School Bus Collision in BC Re-Ignites Seat-belt Issue
The Premier of British Columbia responded that his province will consider updated seatbelt regulations after being asked about a school bus collision that occurred near Lac La Hache last week where 14 persons were taken to hospital. He was quoted in a CTV News Article (June 24, 2024, by Andrew Weichel) as saying the lack of mandatory seatbelts on school buses was “strange”.
This is not the first time that someone has made such comments. CBC News ran a series of documentaries suggesting that Transport Canada was incompetent on the seat-belt issue. The Weichel article did some research on Transport Canada’s website and reported the following wording from the site:
According to a statement on the Transport Canada website, seatbelts can provide “added protection” for school-age children on buses – but they can also have a “negative impact” on safety if not installed or used properly.
“Making sure all children are properly secured in seatbelts is a lot more challenging in a 70-passenger school bus than in a five-passenger car or seven-passenger minivan,” the website reads.
“This is one of the reasons we allow provinces, territories and school bus operators to decide whether to install seatbelts.”
We focus again on the wording that seatbelts “…can also have a ‘negative impact’ on safety if not installed or used properly”. What does that mean? Surely we have been told for many decades now that wearing a seatbelt is an important factor in improving one’s chances of reducing injury or preventing death. So what can this “negative impact” mean? Transport Canada continues to refuse to elaborate. And the public, including a Premier of British Columbia, continually fails to understand the meaning of that phrase. Much of the seatbelt issue is rapped up in emotion and far too little understanding.
While seatbelts have been shown to be a tremendous benefit in the wide scope of prevention of injury and death one needs to understand that there are challenges with respect to what seatbelts can do in select instances. Most collisions occur in very short time frames. The velocities of human bodies in collisions must be reduced rapidly and in a controlled manner. Seatbelts help by beginning “slowing” at an earlier time and they also help in reducing the velocity of the human body in a controlled manner. Seatbelts were designed to apply their force, or load, over specific portions of the body that can accommodate those loads. For shoulder (torso) belts the webbing lies across the chest and onto the collar bone (clavicle). The lap belt lies across the pelvic region below the bony ilium. When located properly those two webbings can apply their loads relatively safely. But bad things can happen when a seatbelt is not worn properly and this is the important issue with children on school buses.
When Transport Canada wrote those words “negative impact on safety when…not used properly” they mean that there is a real challenge in placing children properly in a seatbelt and keeping them in that proper position. By far the greatest danger lies with not placing the lap belt across the lower pelvic region, below the iliac crests. If the lap belt is positioned above that bony pelvic region it can apply a dangerous load to the abdominal region that cannot accept those loads. A narrow webbing applied along the abdomen can cause major injuries to vital organs in that region. When this happens organs may be torn or ruptured requiring immediate critical care. When a school bus is involved in a major collision at a significant distance from a major hospital there is a high likelihood that children will die from seatbelt injuries when a seatbelt is not worn properly. This is part of the concern of Transport Canada, but written in a way that does not provide the public with this critical, detailed information.
The discussion of “compartmentalization” has been long with respect to school buses. Compartmentalization is a way of keeping children in local compartments where they are seated and using the surroundings of the compartment to protect children rather than using a seatbelt. It is sometimes advantageous for example to allow a child’s body to strike a broad surface such as the seatback ahead of them so that the load is distributed across a wider portion of the body. And if the seatback is relatively forgiving (“soft”) then this is a benefit. This benefit is not as great however when buses roll over or sustain a substantial lateral impact. So there are some drawbacks to compartmentalization.
Seatbelts that are similar in design to what is used by adults may be dangerous to children. But there could be restraint solutions that are similar to child seats and booster cushions that might work better for children. If such a solution exists Transport Canada has not found its application yet. And this may be nothing to do with Transport Canada being incompetent. It is not a simple fix. When we look at issues such as economy it may be expensive to produce these solutions. And while one might say that children’s safety is far more important than economy we are not understanding the issue. If we all drove million dollar race cars we would be much safer because of their advanced designs, components etc. that go into protecting race car drivers. But we can’t afford to place everyone in million dollar race cars. It is a similar reality with school buses.
Seatbelts on school buses are not as simple as many believe them to be. One of the biggest problems is that, for their own reasons, Transport Canada is not being clear enough in their explanations of those difficulties. Looking back some 50 years the introduction of seatbelts came with great resistance by some who vowed they were restricting the public’s freedom. There were many groups who searched from every negative occurrence where seatbelts did not perform properly and this negative publicity was worrisome to Transport Canada. So for such reasons Transport Canada became a proponent of secrecy, hiding instances of bad performance from persons who were working hard against seatbelt laws. If these groups of radicals had come to a less biased stance Transport Canada may have felt more comfortable publicizing the challenging circumstances where seatbelts were not functioning properly and where improvements were needed. As a result it took far too long to make improvements such as the development of child seats and booster cushions that could put children in a better orientation with respect to seatbelts that were designed for adults. And other improvements such as webbing pretensioners were far to long in their implementation into adult seatbelts.
The best that can be achieved from everyone involved is to take time to truly understand the challenges of protecting children on school buses and not just sound off because of misinformed frustration. At the same time pressure must be kept on Transport Canada to make sure they are making every effort to improve the status quo. The scenario of children flying in an uncontrolled manner through bus interiors during rollovers or angled impacts is not desirable. While in most instances concussions and fractures may not be life-threatening they are also not benign. Costs of improvements to designs of school buses are a practical roadblock but obviously children’s safety must be adequately appraised in any cost-benefit analysis.
Hamilton Road Fatal Cyclist Collision – Characteristics of Cyclist Road Users
Why has a third male cyclist been killed in a traffic accident on Hamilton Road in London, Ontario in the past five years? That is a question being raised by some citizens of London after a cyclist was killed on Hamilton Road on the morning of June 19, 2024, just west of the intersection with Rectory Street. Not unexpectedly, many opinions were provided on various social media sites by a variety of persons with varying degrees of understanding. What has been lacking in all this discussion is a recognition that informed opinion must be supported by good quality and quantity of objective data. But that data is essentially non-existent.
Data must come from police who investigate collisions along the roadway. But that is insufficient because few cyclist collisions are ever investigated, particularly if they do not involve an impact between a motor vehicle and a cyclist. Data must also come from observations in traffic studies but that too is missing as the City of London either does not collect the data or they keep it close to their chest without making it publicly available.
