Highway 401 Damaged Cable Barrier – Continued, Unadvertised Safety Problem
Not much interest was shown by the public when Gorski Consulting posted an article on May 7, 2022 on our website regarding unrepaired damage to the median cable barrier along Highway 401 between London and Tilbury Ontario. On September 2, 2022 I took another drive along this portion of Highway 401. I observed that the problem is even worse than previously reported.
I travelled about 68 kilometres along the cable barrier between Colonel Talbot Road (near London) to Victoria Road (near Ridgetown). Along this route I observed 4 distinct areas where the cable barrier was damaged and unrepaired from previous impacts. These areas are noted below.
1st Area of Damage: East of Union Road
2nd Area of Damage: West of Furnival Road
The second area of cable barrier damage was observed while travelling westbound past Furnival Road. The cable was located at the edge of the eastbound lanes so the photos below show the view looking across the median. The area of impact damage was located just west of the overpass of Furnival Road.
Upon my return trip in the evening, travelling eastbound, I took the following photos of the same location, west of Furnival Road. In the following photos, several hundred metres west of the area of impact, it is apparent that the cable barrier has lost its tension. In fact the closest cable barrier anchorage is located about 2.8 metres west of Furnival Road. We will see shortly that the impact damage to the cable barrier is just west of Furnival Road. And it will be revealed shortly that the anchorage at the east end of the cable barrier is about 790 metres west of the overpass of Furnival Road. Therefore the cables would be loose for about 2.1 kilometres.
At the right edge of the photo below is a green sign indicating that Furnival Road is 1 kilometre ahead. However this distance may refer to the start of the exit lane and not to the overpass. We can also see the overpass of Furnival Road in the background. It is also possible to see the faint orange colour of traffic cones positioned at the impact location of the barrier. So this gives us the ability to estimate the location of the area of impact.
As we approach the area of impact we can see that the cable barrier is still without tension on all 4 cables.
Just beyond the area of impact the photos below show that the cable barrier continues to exhibit no tension in all 4 cables. This condition exists until the cable reaches an anchorage point just west of the Furnival Road overpass, as shown in the photos below.
In the photo below we see an turn-around driveway in the centre median which is also the location where the cable barrier ends at an anchorage and another anchorage begins for a new length of cable. This turn-around driveway is located 790 metres west of Furnival Road.
Note how the cable barrier is without tension at all 4 cables up to the point where it reaches the anchorage point. Then, upon gaining a new anchorage at 790 metres west of Furnival Road, the cable barrier seems to contain tension all the way up to the overpass at Furnival Road, as shown in the photos below.
3rd Area of Damage: East of Dunborough Road
Next we progress further eastward to a location about 12 kilometres east of Furnival Road, at the Dunborough Road overpass shown below. Dunborough Road is located just east of West Lorne Ontario and just over 2 kilometres west of the West Lorne En Route service centre. As can be seen in the photos, a new section of cable barrier begins at the Dunborough Road overpass along the north edge of the eastbound lanes. However, as we look closer at the anchorage point of the barrier, the cables appear to have lost their tension.
As we continue to travel around the sweeping left curve of the highway we can see, in the photos below, the loss of tension in the cables for a substantial distance.
We then reach the area of impact of the cable barrier which is located just west of the exit to the West Lorne En Route service centre. The photos below show the damage to the cable barrier resulting from this impact.
In the photo below we can see some tire marks on the far side of the median. Although I have no information about this collision these tire marks suggest that a large truck was westbound, entered the median, and then struck the cable barrier on the far (eastbound) side of the median in the foreground. Further research is needed to determine whether this suspicion is correct.
East of the area of impact the photos below show that the cable barrier has lost its tension (at least) in the top two cables. This loss of tension continues for several hundred metres until another anchorage point is reached at the location where the curve of the highway ends about 2.2 kilometres west of Coyne Road.
4th Area of Damage: West of Coyne Road
In the two photos below we see the loose cable barrier from the Dunborough Road impact and it terminates at a new anchorage point adjacent to the En Route service centre in the eastbound lanes of Highway 401. This location is about 1.4 kilometres east of Dunborough Road or 2.2 kilometres west of Coyne Road. It is also only about 350 metres west of the exit to the En Route service centre. A new length of cable barrier begins at this point.
Yet, when we look at the cables along this new section they also appear to have lost their tension. The second cable from the bottom certainly looks to be loose. In the background, next to the white truck we can see a small orange cone and this is the location of another impact the cable barrier.
