enough that they detect the presence of a cyclist whose intention is to enter the lane in front of them. And cyclists are particularly careful not to enter traffic until they are sure they can do so in safety, or it could mean their life. So these accommodations help to mask the dangerous conditions that exist. However, over the long run, there is a higher probability that less-attentive drivers and cyclists will meet and the result becomes tragic.
This is why video observations such as those presented in this article are important. Even before a tragedy occurs we can make observations of the detour and draw conclusions about what might happen. And we can use this analysis to consider how we might improve the safety of cyclists in any further planning of detours.
There are two more articles forthcoming that will focus on the remaining two dangers along the original detour: 1. The narrow CNR underpass, and 2. The steep downslope of Grosvenor Street into Gibbons Park.
Following The Chaos That A Detour Makes – A 3 Part Series
Detours that create chaos should not be taken lightly. While users can be accommodating to them, improper detours heighten the probability that a serious accident will eventually happen. This is the case at a detour of the multi-use pathway of the Thames Valley Parkway in London Ontario. Highlighting this chaos needs to result in changes to how detours are planned for vulnerable pedestrians, cyclists and other non-motor-vehicle travellers.
The General Safety Problem
Certain unknown individuals at the City of London made decisions that led to the creation of a detour around the construction site of the Thames Valley Parkway between Blackfriars Bridge and Gibbons Park. Users/cyclists proposed an alternate (and safer) route that would take cyclists along the west bank of the Thames River, through Gunn Street and Gibbons Park. The City initially accepted this change. But subsequently individuals at the City of London decided that both detours ought to be publicized as acceptable routes.
Review of these decisions by Gorski Consulting indicated to me that the creation of the original detour was a poor decision from poor planning and/or a lack of understanding. Shortly after the two detours were in place, Gorski Consulting began to conduct video observations along the original detour route. As expected these observations revealed some serious safety issues. Those issues rest at the three locations of the detour route shown in the map below.
A Chaotic Example
As an example, the following three images are frames taken from video that was taken on August 24, 2022 on Talbot Street between Oxford and Ann Streets. This date is just 2 days after the TVP was closed and the detour became an advised alternate route. The images show a cyclist following the originally recommended detour.
Future Articles
From my analysis it appears that individuals at the City of London failed to understand how cyclists behave in urban environments. This lack of knowledge or understanding has created the chaos along the detour that is about to be discussed. Given the extent of detail that is required, this discussion will be broken into three articles, each article focusing on one of the three areas of concern shown in the above map. These articles are now being assembled and will be posted on the Gorski Consulting website shortly.
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