In light of such unlit darkness Gorski Consulting has been providing a variety of traffic studies in London and the results of these studies are described in articles posted on the Gorski Consulting website. The cyclist safety problems that exist on Hamilton Road cannot be a full-time occupation provided at no cost to the public. So there are limits to what can be achieved. Yet some data exists with respect to the characteristics of cyclists in the vicinity of the Hamilton Road and Rectory Street intersection. Gorski Consulting has gone back several years and selected a small sample of observations of cyclists and these will be reviewed here. First we will provide a general review of the intersection.
Hamilton Road Site Characteristics
The Googlemaps view of Hamilton Road in London is shown below. The section of interest is about 4.4 km stretching from Maitland Street to the west and Gore Road to the east. Hamilton Road travels in a south-east direction and is a busy arterial roadway.
In the vicinity of Rectory Street the City of London has created left turn lanes that cause a narrowing of the four lanes of Hamilton Road. The two lanes travelling westbound have a width of about 6.0 metres and a similar width is present for both eastbound lanes. Typically a lane width on an arterial roadway is 3.5 metres or more or over 7.0 metres for two lanes. This narrowing of lanes makes it a challenging area for cyclist travel because Hamilton Road also contains a horizontal curve at this location. A westward view of this intersection is shown in the photo below, taken in May of 2024.
Sample of Cyclists Observed Near Hamilton Road & Rectory Street between 2021 & Mid-2024
We begin our examination of observed cyclists by showing an example of a westbound cyclist riding on the north sidewalk of Hamilton Road just west of Rectory street in October of 2021.
The next two photos show a westbound cyclist riding on the north sidewalk of Hamilton Road just passing west of Rectory Street. These photos were taken on May 9, 2022. This is about the same location where the cyclist was fatally injured on June 19, 2024. If the cyclist had been travelling within the westbound lane it would result in a precarious situation. Note that the cyclist is not wearing a helmet.
In the next three photos we see an eastbound cyclist as he travels in the eastbound lane of Hamilton road through the Rectory Street intersection.
The final photo of the eastbound cyclist is a close-up view as shown below. He is not wearing a helmet yet he is riding a high-end road bike. Many experienced riders feel confident enough that they can ride further away from the curb, thus drawing attention to themselves, in the belief that this will make drivers of motor vehicles adjust their travel positions away from them. Unfortunately cyclists do not have control over how motor vehicle drivers will react or not react to their presence. In most instances our advice is that, if you have concern about being struck by motor vehicle traffic do not ride in that roadway as riding within the travel paths of motor vehicles only courts a disaster.
In the next example we see a rider who has dismounted from their bike and is walking next to the north sidewalk of Hamilton Road just west of Rectory Street. This photo was taken on November 17, 2022. While dressed appropriately to protect from the cold weather this rider is not wearing a helmet that might protect from an impact. Note the rider is also not wearing any reflective clothing and there are no lights illuminated on the bike.
In the next photo taken on January 6, 2023 we see a westbound cyclist who is riding on the north sidewalk of Hamilton Road and approaching the intersection with Rectory Street. While the cyclist has protected his head with a hat from the cold he is not wearing a helmet.
In the next photo taken on February 26, 2023 we see a westbound female riding in the westbound lane of Hamilton Road and not wearing a helmet. Female riders are uncommon in this area but they commonly do not wear helmets just like their male counterparts.
In the next series of four photos we see a westbound cyclist who had decided to cross Hamilton Road just west of Rectory Street. These photos were taken on December 29, 2023. As he travels onto the south sidewalk it can be seen that he is not wearing a helmet, his clothing does not make him standout and he has no lighting on his cycle.
The next photo was taken on January 30, 2024 and it shows a westbound cyclist riding on the north sidewalk of Hamilton Road just west of Rectory Street. It is approaching sunset and the rider is fully in dark clothing with no lights on their bike. If this cyclist was riding in the westbound lane there would be a good likelihood that they would not be detected by westbound drivers.
In the final photo below we see a rider on April 7, 2024, riding eastbound in the eastbound lane of Hamilton Road a short distance east of Rectory Street. He is attired in typical cycling clothing and is wearing a helmet. Unfortunately his cycle is not equipped with a mirror to allow him to see approaching traffic from the rear.
Discussion
Whenever a collision occurs there are many factors that need to be taken into account to determine how it might be avoided. Too often a simplistic solution is acceptable even to the most experienced investigators. With respect to cyclist collisions on Hamilton Road relevant data that is of proper quality and of sufficient quantity is needed to identify the human, vehicular and roadway influences existent at the road segment. This continues to be lacking while some express opinions that they already know what needs to be done without that data.
Cyclist Collision On Hamilton Road In London Ontario – Safety Concerns Continue
Much concern was expressed by residents along Hamilton Road in London, Ontario when two fatal cyclist collisions occurred in June of 2019 and September of 2022. In February of 2023 a meeting was organized by the Crouch Neighbourhood Resource Centre in the Hamilton Road area and CTV News in London also posted an article entitled “What would make Hamilton Road safer?” Many opinions were expressed at that time and no changes have been made since then.
What has been obvious for a number of years is that there has been no official tracking of cyclist collisions in London therefore no objective data can be referenced in terms of finding safety solutions.
Gorski Consulting has been making observations of cyclists in London for many years but that cannot replace actual data on the numbers of cyclists being injured or killed and in what circumstances. In previous articles posted to the Gorski Consulting website we have demonstrated that nothing of substance has been learned from cyclist collisions in the past five years. We have also quoted research from the Toronto area which shows that only about 8 per cent of injured cyclists who attend a hospital emergency department are ever documented in police collision data. Even when police investigate a cyclist collision those findings are never shared with the cycling public who are being injured and killed.
With respect to the Hamilton Road community Gorski Consulting has provided some general observations of cyclists as shown in the table below.
Data from the remainder of 2023 and the first half of 2024 have been gathered but have not yet been summarized.
The Summary in the above table provides some important facts. Only about 8.5 per cent of cyclists observed on Hamilton Road were females. Generally it has been opined by researchers that the fewer female cyclists using a facility suggests that it is less safe. Data from Gorski Consulting observations throughout London in the past several years has shown that observations of females are in the range of 10-15 per cent. So the lack of females on the Hamilton Road vicinity suggests its lack of safety.
Another important point in the above table is that about 86 per cent of cyclists observed on Hamilton Road were not wearing helmets. This lacking is counter-balanced by the additional observation that 80 per cent of observed cyclists did not ride on the road. So, while it is quite dangerous for cyclists to share a lane of Hamilton Road with motor vehicle traffic, most cyclists use the safer option on riding on a sidewalk, even though riding on sidewalks is against the law in London.