I almost missed taking a photo of this additional area of damage however an out-of-focus view is shown below. In the background the entrance/exit can be seen to the En Route service centre located in the westbound side of the highway. So this location is just west of Coyne Road.
The photo below shows the status of the cable barrier just east of the area of impact. Its position can be noted by the tall masts of the lighting at the entrance to the En Route service centre on the westbound side of the highway. Also in the background is the overpass of Coyne Road. The cable barrier contains loose cables, most notably the third cable from the bottom is very loose. This is caused by the impact damage of the barrier just west of this location.
The photo below shows the cable barrier as it reaches its next anchorage point at Coyne Road. The bottom cable appears to be loose at this location. But we also know, from the previous photo, that the third cable from the bottom is also loose.
Beyond Coyne Road the photo below shows that the cable barrier starts from a new anchorage. It is not clear in this photo whether the cable in this new section contains proper tension however we did not observe any further impact damage until the damage east of Union Road which is about 20 kilometres east of this location.
The following three photos are of the damaged cable barrier just east of Union Road. These views were taken while eastbound on our return trip.
Summary
In summary impact damage to the cable barrier on Highway 401 caused the barrier cables to be loose for a distance of 2.1 kilometres west of Furnival Road. Two additional impacts to the cable barrier between Dunborough Road and Coyne Road meant that an additional 3.6 kilometres of cable was left loose. Thus a total of 5.7 kilometres of cable were observed to be loose in the 68 kilometre distance between Colonel Talbot Road and Victoria Road. Stated differently, 8.4 percent of the total cable length was observed to be in a state of disrepair. There is no information available to determine the level of danger that exists when a vehicle makes contact with loose cables from a damaged barrier. Yet my review of similar incidents in other collision environments indicates that such an interaction could result in worse injury consequences than if no barrier existed at all.
In my website article of May 7, 2022 on this topic I made the following comment which still applies:
“It is easy to get information on the effectiveness of high-tension cables barriers especially from those organizations who either sell them or use them on their highway systems. But what about information that demonstrates their in-service performance and whether the barriers are being repaired in a timely fashion? Silence.”
The level of silence today is quite deafening. There has been no news media coverage of this issue. Certainly OPP vehicles travel along Highway 401 on a regular basis yet I have not heard or read of a single complaint or warning from police about this safety hazard. And there is no reason why the Ontario Ministry of Transportation should be allowed to cause these conditions to exist.
Are Construction Detours More Complicated and Dangerous When Cyclists Are Involved?
Construction detours are a necessity of life. However with the increase in cyclist traffic in North American cities the relatively simple detour route may require new considerations. In previous years, when motor vehicles dominated traffic volumes, there was less need to focus on the qualities of the roadway on which traffic was diverted. However, as cyclist volumes are increased there is a greater need to consider how those cyclists will mix with motor vehicle traffic. Also certain roadway characteristics that may be unimportant to motor vehicle travel may be of great importance to the safety of cyclists.
The Talbot-Grosvenor Detour
An example of the complexity of the problem is demonstrated in the construction detour in London, Ontario that was necessitated when the north branch of the multi-use pathway, the Thames Valley Parkway (TVP), needed to be closed for construction.
The TVP is a shared use facility that allows non-motor-vehicle traffic to travel through London. It generally follows the banks of the Thames River. The area of construction of the TVP is in the north-south section between the Blackfriars Bridge and Western University. Recent traffic counts indicate that about 84 cyclists and 102 pedestrians use the facility every hour. In addition another 7 special users (wheel-chaired, e-scooter, skateboard, etc.) also use the facility every hour.
Employees at the City of London developed a detour of the construction site on city streets that would take cyclists through several challenging roadway features. Three areas of concern can be noted.
Three Areas of Concern
Firstly, the detour required that cyclists make a left-turn to travel northbound on Talbot Street. Although Talbot Street is a two-lane roadway it is very busy and few gaps in traffic would be available for a cyclist to complete such a turn. Traffic volume data from August 23, 2018 available from the City of London indicates an AADT of 14,000.
Secondly, the same detour caused cyclists to travel through the narrowing of Talbot Street as it passed under a narrow underpass of the Canadian Pacific Railway line. And thirdly the detour caused cyclists to travel down a steep downgrade of Grosvenor Street into a busy parking lot at Gibbons Park.
Some examples of the challenges existing at the detour are shown in the figures below.