Unfortunately it is apparent from the current collision that the cyclist was struck while on the road, although that information has not been publicly revealed at this time. Damage to the striking vehicle was visible on the right side of the windshield as shown in the photo below. A lucky result may be that the contact damage is to the windshield glass and not to the stiffer portions of the vehicle such as the right A-pillar or the windshield header. While the extent of the cyclist’s injuries is unknown at this time the visible evidence may improve the cyclist’s changes of survival.
In all areas of collision reconstruction investigators ought to become sufficiently familiar with collecting relevant evidence such that they should be able to document “points of mutual contact” as well as understand what the pattern of damage indicates. For cyclist collisions examination of any imprints and offset of the direct damage at the striking vehicle’s front bumper can provide partial information about how the collision occurred.
The damage caused to the cycle can also provide further clues. Deformations of the wheels of the cycle and to the cycle’s handle bars can provide further information about how the collision occurred.
While attending the site of the present cyclist collision we entered into a short conversation with a nearby London police officer. As a cyclist passed by while riding on the sidewalk we noted that this was the safer option for cyclists riding on Hamilton Road. This officer confirmed that no cyclist will ever be given a traffic citation for riding on a sidewalk in London. Whether that personal comment is accurate or not it reflects the bazaar, official stance of London police and the City of London. Cyclists in London are forced to ride in the dangerous lane of Hamilton Road because they believe they will receive a traffic citation if they ride on a sidewalk. Yet the unannounced official policy is that cyclists will not be fined for riding on a sidewalk.
UPDATE: June 20, 2024; 0650 Hours
Regrettably, the struck cyclist reportedly died. He is identified as 54-year-old Rafal Szabat.
The collision reportedly occurred around 0510 hours on Wednesday morning. Traffic would be expected to be sparse at this early hour. It is known that vehicles travelling westbound on Hamilton Road must follow a right bend in the road at Rectory Street and the collision would have occurred just west of that intersection. An example westbound view on approach to Rectory Street is shown below, taken on May 25, 2024.
Based on past experience police will not reveal the circumstances that led to this tragic collision. This prevents the public from developing informed opinions as to how future cyclist collisions could be avoided.
Humbolt Broncos – Truth Is An Annoying Little Mosquito
It has been over six years since the tragic death of 16 persons, and many injured, on a bus carrying the Humbolt Broncos hockey team in the Canadian Province of Saskatchewan. Now the incident has been pushed into the back pages of history, except for the infrequent mentions of the truck driver, Jaskirat Singh Sidhu, who reportedly caused the disaster. The most recent news is that Sindu has been ordered deported to India. And many believe that this wicked, evil person deserves this additional punishment.
In our public mask no one has ever driven through a red traffic signal, mistaken the presence of a stop sign, or inadvertently pressed on a gas pedal when attempting to brake. In many of these non-existent instances no other vehicle or pedestrian is present and nothing of substance is the consequence. And we also strongly believe that there is a Santa Claus. So it is comforting to believe that only one entity, Jaskirat Singh Sidhu, was the sole culprit in the Broncos tragedy.
The fact that the official police reports into the Broncos collision have never been publicly revealed appears to be a minor triviality. After all, numerous news media were present shortly after the crash and numerous reports were filed about Sidhu’s trial and final sentencing. How could anyone be misled about what actually transpired and who was at fault when so many news people were reporting on the story?
Yet some news media reported additional facts. Many years before the Broncos tragedy, six persons were killed at the same intersection and the government of Saskatchewan has the obligation to examine the site for its safety. An area of trees was present at the south-east quadrant of the intersection and anyone with the simplest understanding of road safety would have recognized that this could be a visibility problem for drivers approaching from the east and south, exactly like the travel directions of the Broncos bus and Sidhu’s heavily laden truck train.
However not everyone would have the additional knowledge that, in rural Saskatchewan, on smoothly paved highways, where urban traffic is minimal, vehicles travelling straight through on a flat road could exceed the speed limit. Such data would only be available to the government.
And similarly, few would have the knowledge that, a fully-laden truck, with an additionally long trailer attached to it, would require an exceptionally long time to clear a cross road. If such a truck came to a full stop at a busy cross road it would require the driver to look a very long distance along the cross road to evaluate whether his truck could make it across the road in safety. But human visual capability is not limitless. Humans are simply incapable of detecting the approach speed of vehicles if those vehicles are well beyond 200 metres. So often a truck driver must estimate by considering the distance of the approaching vehicle rather than its speed, to determine whether a crossing is safely possible. A frequent alternative is that such drivers do not come to a complete stop at a stop sign because it would take too long to gain speed and too long to clear the intersection. So such drivers approach the intersection and make a quick glance along the cross road and continue without stopping so they can clear the intersection in a quicker time. But this is often done because many intersections have considerable visibility on approach to a cross road. The truck driver can begin looking along the cross road, and see a substantial part of it, before coming to a stop sign.
But at the rural intersection of the Broncos crash site the visibility was limited by the previously noted trees. This danger was two-fold. Not only did the trees prevent Sindu from seeing the Broncos bus approaching from his left, but the trees also prevented the bus driver from seeing the approach of the Sindu truck to its stop sign. If a sufficient amount of visibility was made available, the bus driver could have seen the substantial approach speed of the Sindu truck and could have had the opportunity to brake and likely avoid the collision. If the Saskatchewan Department of Transportation was performing its role properly it should have been aware of these facts even through they might not be apparent to the average user of the intersection. To what degree was this additional problem discussed at Sindu’s trial? While Gorski Consulting followed the various news reports, we could not locate any information about what was discussed on this issue at Sindu’s trial.
The news media reported further “facts” from the trial that seemed to make little sense. Such as the fact that police calculations would have demonstrated that the bus driver applied his brakes before seeing the Sindu truck. Or that the police calculations suggested that the bus speed was 123 km/h. Such confusing information could have been sorted out if a detailed study was made of the police investigation by an independent entity such as Gorski Consulting. But we were never given that opportunity.
Furthermore, the roof the bus was found to be separated from the rest of its structure when photos were shown at its final rest position shortly after the crash. The characteristics of the separation gave the initial impression the emergency personnel had cut off the roof in order to gain access to the numerous injured passengers. However subsequent information from others suggested that this was no the case and that the roof became separated as a result of the crash. Such an occurrence would be highly relevant to the safety of the passengers. But nothing was officially revealed about what happened with respect to the bus roof.
While it would seem that the annoying little mosquito of truth was finally put to rest, a new article became published by the Canadian Press and displayed on the CP24 News website dated May 28, 2024. The title of this article was “Humboldt Broncos families fight to keep Saskatchewan government named in lawsuit”. It reported that four families of those bus passengers were suing the Saskatchewan government because “…the province knew the rural intersection where the crash happened had problems with visibility but did nothing to fix it”. The families’ lawyer, Kevin Mellor, was quoted as saying “If the government had simply designed and constructed and maintained the highway…the bus would have stopped regardless of what Mr. Sidhu had done…and the Broncos would have lived”. The Saskatchewan government was fighting to prevent the trial from taking place.
Much like Sidhu’s trial, even if the civil trial takes place there is no guarantee that the basic truths about the Broncos crash will ever be publicly revealed. Deals will be made behind the cameras so that nothing of substance is made public. Yet public knowledge is what keeps the powerful accountable for their actions. It is not a way of looking for vengeance. It is a way in which safety problems become acknowledged and fixed so future families do not have to experience these terrible tragedies. Killing that pesky mosquito of truth before it has a chance to draw the public’s attention is the additional Humboldt Broncos tragedy.
Ford Government Secretly Directs Prosecutors To Reduce Impaired Driver Charges
Global News reportedly broke the story that, the Ford Government sent a directive to Ontario Prosecutors to use their discretion in reducing impaired driving charges as a way of reducing the court backlog.
The reality is that the Ford “family” has been using its power to reduce government expenditures in every way possible, regardless of circumstances. Whether it be in Ontario’s health system, education system and its justice system. Rather than increase government costs by appointing more judges to clear the court backlog, the Ford “family” chose to let criminals free, but not revealing which criminals received those perks.
In a Global News article of May 22, 2024, it was revealed that the Ford government never kept track of how many impaired driving charges were reduced and to who. As prosecutors are appointed by the Ford “family” it is conceivable that those in Ford’s inner circle would receive preferential treatment. It continues a Ford track record of interference with Ontario’s justice system.
No sooner than the Ford government came into power they immediately scraped the plans to improve the Police Act which would have created more transparency is the workings of institutions such as Ontario’s Special Investigations Unit. Doug Ford then tried to install his friend into the position of the Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police. He also talked about appointing “like-minded” judges who would support his way of thinking regardless of the evidence presented at trial. The latest interference with sentencing select impaired drivers is just a continuing process of crooked activity by a government that was not elected by a majority, but elected through a minority, because the Ontario public was too apathetic to vote in sufficient numbers in the last election.
Arrest Of Scottie Scheffler Spotlights Need For Better Judgment & Training Of Police In Traffic Scenarios
It became a bazaar circumstance when the world’s top golfer became arrested in an early morning encounter with Louisville Police at the site of a fatal pedestrian collision near the grounds of the Valhalla golf club where the 2024 Professional Golf Association (PGA) was taking place. The details of what happened have not been discussed in official circles but it appears that Scheffler attempted to drive through the collision area on his way to the golf course where he was scheduled to tee-off in about 4 hours time. News media reported that Scheffler’s vehicle passed by a police officer who yelled at him and then “attached” himself to Scheffler’s vehicle. Other news reports indicated that Scheffler failed to follow police instructions and that a police officer was “dragged to the ground”.
In another news article description from a police report we have the version from the police:
“Listed subject (Scottie Scheffler) was driving eastbound to gain access to the course. Subject pulled into the westbound lanes, where outbound traffic was flowing and to avoid backed up traffic. Detective Gillis was in the middle of the westbound lanes, in full LMPD uniform and a hi-visibility yellow reflective rain jacket. Detective Gillis stopped subject and attempted to give instruction. Subject refused to comply and accelerated forward, dragging Detective Gillis to the ground. Detective Gillis suffered pain, swelling, and abrasions to his left wrist and knees. He was transported to the hospital for further medical treatment by emergency medical personnel. Detective Gillis’ uniform pants, valued at approximately $80 were damaged beyond repair.”
In another news report it was noted that “The officer screamed at him to stop and then grabbed onto the car until Scheffler stopped about 10 yards later”. Also “The officer, identified in the arrest report as Det. Gillis, was dragged ‘to the ground‘ and suffered ‘pain, swelling, and abrasions to his left wrist’ after the car accelerated forward’.
Whatever actually took place in the Scheffler incident highlights that, in many instances, police are struck by vehicles in a variety of circumstances. But in some of those circumstances the consequences could clearly have been avoided or minimized. This is largely due to the fact that in those circumstances police have tried to step into the path of a moving vehicle, have tried to grab hold of a moving vehicle, or have tried to enter into a vehicle when a driver has not complied with their commands. The scenarios have repeated themselves so often that it suggests police administration is not conducting proper training of officers leading to poor judgments.
While many instances result in minor consequences some do not. Recently there have been examples in the vicinity of Toronto, Ontario where both results occurred.
A recent trial took place this spring where a police officer from Toronto was killed in a parking garage of Toronto’s City Hall. In that incident police in plain clothes approached a driver and his family as the father was beginning to pull out of a parking spot. Not recognizing the persons as police the driver backed out and then ran over one of the officers, killing him. The description of what happened was dubious as officers claimed that the struck officer was standing in front of the vehicle, in plain view when he was struck while the physical evidence indicated that the officer was lying on the ground and likely not visible. The safety issue is that police failed to understand that they might not be recognized as police when they are in plain clothes and that someone who believes they could be assaulted might attempt to escape. In that scenario police ought to have stayed clear of the vehicle because past experience and proper training ought to have instructed them that they could be struck.
In a contrasting incident a police officer from York Region (Toronto) was struck on April 30, 2024 when he ran out in front of vehicle whose driver was attempting to flee. A frame from video of that incident is shown at the top of the article. As shown in the three additional frames below, the officer was thrown up and did a summersault landing back on his feet. He reportedly sustained minimal injury but the result could have been much worse.
This incident took place at the same time as the trial was taking place involving the plain clothes police officer who was killed. The well-publicized trial should have been a warning to police about the consequences of entering into the path of a fleeing vehicle. Yet the actions of the officer from York Region demonstrate that he did not heed that warning.
Historically there have been tragic results that ought to be used in police training.
In January of 2011, a mentally disturbed male stole a tow truck and began driving erratically through the streets of Toronto while police tried to stop him. At one point a police Sergeant stepped out of his cruiser to confront the approaching tow truck. The Sergeant was struck and killed. This incident should have been used by police in their training to inform them that they should not allow themselves to be exposed to an erratic driver but remain in the greater safety of their own cruiser.
A short time later, in June, 2011 a young driver became engaged in an encounter with a police officer at a traffic stop on Hwy 48 east of Toronto, Ontario. The officer attempted to enter the vehicle through the driver’s window. The driver accelerated from his stop while the officer was partly in the vehicle. The vehicle reached a high speed before it exited onto the roadside and rolled over. The police officer became trapped under the rolled vehicle and perished before support help could arrive. This tragic incident should have been used by police trainers to inform officers never to reach into a vehicle while a driver still has control of a vehicle.