The third safety issue along the detour is the steep downgrade of Grosvenor Street leading into the busy parking lot of Gibbons Park. The downgrade contained a maximum of 15.7 percent which is a steep slope considering the environs of south-western Ontario. Additionally it became known that construction was supposed to take place at the bottom of the downgrade. A sewer pile was installed and this required that a trench be dug across Grosvenor Street at the bottom of the downgrade. This is precisely at the location where cyclists would reach their highest speeds. The site of the construction is shown in the following photo taken from the parking lot of Gibbons Park.
One cannot get into the minds of the persons who decided that this detour route was a reasonable decision. There must be some unknown reason why it was selected despite such safety concerns.
Brief documentations of cyclists travelling down the slope of Grosvenor Street were conducted between August 18 and 22, 2022. These observations showed that one cyclist reached a speed of over 57 km/h at the base of the downslope. While this single observation may not reflect the actions of many cyclists it has been demonstrated in previous testing by Gorski Consulting, at other locations in London, that a large percentage of cyclists reach high speeds on downslopes.
While speed is not the only factor that leads to cyclist collisions (and injuries) it must be noted that high speed is any important factor. This is particularly so at the Grosvenor Street site because cyclists ride into a busy parking lot at the end of the downslope. Drivers pulling into and out of parking spots would not be accustomed to looking for cyclists travelling at high speed toward, and past them. Given the typical actions of such drivers they would be more preoccupied with searching for the parked vehicles around them, to avoid hitting them, such that their focus would be on the very limited area around their vehicle.
A short time after the detour route was officially announced cyclists began to complain about its shortcomings. An alternative route was proposed taking cyclists along the west bank of the Thames River which avoided most of the safety problems of the original route. After some consideration the City announced that both routes would be accepted leaving cyclists to chose between the two. While this decision appeared reasonable it did not recognize that some cyclists would likely be unfamiliar with the area and may not be able to judge for themselves which route should be taken. Directing such inexperienced cyclists through the original detour could create unintended safety consequences. Unfortunately the City’s decision still stands until the construction is completed at the end of September, 2022.
Summary
Modes of transportation in North American cities are expected to continue to evolve in the near future as the world responds to a global climate crisis. Mass transit, various forms of e-vehicles, walking and cycling are all expected to push aside the motor vehicle that has dominated transportation for the past 100 years. With these new forms of motion there will be challenges as the road system needs to accommodate them. There will be times when accommodation is not ideal and conflicts will exist. For cyclists it means that travelling on roadways designed exclusively for automobiles is likely to continue for some time into the future even though great strides in changing the system occur. Road construction projects and changes to improve cycling environments will necessitate that cyclists be displaced onto detours that are normally thought of in terms of motor vehicle travel. It takes time to reverse that logic. More and more those who plan detour routes will have to have an understanding of the complexity of the new modes of transportation that are evolving. Those detours will have to consider that all users of the detour need to pass through it with a similar level of safety.
Judicial Inquiry into Red Hill Valley Parkway Continues
Forgotten to most, the Judicial Inquiry into the Red Hill Valley Parkway (RHVP) controversy is continuing in Hamilton Ontario. The inquiry was requested by the City of Hamilton, as noted in the following excerpt taken from a letter to the Superior Court of Ontario:
“At a meeting held on March 20, 2019, Council of the City of Hamilton passed a
resolution requesting a judge of the Superior Court of Justice to investigate matters
relating to a failure to disclose to the City Council a draft report prepared by Tradewind
Scientific Ltd., dated November 20, 2013 with respect to the friction levels on the Red
Hill Valley Parkway in the City of Hamilton.”
Complaints about the slipperiness of the surface of the RHVP had been reported on a number of occasions and several serious collisions were noted that could be related to that cause. Eventually it was discovered that a technical report prepared for the City of Hamilton by Tradewind Scientific in 2013 confirmed the substandard surface conditions however that report seemed to have become lost, or perhaps purposely hidden. The Judicial Inquiry was created to obtain the facts about how these events occurred. Meanwhile a class action lawsuit claiming $250 million dollars was announced against the City of Hamilton with respect to these events. Presumably the lawsuit is awaiting the completion of the Inquiry before moving forward.
However the Judicial Inquiry seems to be dragging on and on. One reason for the delay was the COVID-19 epidemic. Never-the-less millions of dollars have already been spent for the inquiry and its completion does not appear to be on the horizon. Yet, useful details are emerging, if one had the time to read through its transcripts. Up to July 20, 2022 the Inquiry has produced transcripts with a total of 9025 pages of testimony. And this only includes the testimony of witnesses. The testimony of expert witnesses is still forthcoming.
A twist in the proceedings occurred when the City of Hamilton requested that 56 documents in its possession should not be disclosed claiming “solicitor-client” or “litigation” privilege. A separate decision was requested the Judicial Inquiry and that was rendered on August 9, 2022 by arbitrator Frank Marrocco of Stockwoods Barristers. The decision did not bode well for the City of Hamilton and now the Inquiry is in a holding pattern as it awaits whether the City of Hamilton will appeal the decision.
…and the holding pattern continues and the Inquiry drags on and the costs continue.
Ultimately the taxpayers of the City of Hamilton will be paying for the costs of the Inquiry and for the results of the class action lawsuit which is still to come.
Much of the focus of the Inquiry may be on the actions of the Director of Engineering Services for the City of Hamilton, Gary Moore. The Tradewinds report was given to Moore and his actions seem to be at issue since the report became missing. His latest testimony was completed in July, 2022 just before the actions of the Inquiry were stopped to deal with the City of Hamilton privilege issue.
It remains to be seen how interested the public may in these proceedings. How a municipality’s actions may be hidden from public scrutiny may be a central theme in the Inquiry. Who was at fault for such secrecy? And how can such developments be addressed in the future in the actions of other Ontario municipalities? It requires the public’s vigilance to keep this proceeding in its busy radar when so many other issues take away the public’s attention.
Pretty Flowers Do Not Help In Understanding Vehicle Fire and Multiple Deaths
Why did a vehicle catch fire after it struck a tree near the intersection of Conestoga Drive and Elmwood Ave in Brampton in the early hours of Saturday, August 20, 2022? Three persons in the vehicle perished. Did they die because of the impact force or because of the fire? Is that important?
Some news media, such as CP24 News, provided photos of the vehicle and the collision site along with their articles. But those photos are copyrighted. So they cannot be shown in an independent site such as ours. And if we had something of importance to convey to the public that could relate to their safety we could not do that with examples from this collision site.
What we can convey, in words, is that the vehicle appeared to strike the tree head-on without any post-impact rotation or travel. So all the pre-impact kinetic energy was dissipated at impact. This would have been a revelation 30 years ago because it would have been an obvious sign of someone attempting to commit suicide. In olden days when vehicles were not equipped with electronic stability control they would travel around a curve, rotate, and then strike a tree with their sides. Although this was not helpful it was sometimes preferable because the impact as not always central, resulting in a less-severe change-in-velocity and allowed some of the vehicle’s kinetic energy to be dissipated in non-harmful post-impact rotation and sliding to rest.
What we see in the present collision is suggestive of the infamous Princess Diana collision of her Mercedes in a Paris tunnel in 1997. That Mercedes was equipped with a primitive, mechanical, stability control system which caused it to straighten out after initial contact with Fiat Uno. While straightening out is often desirable it can also be lethal and undesirable. And these matters need to be discussed.
Another bit of fact is that of Newton’s Third Law of Motion which states that “for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction”, might apply here. Rephrased, it means that when the front end of a vehicle is crushed by the impact of a tree, the severity of that impact is not only displayed in the crush of the vehicle, it is also displayed in the damage to the tree. So if we have a severe impact it should be displayed in severe damage to the tree. As much as officials covered up the vehicle with a blue tarp they did not cover up the tree. And some closer views of the tree which were shown by other news media after the damaged vehicle was removed showed less than expected damage except for scaring from the flames. The result is that either this tree was very robust and made of iron, or the impact was not as severe such that three occupants should have perished from the impact force.
Next we are informed by police and news media that the reason why the vehicle crashed is unknown and no one can speculate. Well up to now speculation has not be against the law. And if speculation must be applied because no meaningful information has been revealed, then we will speculate. None of the site photos helped to demonstrate that Conestoga Drive contains a sweeping curve as it approaches Elmvale Ave. And in such circumstances is it very common for vehicles to go out of control and travel to the outside of the curve, as is what happened in the present circumstance. But why did this happen? A single overhead photo provided by CP24 News showed the surface of the Conestoga Drive for some distance before the tree impact. In the corner of that photo, which is furthest away from the impact, the condition of the road surface could been as heavily cracked and possibly patched. If one looked at a current view of the road surface on Googlemaps, which is often several years old, one would see that the road surface was in poor condition. We are not able to travel to the collision site and examine the road. And the police and news media, in their goodness, have not provided a view of the road surface on approach to the tree impact. So, beyond the heightened speed of the vehicle, and or perhaps the inexperience of its driver, was the cause of the collision due to a loss-of-control due to the poor condition of the road surface? We will not know. And this is speculation. But it is speculation from a lot of past experience in examining thousands of serious collisions.