In a similar incident in August, 2012 in London, Ontario. A female driver was pulled over by a police traffic stop when two of the vehicle’s passengers ran away on foot. One of the officers reached in through the right side window “to arrest the driver”. The driver accelerated, steering left and right to shake the officer off the vehicle. The officer fell onto the pavement but was not killed. Again, this incident occurred within a year of the previous two police fatalities noted above. Clearly the officer who reached into the motor vehicle should have appreciated the danger of such an action but that did not happen.
In another dragging incident in downtown Kitchener, Ontario in December, 2013, two police officers were dragged while they attempted to reach into a vehicle and the driver sped off. The officers were reportedly dragged for only a short distance before they disengaged and were not seriously injured.
In another incident in June, 2023, a police officer from Hamilton was dragged when his arms became trapped as a driver rolled up his window on the Red Hill Valley Parkway. No information was made available about how the officer was able to free himself and no injury information was available except that the officer was able to return to duty.
Yet the complexity of these incidents demonstrates that sometimes police are faced with difficult decisions. Another incident occurred in July, 2012, in the vicinity of London and St Thomas where robbers were pursued by police in a long chase from London, to St Thomas and back to London again and speeds of 130 km/h were reached through city streets. In that incident a spike belt was used to deflate the vehicle’s tires yet the driver continued to drive while the wheel rims produced a long trail of metal markings on the pavement. Nothing could be done to stop the vehicle until it became jammed on railway tracks in the north-west of London’s downtown and slid into a ditch. During that long pursuit the public was exposed to danger and this is the flip side of the coin, demonstrating that stopping a fleeing vehicle is necessary as time and distance increase the chances of the occurrence ending in a tragic result. But there was no indication that police exited their cruisers and put themselves in the path of the fleeing vehicle.
Another incident began in September, 2013 when a store keeper pressed an alarm to reveal shop-lifters at a Kitchener grocery store. Police arrived and the shoplifters escaped in a car which eventually became trapped in an apartment building parking lot. The police sergeant partially blocked the only exit with his cruiser and then walked out in front of the vehicle with his pistol raised. The sergeant was surprized as, instead of surrendering, the driver ducked down below the windshield and accelerated. The sergeant managed to fire 4 rounds, striking the fleeing vehicle’s windshield but missing the driver and his passengers. The sergeant was struck, rolling onto the hood and sustained a fractured knee including other injuries. At trial it became revealed that the fleeing driver was a career criminal who had injured another police officer while speeding from police three months earlier. It was also revealed that the driver was impaired by drugs (heroin and crystal methamphetamine) at the time of the shoplifting incident. This demonstrates that police cannot know who they are dealing with as an incident unfolds and that stepping in front a vehicle is the last action that should be contemplated without considering what might occur.
Many incidents occur where police are struck and either minimal information is available or an officer sustains only minor injuries. For example in another incident in April, 2016, a police officer from Ottawa, Ontario was struck when he turned his back on a vehicle with its engine running and its driver seemingly sleepy and impaired. The driver reversed his vehicle striking the officer and pinning him against his own cruiser. Fortunately the officer sustained only minor injuries. In another incident in September, 2016, a Toronto police officer was struck after he exited his cruiser believing that police had successfully boxed in a fleeing vehicle. Again it was fortunate that no serious injuries occurred.
In another incident in September, 2017, an OPP officer was struck and “dragged” for a substantial distance in an apartment building parking lot in Mississauga, Ontario. The officer had been standing next to the stopped vehicle when it suddenly accelerated and he grabbed the headrest of the driver seat. He sustained injuries that were initially believed to be critical as his head hit the pavement, but further information confirmed that his injuries were not life-threatening. Unfortunately the head injuries led to prolonged symptoms that affected his career.
In summary police, when they are on foot, are in no less danger of serious injury than any unprotected pedestrian, when in close proximity to a motor vehicle. The complexity of these scenarios is that each is unique. Drivers of vehicles are unpredictable in what they might do. In the case of someone like Scottie Scheffler, the driver may not be a dangerous criminal but might simply misunderstand the actions or intentions of a police officer. And in other instances a driver may be impaired by drugs/alcohol or may be mentally unstable making it difficult to predict what their actions might be. And in the case of drivers purposely attempting to flee, police should be exceptionally cautious in exiting their cruisers or standing in the path of a fleeing vehicle. Events unfold quickly and require quick and good reasoning as to what the best actions must be.
There are instances where police themselves are the dangers to the public. A percentage of officers should not be employed in their capacity because they are prone to exaggerated behaviour which inflames minor issues into major problems. It remains a significant problem that police who refuse or are incapable for de-escalating confrontations cannot be removed from their employment.
But, overall, police must be trained and to understand that they must not attempt to enter a vehicle that is moving or stopped but under control of a driver. If a driver does not comply with commends this must be a sign to police that they could be in grave danger. In some instances it may be reasonable to disable a vehicle with whatever means are necessary so that it cannot be used on a wild rampage.
In one instance, when a vehicle was boxed in, a Toronto police officer jumped on the hood of the vehicle and shot multiple rounds into the engine compartment. This action was viewed by news media and bystanders as excessive and unnecessary. Yet if that action disables a vehicle and there are grounds to believe the driver may try to flee, this could be a reasonable police action. The alternative in the past has been that police have shot into the occupant compartment of a fleeing vehicle, sometimes killing an innocent passenger. This occurred to an innocent boy who was abducted by his father and subsequently killed when the father drove through a police barricade and police shot at the passing vehicle north-east of Toronto a few years ago.
So disabling a vehicle by whatever means is an important action that could save the lives of others. It is a matter of good judgment. Good judgment is not always instinctive but can be developed through proper police training. The many instances where police on foot attempt to gain control of a vehicle by grabbing hold of it, or trying to enter it, indicates that there is a lack of proper training that must be corrected.
Automatic Emergency Braking Will Finally Become Law
Emerging technology cannot solve all of safety problems. And in some instances it just creates new ones. But Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) is one technology is that should improve far more than it complicates. Recently the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has introduced the new AEB standard. While it applies to the U.S., safety standards are essentially copied by Transport Canada and will equally affect the Canadian market.
The following summary is taken from the the introduction of the new standard.