As the State Farm Insurance commercial says “You’re in good hands”. No need to pursue what really happened because you will never know. And without remediation the next, multiple-fatal collision is just around the next future curve.
Grosvenor Street Slope Compared to Other Locations Along Cycling Routes in London Ontario
Proposed construction at the Thames Valley Parkway in the City of London has necessitated a detour route. The original detour, encompassing Talbot St and Grosvenor Street met with opposition from users who proposed an alternate route by way of Gunn Street. Initially the City of London appeared to abandon the original detour in favour of the Gunn Street route. But subsequently the City changed its mind again and indicated that both routes would be posted, allowing users to decide for themselves.
Many opposed the original route because of the danger of sending cyclists through the busy section of Talbot south of Oxford Street. This location also included a narrowing of Talbot Street as it passed through the underpass of the CP railway line just south of Oxford.
In these discussions there has been no recognition that additional dangers exist in the original detour route. In particular the original detour would cause cyclists to ride down the steep downslope of Grosvenor Street into the large parking lot at Gibbons Park. This route has been taken by cyclists in the past and there is no information about the numbers of cyclist collisions and injuries that might have occurred there. Yet, in general, there is no information that is publicly available in London as to how many cyclists become injured from collisions, where those collisions occur, and under what circumstances.
Gorski Consulting has been conducting a variety of testing in recent years on downslopes where cyclists ride in the City of London. This testing has shown that the speed of cyclists is proportional to the steepness and length of these downslopes. While speed is not the only factor in cyclist injury causation it is one of the major factors that cannot be ignored. Of particular concern at the Grosvenor Street downslope is that, upon reaching the bottom of the slope, cyclists enter into a large and busy parking lot. There is a reasonable likelihood that vehicles turning into and out of a parked position will enter into a conflict with cyclists. Cyclists are likely to be difficult to detect by drivers who may be looking in different directions when backing in or out of parking spots. The potential for increased conflicts exists when more cyclists may be directed into the parking lot as a result of the proposed detour route.
Gorski Consulting has conducted some measurements of the downslope of Grosvenor Street between St George Street and the parking lot at Gibbons Park. The distance between these two endpoints is about 200 metres. The slope measurements are noted in the table below.
In comparison the slope at several sites where previous testing has been completed are noted below:
Meadowlily Rd: Distance = 400 metres, Average Slope = 4.99 %, Maximum Slope = 7.34 %
TVP at Trafalgar: Distance = 300 metres, Average Slope = 3.90 %, Maximum Slope = 9.5 %
TVP W of Richmond: Distance = 80 metres, Average Slope = 6.40 %, Maximum Slope = 11.6 %
Speeds of a Trek, hybrid bicycle, were documented as the cycle was coasted from a stopped position. The maximum speed at each of the above sites is noted below:
Meadowlily Rd Maximum Coasting Speed = 42.4 km/h
TVP at Trafalgar Rd Maximum Coasting Speed = 39.1 km/h
TVP W of Richmond St Maximum Coasting Speed = 30.3 km/h
Maximum speeds were also documented of cyclists riding on these slopes as noted below:
Meadowlily Rd Maximum observed speed = 62.72 km/h
TVP at Trafalgar Maximum observed speed = 52.94 km/h
TVP at Richmond Maximum observed speed = 43.37 km/h
If cyclist speeds, such as those noted above, occur at the Grosvenor site then there should be reason for concern. It can be noted that the steepest slope at the Grosvenor site occurs in the vicinity of 175 metres and this is just as cyclists would be approaching the parking lot. With the recognition that they are entering into a parking lot cyclists may apply higher braking at the Grosvenor site. Alternatively there could be cyclists entering into this area who have not ridden down the slope before or have limited experience with it. They might also not comprehend the danger or riding into a parking lot at high speed. Thus there is a reason to conduct testing to explore this potential safety issue.