SUMMARY: This final rule adopts a new
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
to require automatic emergency braking
(AEB), including pedestrian AEB
(PAEB), systems on light vehicles. An
AEB system uses various sensor
technologies and sub-systems that work
together to detect when the vehicle is in
a crash imminent situation, to
automatically apply the vehicle brakes if
the driver has not done so, or to apply
more braking force to supplement the
driver’s braking. This final rule specifies
that an AEB system must detect and
react to an imminent crash with both a
lead vehicle or a pedestrian. This final
rule fulfills a mandate under the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL)
directing the Department to promulgate
a rule to require that all passenger
vehicles be equipped with an AEB
system. The purpose of this final rule is
to reduce the number of deaths and
injuries that result from crashes in
which drivers do not apply the brakes
or fail to apply sufficient braking power
to avoid or mitigate a crash, and to
reduce the consequences of such
crashes.
The standard applies to capabilities of avoiding impacts with other motor vehicles and pedestrians. Curiously, nothing appears to be mentioned about avoiding cyclists, although that may exist in the 110-page publication which has not be reviewed in detail at this time.
Another Cyclist Fatality in Toronto That Will Never Be Explained To Those Who Are Being Killed
Once again, we are taken on the same merry-go-round, noting that another cyclist has been killed, but doing nothing about identifying how or why.
News agencies report that a 59-year-old cyclist was killed in Toronto Ontario “on Bayview Avenue at the Don Valley North exit ramp, near the Brick Works” (CP24 News article April 8, 2024). The cyclist was reportedly struck by a 2023 Ford Bronco Sport SUV.
We can note the “very helpful” description of what happened as noted in the police news release: “The two collided causing the cyclist to fall and causing significant injuries”.
It is understandable that collision reconstruction takes time. That is why persons reading such comments believe that, although nothing is known at an early time, it will eventually be unraveled. But the unfortunate reality is that, even though police may unravel what happened, the explanation of what happened will never reach the public that needs to know. And the public has a short memory. Within days the public is bombarded by numerous other news items and the relevance of a cyclist death become irrelevant.
But why does the public need to know? Surely, over the years, it has been understood that how and why collisions occur is only to be known by investigating police and then only known by those to whom the police report the information. Strangely this process has carried on for decades as if it could be an efficient way to improve road safety.
Our view at Gorski Consulting is clear: Anyone who rides a cycle on or near public roads and paths ought to be provided with clear and accurate information about what risks exist that could injure or kill them. At the present time that is not happening.
The evidence is clear, as demonstrated by Dr. Alison Macpherson in her recent research on cyclist collisions in Toronto. Her work showed that police reports of collisions captured only 8% of cyclist visits to hospital emergency departments in Toronto. She also noted that, over a 5-year-period, there were over 30,000 cyclist visits to hospital emergency departments and about 87% of those incidents did not involve a collision with a motor vehicle. Whenever a motor vehicle is not involved police do not have to fill out a report. So this is another reason why vast numbers of cyclist injuries are never made public.
Zameer’s Innocence Raises Sudden Interest In Justice
Apparently you just need an obvious innocence to waken the sleeping public? So now many official entities are questioning why Umar Zameer was charged with first degree murder. Let us roll back the tape…
A collision reportedly occurred in the underground parking garage of Toronto’s City Hall in July of 2021. The collision occurred as plainclothes police officers, including Constable Jeffrey Northrup, approached a parked BMW driven by Umar Zameer, for an unclarified reason. A witness police officer, Constable Tony Correa stated with respect to Constable Northrup’s actions: “His hands hit the hood. He goes up in the air. He bounces off the hood of the car. He lands forward on the floor”. The reported (by CTV news) motions of the BMW in a security video showed “Zameer’s car lurching forward, reversing, and then turning and driving towards the camera position”. The type of contact described by Constable Correa does not appear to be consistent with the lack of vehicle damage as shown in the court exhibit of the BMW shown below.
The reason for Zameer’s actions was that he did not know the persons at his vehicle were plainclothes police officers. He thought they were trying to rob him and so he fled. His vehicle was eventually rammed by another unmarked police vehicle and he was subsequently arrested. It is notable that during that arrest Constable Scharnil Pais punched Zameer in the face.
Toronto Police Chief James Ramer was quoted as saying the incident was “deliberate and intentional” and that the officers were wearing police identification at the time (CTV news). Zameer was charged with first degree murder.
For a long time after this incident no information was allowed to be revealed because there was a ban placed on the publication of evidence. But, in typical fashion, news media quoted various dignitaries, who apparently knew nothing about the details of the incident including Toronto Mayor John Tory, Ontario’s Premier Doug Ford, former Police Chief Bill Blair, and Toronto Police Association President Jon Reid. While they expressed their condolences, none came out to emphasize that they knew very little about the incident and that conclusions should be withheld until further information was known.
It was reported that police were in the parking garage as a result of a reported stabbing. So they were there to “look for evidence”. But it is unclear why the search for evidence resulting in approaching the Zameer BMW to the point that police had to be closeby when Zameer was making his movements out of his parked location. Nor was it clear why police needed to be in plainclothes to collect the evidence about the stabbing. And if the police had worn body camera’s much of the speculation about what occurred might have been nullified.
Zameer’s trial did not commence until March, 2024 or approaching 3 years after the incident.
During the trial prosecutors maintained that “Zameer chose to make a series of manoeuvres with his car that caused Northrup’s death”. Police reportedly banged on Zameer’s window and Zameer drove forward to avoid them. But Zameer’s forward motion was terminated when an unmarked police SUV blocked his path, so he reversed his BMW into the lane before accelerating forward toward the exit. He ran over something that he thought was a speed bump which turned out to be Constable Northrup’s body. Zameer’s perceptions were also affected by his pregnant wife’s stress and his crying son in the back seat.
The testimony from three police officers all provided the same description that Constable Northrup had been standing in front of the BMW and was fully visible to Zameer when he accelerated forward in the laneway. This version was not supported by two experts from the defense and the prosecution who concluded that Northrup was on the ground when he was run over.
Eventually a jury found Zameer innocent of all charges and the judge offered to Zameer “my deepest apologies for what you’ve been through”.
The trial judge raised concerns about the prosecution’s case and even came to the suspicion that the three witness officers who provided their statements colluded to provide a false account of what transpired. Subsequently, Toronto’s Police Chief, Myron Demkiw, announced an independent investigation by the Ontario Provincial Police to shed light on how the prosecution occurred with involvement of the Toronto Police.
Discussion
Some news media are now questioning why a decision was made to prosecute Zameer for first degree murder. Comments made by several local defense lawyers suggested that it should have been clear that the evidence did not support such a charge. Mr. Zameer’s lawyer, Nader Hasan, expressed his belief that the prosecutors in the case were pressured by their superiors to follow through with the charges.
One defense lawyer was quoted in a Canadian Press article as saying “They’re trying to turn something that isn’t a murder into a murder”. The same lawyer also said “The premier of Ontario was putting his thumb on the scales of justice and infecting the public’s views about how they should view this man”. This comment was made in relation to Premier Doug Ford’s criticism of the decision in the fall of 2021 to release Zameer on bail.
The results of the Zameer trial have spurred a renewed interest in Ontario’s justice system and justice as a whole. While there has been previous discussion about the ideals of being innocent until proven guilty, the practical reality is that in many instances that ideal is not met. The Zameer case demonstrates that you may be in jeopardy of being found guilty due to pressure exerted from certain interest groups or persons of high influence. When someone dies, someone has to pay, and a scapegoat continues to be found even when the evidence does not support the charge.
Premier Doug Ford has shown a continued lack of respect for the justice system by interjecting his will to influence it at inappropriate instances. In can be recalled from the past that he tried to appoint one of his friends into the position of OPP Commissioner even though other candidates were more qualified. He also talked about appointing “like-minded judges” who would prevent persons from being released on bail, seemingly ignoring the facts surrounding any specific case. Problems in the justice system grow roots from the top down so that, when the Premier is not an ethical person, he surrounds himself with persons of similar calibre and this process filters through to the rest of the system.
Respectable members of the justice system cannot function properly when they become accountable to persons who are unethical and corrupt. There is evidence of this dysfunction in all levels and areas of Ontario’s justice system. Inappropriate behavior becomes acceptable and condoned when the upper echelons of the justice system are themselves part of the inappropriate behavior. The possibility of collusion by three witness police officers in the Zameer trial, is an example which suggests that this inappropriate behaviour was not kept in check by those whose responsibility it was to provide that oversight. And the first degree murder charge against Zameer is another example of the inappropriate action of the justice system. It still has not been resolved who was actually responsible for applying the pressure to lay that charge.
McNorgan Found Guilty Without Full Discussion Of Issues
Why a 2017 Honda CRV accelerated through an intersection and struck a group of children was the basis for a trial of its driver, Petronella McNorgan. The fatal collision occurred on November 30, 2021 on Riverside Drive in London, Ontario. The trial heard from prosecution experts that McNorgan did not press on the brake, like she claimed, but that she was pressing on the accelerator pedal, as supported by a download from the vehicle’s event data recorder and summarized in a Crash Data Retrieval (CDR) report that was entered as evidence. News media reported that on December 13, 2021 the vehicle was inspected by “Transport Canada inspectors, police and a Honda Canada mechanic”.
The prosecution conclusion, as summarized by Constable Blair Jackson, was that “the evidence collected throughout the investigation revealed that the subject motor vehicle was in good mechanical condition, and that the brake system specifically, was in good working order and this was a preventable collision due to driver input”. Strangely, it was reported that McNorgan had been licensed to drive since 1967, or about 54 years when the collision occurred, yet there was no discussion whether, in all those years, she had ever mistook her accelerator pedal as the brake pedal.
The events unfolded on November 30, 2021 when McNorgan was westbound along the downslope of Riverside Drive and approaching the busy intersection with Wonderland Road. Two vehicles were reportedly ahead of her, presumably stopped at the Wonderland intersection. As she applied her brake she reported that the vehicle began to accelerate. It was reported that her Honda struck a Jeep but this was a glancing blow as police believed that such an impact would not trigger the vehicle’s event data recorder to start recording. After this glancing impact the Honda travelled at high speed onto the north roadside of Riverside Drive where it struck a lamp standard with its front end. Following this the Honda continued to travel onto the north sidewalk where it struck a group of children, killing one of them. Following this the Honda travelled in an arcing fashion back onto Riverside, crossing it, and entering the south roadside where it came to a stop.
The progress of the trial in early 2024 was reported by local news media. On March 27th the news media reported that the prosecution was finished with their evidence and that the Judge in the case would ask the defense whether they would call any evidence. On the following day news media described McNorgan’s testimony and she stood fast with her belief that she tried to apply her brake yet her vehicle accelerated. The news media did not indicate that there was any testimony provided by an expert witness for the defense.
The possibility that there was no expert witness for the defense that provided any countering comments to the prosecution’s experts is disturbing. Since the CDR report was never released for viewing by the public important questions about its content can never be answered.
Some questions that needed to be answered include the following.
Was a non-deployment file activated when the Honda struck the Jeep at the Wonderland Road intersection? If a non-deployment file was not created why did the stability control system activated so that it caused the Honda to reduce its speed by about 20 km/h even through the accelerator pedal was presumably pressed to the floor?
What was the status of the rest of the data contained in the CDR report?
Did Defense experts examine the vehicle and conduct their own download of the Honda’s event data recorder?
What did the court know about the details of Honda vehicle control networks and whether any of those could have failed?
Answers to questions like these are unlikely to be provided.
The content of Crash Data Reports is trusted essentially by everyone who examines them. Analysts of such reports regularly discuss various details and problems in internet chat groups. The accuracy and reliability of these reports is safeguarded by government legislation which instructs manufacturers what they must do in terms of providing collision data. As of the year 2013 manufacturers were instructed that, if their vehicles contained the ability to record collision data, such data must be made available to their parties and there must be a list of mandatory data that must be included in any report. The belief is that, those requirements are sufficient to guarantee the trustworthiness of these reports. One difficulty is that no one can be absolutely certain that motor vehicles are functioning safely except through examining the content of these reports. As the functioning of motor vehicles becomes more complex, so are the systems. The details of electronics, software and complex vehicle designs are proprietary information that is only available to the manufacturers for competitive reasons. Only a small part of this information is available through analysis of Crash Data Reports. Given the mandatory parameters that must be reported government officials believe that safety problems can be reliably uncovered. But there is no absolute certainty in that belief.
A review of past instances where motor vehicle manufacturers hid safety related problems likely never reached the jury in the present trial.
For example, it was not that long ago that a driver who was convicted of “criminally negligent homicide” was set free and the conviction was overturned because new evidence revealed that a motor vehicle manufacturer hid crucial information about sudden unintended acceleration in its vehicles. How quickly we forget that in August, 2015, Koau Fong Lee, was sentenced to eight years in prison, and was in prison for two-and-a-half years, before it became known that Toyota failed to reveal certain causes of sudden acceleration of which they were aware. The tragic collision occurred when Lee’s 1996 Camry suddenly sped up and he could not gain control it until he crashed into an Oldsmobile occupied by two adults who were killed and a six-year-old girl who became quadriplegic.
Here are some examples of past misdeeds by motor vehicle manufacturers where safety related problems were hidden for many years.