Proposed Double Choice Detour on Thames Valley Parkway Ill-Advised
The official City of London stance regarding the direction of a detour around the upcoming Thames Valley Parkway (TVP) construction is to provide two options, their original route via Talbot St and Grosvenor St as well as the route proposed by cyclists via Blackfriars Bridge and Gunn St. Cyclists have warned that the original detour is flawed and dangerous but the City still maintains it as a reasonable option.
In our view, the original detour is dangerous. It proposes taking cyclists through the busy stretch of Talbot St to Oxford St which includes the narrow passage under the CP railway bridge. Additionally, and what is missed by most, is that this route will also take cyclists down the very speed downgrade of Grosvenor St through a busy parking lot into Gibbons Park.
The City seems to misunderstand the influence that downgrades have on cyclist speeds. Our data from testing at several hill sites throughout the TVP has been previously published on this Gorski Consulting website. It clearly shows the heightened speeds of cyclists observed when travelling along downslopes. It is of additional importance that the downslope at the Grosvenor St site ends at a busy parking lot to Gibbons Park. There will be motor vehicle drivers pulling out of parking spots or travelling toward the Grosvenor St exit exactly where cyclists will be racing down the slope. Drivers will not expect or detect high speed cyclists approaching at unexpected angles toward them. Unless major enforcement and signage efforts are engaged there is a heightened probability that a collision will occur.
Our data from our Blackfriars Bridge Traffic Study (BBTS), conducted this summer, provides an indication of the types of cyclist and non-pedestrian users (e-scooter, e-board, medical carts, mini-trailers, e-bikes) that travel northbound along the TVP toward the area of construction. Some of these users include the transportation of children in mini-trailers or wider than normal cargo bikes which do not function in the same manner as a single-manned pedal bike. Braking and acceleration characteristics are different and important when travelling down a steep down-slope or when trying to travel through the narrow confines of the railway underpass at Talbot St.
Not all users of the TVP have an intimate knowledge of its characteristics. As such they may listen to the advice of expert-sounding, officials who would seem to know the quality of the advice they provide. The City has never explained what knowledge they possess about the characteristics of the users of the TVP and whether they know how many vulnerable persons might be placed at risk along the original detour route.
More generally, when collisions occur with cyclists they are rarely publicized in local news media such that the general public is unaware of the safety risks at certain locations. A recent example is the case of the owner of the Smiley’s Pizzeria who was found unconscious somewhere along his cycling route, in the early morning of August 7, 2022, either on Adelaide St north or Sunningdale Road, a location that was never official disclosed. While news media indicated that it was unclear whether the cyclist fell off his bike or whether it was a hit-&-run, nothing was disclosed about the police investigation. Such lack of disclosure could place other cyclists at risk if they are unware of the dangers that may exist at such unknown sites in the City.
It has also been recently disclosed by the Canadian Institute of Health Information that cyclist injuries, identified by visits to hospital emergency wards, have increased dramatically in Canada and in Ontario: “The jump was especially big in Ontario, which logged 1,579 bike-related hospitalizations and accounted for about 30 per cent of all cycling traumas”. Why has this fact not been disclosed in the City of London which, most likely, would not be immune to the developments in the rest of Ontario? Lack of disclosure of where/how/why cyclists have sustained their injuries means that sites dangerous to cyclist travel continue to exist without proper knowledge of the cycling public. If injuries occur to cyclists from travelling along the originally-proposed detour route of the TVP will the public be made aware of that or will that information remain hidden?
Our advice to the City is to stop advertising this original detour as a safe and reasonable option for cyclist travel.
Blackfriars Bridge Traffic Study – Summary of Results From Session #5
Gorski Consulting continues to gather data from the Blackfriars Bridge Traffic Study (BBTS) in London, Ontario. A fifth videotaping Session was conducted on Tuesday, August 9, 2022 commencing at 0918 hours. This video has now been analysed and this article will report the results of this study.
The table below shows the results of volumes of all traffic units in Session #5 compared to the previous 4 Sessions conducted earlier this year.
As suspected, Session #5 resulted in substantially more non-motor vehicle observations as compared to motor vehicles. Although 66 motor vehicles were observed (lowest of all 5 Sessions) there were 358 observations of cyclists, pedestrians and non-pedestrians. The ratio of motor vehicles to non-motor vehicles is well more than 1:4, more like 1:5.4.
With respect to the speed of motor vehicles the table below shows the completed table: an incomplete table was shown in a preceding article.
We speculated earlier as to why only about 7.6 percent of motor vehicles were “speeding” in Session #5, the lowest of all 5 Sessions. We suspected that larger numbers of non-motor-vehicles were slowing the speed of these vehicles. Another possibility is that the shadows existing at the pedestrian crossing at the east end of the bridge caused drivers to be more cautious as they approached from the bright sunshine on the bridge.
With respect to cyclists the table below shows the travel directions they took in Session #5. As explained previously, the column “Source” is the direction from which cyclists entered the study area and the other columns indicate which direction the cyclists travelled upon exiting the study area.
And the next table takes all the cyclists from all 5 Sessions and groups them together.
About 83% of the cyclists in all 5 Sessions were observed riding on the TVP. Of those TVP riders only about 6.7 percent turned off the parkway to travel onto Blackfriars Bridge. In terms of the 80 cyclists who were eastbound on the Blackfriars bridge their exit directions appeared to be somewhat equal (SB TVP=23, SB Ridout=33 and NB TVP=24), although there was a slight increase in numbers continuing southbound onto Ridout Street.
Next we look at pedestrian motions in Session #5 as indicated in the table below.
And again we combine all the pedestrian observations from all 5 Sessions in the table below.
With respect to pedestrians their approach into the study area was not as dominated by the TVP as they were for cyclists. A substantial number of pedestrians (NB Ridout=163, EB Blackfriars=247) came from either northbound on Ridout or eastbound on Blackfriars Bridge. There seemed to be a slight increase in the number of pedestrians southbound on the TVP (332) versus northbound (275). In terms of departures, 302 pedestrians of the total 770 chose to exit from the other three travel directions (SB TVP, NB TVP, NB Ridout) to travel westbound on the Blackfriars Bridge.
Discussion
Recent notification by the City of London indicates that the Thames Valley Parkway will be closed from August 22 to September 30, 2022. This development will likely mean that observations at the Blackfriars Bridge study area will likely be affected and no further Sessions can be completed during this time of construction. For cyclists it can be noted from our previous tables that 331 cyclists were observed travelling northbound on the TVP in the 10 hours of our observations or about 33 cyclists per hour. A detour map suggested by the City of London is shown in the image below.
This detour will take cyclists through the busy and narrow areas of Talbot Street south of Oxford Street. This is not a safe route. Readers have suggested an alternate route taking cyclists westbound/eastbound across Blackfriars Bridge and along the path on the west side of the Thames River. It is not clear where this route might take cyclists back onto the TVP. Either way cyclists and perhaps some pedestrians will experience some dangerous situations during this construction period.
It is unclear at this time whether a sixth videotaping Session will be attempted before the construction begins on August 22nd.
UPDATE
A map showing an alternate route was posted by a reader on Twitter and this map is reproduced below.
Blackfriars Bridge Traffic Study – Preliminary Results of Motor Vehicle Speeding in Session #5
Preliminary results are now available from Session #5 of the Blackfriairs Bridge Traffic Study (BBTS) with respect to the number of observed motor vehicles and their speeds. The analysis is incomplete such that the only speeds available are those as eastbound vehicles travel the 10 metres approaching the pedestrian crossing at the east end of the Bridge. As analysis continues calculations of speed in the two preceding segments of road along the Bridge will be completed.
For now the incomplete table below is a comparison of Session #5 against the results of the other four preceding sessions.
As can be seen in the table, the smallest number (only 66) of motor vehicles were documented in the two hours of observation in Session #5. Yet this compares fairly well with the 68 observations in Session #4.
The most striking revelation is with respect to the number of “High Speeders” in Session #5. Only 5 motor vehicles were observed travelling at 25 km/h or higher as they approached the pedestrian crossing. One of the reasons for this may be that there were a large number of cyclists, pedestrians and non-pedestrians who interfered with the motion of these vehicles. Although no official count has been made yet it was observation, while standing at the site, that there were many more cyclists, pedestrians and non-pedestrians than motor vehicles. We have already indicated from previous Sessions that motor vehicles were out-numbered by almost 4-1. However it is possible that this ratio might even be higher in Session #5, although that remains to be officially determined.
We are continuing our analysis of the relevant facts in Session #5 and will continue to report these details as they become available in the next few days.
Blackfriars Bridge Traffic Study – Session #5 Videotaping Completed
Videotaping with respect to Session #5 of the Blackfriars Bridge Traffic Study (BBTS) was completed in the mid-morning of August 9, 2022. More precisely it is expected that data will be tabulated between 0918 and 1118 hours.