Toyota Sudden Acceleration
In a U.S. Justice Department report the following summary was provided about the Toyota sudden acceleration defect:
In the fall of 2009, TOYOTA deceived consumers and its U.S. regulator, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), by claiming that it had “addressed” the “root cause” of unintended acceleration in its vehicles through a limited safety recall of eight models for floor-mat entrapment, a dangerous condition in which an improperly secured or incompatible all-weather floor mat can “trap” a depressed gas pedal causing the car to accelerate to a high speed. Such public assurances deceived customers and NHTSA in two ways: First, at the time the statements were made, TOYOTA knew that it had not recalled some cars with design features that made them just as susceptible to floor-mat entrapment as some of the recalled cars. Second, only weeks before these statements were made, TOYOTA had taken steps to hide from NHTSA another type of unintended acceleration in its vehicles, separate and apart from floor-mat entrapment: a problem with accelerators getting stuck at partially depressed levels, known as “sticky pedal.”
General Motors Ignition Switches
Ignition switches installed in certain General Motors vehicles led to them being shut off while vehicles were in motion. Such an occurrence would prevent activation of air bags in a crash. The problem existed for many years until a local and independent mechanic uncovered that a spring in the ignition switches was too short. It was further uncovered that a General Motors engineer was aware of this defect but hid it. At last count, in the years around 2016, well over 400 deaths were accepted by GM as related to the defect although the final number has never been revealed.
Takata Air Bags
In February, 0217 Takata pled guilty to charges that it concealed a defect in its air bags that caused them to explode because of the chemical in the inflators did not function properly when exposed to prolonged heat and humidity. Meanwhile plaintiffs in other lawsuits claimed that other manufacturers such as Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Ford and BMW had independent knowledge of the Takata defect.
Discussion
It was the opinion of the prosecution experts in the McNorgan trial that two seconds prior to the impact with the lamp standard the vehicle’s stability control system was activated. This caused the Honda to slow down from 121 km/h to 102 km/h at the instant of impact with the lamp standard. Yet they also stated that the accelerator pedal was pressed down 99% throughout the 5 second time before the impact. This is a demonstration of how the systems in the Honda took over and changed the speed of the Honda despite the driver’s actions. It is assumed that the experts did not believe that a similar control could have taken place if McNorgan applied the brake but that somehow the Honda systems caused it to accelerate. This belief would likely come from the CDR report that showed that the brake pedal was not depressed. Yet braking of the Honda had to have occurred because its speed was reduced on approach to the lamp standard impact.
The question remains, what should the brake pedal data look like when the Honda’s stability control system was braking the vehicle? Mechanically, if there is a physical connection between the brake pedal and the brake fluid, the brake pedal increases the pressure in the brake fluid and this pressure travels to the brake calipers which collapse around the wheels’ rotors and thus the vehicle slows down. But it appears that the stability control system had priority over the brakes. The systems engineered into the Honda were such that it was more important to “stabilize” the vehicle rather than allow maximum braking. The word stability is somewhat of a misnomer because what is really happening is that the systems are controlling the rotation of the wheels to achieve the goal of pointing the vehicle in the direction that it is travelling. During this process a substantial amount of tire force must be taken up that might otherwise be available for steering, full-wheel braking or acceleration. While some tire force may remain to steer the vehicle for example, it is not the full tire force that would be available if the stability control system was not engaged. In this sense, there remains some ability to steer a vehicle away from danger but that ability is compromised.
The goal in pointing the vehicle in the direction it is travelling is to prepare the vehicle for any impact that might occur. It is understood that a vehicle striking something with its front end is safer to the occupants than if the impact occurs to the side. So in most instances the logic makes sense. But in some instances the result is not as favourable.
In the present case, after the Honda made a glancing contact with the Jeep it most likely entered into a rotation that needed to be countered and that is why the stability control system was activated. The safety systems imbedded in the Honda likely determined that the most important matter was to stop the rotation. In fact, if the rotation was allowed to continue the Honda might have entered into a sideways slide, or a further spin during which a greater level of deceleration might be achieved than what the stability control system was needing to stop the rotation.
Granted, there was some danger to McNorgan if the Honda began sliding sideways because it is possible that it might approach the lamp standard while leading with its driver’s side. If the lamp standard contact was directly to the driver’s door there could be a substantial danger that might be mitigated somewhat by deployment of a side air bag. But such a direct contact would have to be precisely where the driver is seated to pose a substantial danger.
The further advantage of allowing the Honda’s rotation is that, if McNorgan was indeed pressing on the accelerator pedal there is a reasonable chance that her foot might slip off the pedal due to the rotation. And if the Honda struck the lamp standard with its driver’s side there would be an even greater opportunity to force McNorgan’s foot off the accelerator pedal.
It also becomes important to study what might have happened after the Honda struck the lamp standard. Was the stability control system active after that impact? There is reason to believe that this was the case because of the manner in which the Honda continued to straighten its rotation as shown in the tire mark evidence. The two photos below show the Honda’s tire marks on the north roadside and after it crossed the road onto the south roadside. In the first photo there is evidence that the Honda is in a counter-clockwise rotation (“yaw”) but the convergence of the tire marks indicates that it is straightening out. And by the time the Honda reaches the other side of the road there are only two tire marks so it has now fully straightened out and is pointing in the direction it is travelling. Such a successful straightening of the vehicle’s pointing direction is indicative of the action of the stability control system.
So one can conclude that the stability control system was active from 2 seconds before the impact with the lamp standard and throughout the Honda’s travel after that impact.
The jury at trial should have been instructed about the complexity of modern vehicle control systems and what systems were installed in the version of the Honda CRV driven by McNorgan.
Some CRVs are equipped with a Forward Collision Warning (FCW) system. As described by Honda the system is “designed to detect the presence of vehicles in front of you and issues alerts if you’re approaching with too much speed. If you fail to respond to the alerts, the SMBS is triggered”. The Collision Mitigation Braking System (SMBS) is described by Honda as follows: “To help reduce the likelihood or severity of a frontal impact, the available CMBS is engineered to apply brake pressure if you don’t slow down when it senses you’re at risk of a collision. If it still senses an imminent collision, the SMBS is designed to brake firmly”.
So was there any discussion at trial whether the above systems were installed in McNorgan’s Honda? And if the CMBS was installed why did it not apply braking when the Honda made initial contact with the Jeep? Such automatic braking could have prevented the remaining tragedies from occurring.
A number of questions still exist with respect to what occurred at McNorgan’s trial. Unfortunately news media did not provide enough detail to answer these questions.
In incidents like these many persons question why a driver would not gear down or turn off the ignition. Such arm-chair quarterbacking never appreciates how drivers can become confused about what is happening and then must fight with avoiding immediate dangers that are occurring in very rapid succession. Never-the-less good driver training should emphasize to drivers the need to become familiar and practice methods of slowing a vehicle by gearing down or turning off the ignition.
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