Of interest in the current Session was the discovery of shadows at the east end of bridge while the eastward approach of motor vehicles was in bright sunshine. The first photo above shows the scenario while an eastbound cyclist is riding ahead of the motor vehicle seen in the view. The presence of the cyclist is more evident in the two other photos shown below.
This scenario exemplifies the unique situations that can occur at collision sites where visibility can change drastically, sometimes in just a few minutes, depending on specific environmental conditions. The next four photos below show another example of pedestrians walking through the pedestrian crossing at the east end of Blackfriars Bridge and how difficult it might be for a motor vehicle driver to detect them in the shaded area.
The video from this Session is now being assembled within editting projects and will then be analysed to extract the important details for comparison with the previous four Sessions.
Blackfriars Bridge Traffic Study – High Speed Motor Vehicles
Interest in the use of the historic Blackfriars Bridge in London, Ontario became heightened when the City of London decided to open the bridge to eastbound motor vehicle traffic in November of 2021. Pedestrians, cyclists and other users had grown used to having the bridge all to themselves during the incidence of the Covid 19 pandemic and were not happy with the change.
While opinions flourished no actual data was made available to support one point of view versus another. As a result Gorski Consulting decided to conduct a traffic study that would provide some base information to all involved.
The volumes of various traffic units at the site were reported in several website articles on the Gorski Consulting website. At present four videotaping Sessions have been completed and more may be added in the future. The present article will study the speeds of eastbound vehicles at the site.
The observed speeds of eastbound motor vehicles was frequently interrupted by other users of the site therefore it was not useful to provide average speeds of all vehicles. Instead we focused on those vehicles which we labelled “High Speeders”. High Speeders were defined as those whose travel time was 1.5 seconds or less within the 10 metre distance approaching the pedestrian crossing for the Thames Valley Parkway. Why this definition was chosen cannot be discussed here due to the complexity of the issue but may be addressed in another future article.
The table of results is shown below, summarizing all four videotaping sessions that have been completed to this date. An explanation of the table contents will follow.
Speeds were documented over 3 segments of roadway commencing westward from the west edge of the pedestrian crossing at the Thames Valley Parkway. The pedestrian crossing is located at the east end of the Blackfriars Bridge. The first segment was over a 10-metre distance progressing westward from the west edge of the pedestrian crossing, as explained in the photo below.
The next two road segments were each 25 metres in length. So, commencing westward from the 10-metre mark, paint markings were made at 35 and 60 metres west of the pedestrian crossing. An example of the paint marking at the 60 metre distance is shown in the eastward view of the photo below.
A camera was also placed on the north railing of the bridge (at 35 metres west of the pedestrian crossing) pointing in an eastward direction toward the pedestrian crossing, as shown in the photo below.
We can narrow the study further by noting the four vehicles, from all four Sessions, that travelled the 10 metres toward the pedestrian crossing in less than one second. This data is shown in the table below.
Three of the vehicles shown above are from Session #2 which took place on the afternoon of Friday, June 17,2022. No vehicles were noted to be travelling at these speeds in Sessions 1 and 3.
It can be noted that in two of the four instances the vehicles actually increased their speed in the 10 metre distance of approach to the pedestrian crossing in comparison to their speeds in the preceding segments. In those two observations (#44 and #142) the average speeds were well above 40 km/h (42.35 and 46.75 respectively). While these speeds may appear to be rather slow in terms of highway or even urban streets the special conditions of this site involve very limited lines of sight. If a pedestrian, cyclist or other vulnerable person were to enter into the path of these motor vehicles there would most likely be some serious injury consequences.
Addendum
This addendum is included to provide some explanation about the total observations of motor vehicles in the table of four Sessions noted at the top of this article. That table is reproduced again below.
The 149 observations in Session #2 is lower than the total (158) mentioned in previous tables because there was a time delay before all the cameras were put in position be able to document the vehicle speeds. So, although the counting of individual motor vehicles began at 1532 hours, a number of minutes passed before the cameras were set in place to be able to document their speeds. Thus the speed of the first 9 vehicles were unable to be calculated.
Also, in previous articles the total number of vehicles that were documented in Session 1 (77) and Session 2 (157) were incorrect. Upon further analysis during vehicle speed calculations it was discovered that one additional vehicle existed in each of those two Sessions. So the correct motor vehicle total for Session #1 is 78 and for Session #2 is 158. And again, the reason why only 149 observations are shown in the above table is because we could only obtain speed calculations for 149 of the 158 vehicles that were observed.
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